Countering violent extremism
What we need is an anti-extremism campaign, which cannot be waged without the development of an anti-extremism ethic.
Eight years ago, in an article called Developing a Philosophy of Counterterrorism published in the Muslim Public Affairs Journal, I argued: “Most Muslims, despite having a negative view of those who carry out terrorist acts in the name of religion, are unwilling to actively oppose such militant elements within their midst.” The results of the new Pew survey on Muslim attitudes towards extremism released recently show that my assertion continues to hold true — at the very least in Pakistan. Though quite encouraging, we should not take too much comfort in the fact that 66 per cent of Pakistanis are concerned about religious extremism and 59 per cent see the Taliban in an unfavourable light.
Far more significant is that 33 per cent don’t have an opinion on the matter while another eight per cent hold a favourable view towards the militants. Not only do these figures underscore why terrorism has flourished in the country, but also the scale of the challenge that the country faces. The various militant outfits that have been waging a vicious war against the state and the nation for nearly a decade have been able to do so in a social environment conducive to their ambitions.
At a basic level, militants need support from a significant cross section of the population. Eight per cent means a whopping 15 million (assuming that the national population next year will be reaching 190 million). No wonder the TTP et al have been acting with impunity.
But let us also factor into this equation the 33 per cent who do not have an opinion about the medievalist insurrectionists. We are talking a little under 63 million people, who may or may not support the militants but they are also not supportive of the struggle against them. Militants are able to exploit this significant minority to their advantage by leveraging the lack of clarity within this group of people.
Of course, Operation Zarb-e-Azb is now in full swing and it is going to be much more than simply denying the terrorists a sanctuary in the country’s last major militant bastion in North Waziristan. But counter-insurgency offensives and counter-terrorism initiatives alone can only neutralise the war-making capabilities of the militants and many times temporarily. Even deradicalisation is not sufficient and for two separate reasons.
First, deradicalisation largely is about getting combatants to abandon armed struggle, which is not the same as purging them from radical ideas. There are many former militants who have renounced violence as a means towards a political end but they have not given up their radical ideas. Second, deradicalisation is about bringing those back into the mainstream who have already been contaminated by extremism.
In other words, we are talking about reactive measures, which will not be enough to win this war. The need is to go on the offence and here I mean ideologically (in addition to militarily). What we need is an anti-extremism campaign, which in turn cannot be waged without the development of an anti-extremism ethic at the national level. This is why some 33 per cent of the population, having an ambivalent attitude towards the Taliban, is far more significant of a statistic than the 59 per cent. The Taliban can wreak havoc even with the support of a minority of people, but Pakistan cannot fight them back effectively without constructing the appropriate social norms.
Long after Operation Zarb-e-Azb has achieved its objectives, the Pakistani nation will still be dealing with the challenge of countering violent extremism. And an end to this cannot be accomplished without a national consensus on a discourse that can successfully combat the extremist narrative. Counter-extremism is thus the most critical building block of a prosperous Pakistan that we can leave behind for the coming generations.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 11th, 2014.
Far more significant is that 33 per cent don’t have an opinion on the matter while another eight per cent hold a favourable view towards the militants. Not only do these figures underscore why terrorism has flourished in the country, but also the scale of the challenge that the country faces. The various militant outfits that have been waging a vicious war against the state and the nation for nearly a decade have been able to do so in a social environment conducive to their ambitions.
At a basic level, militants need support from a significant cross section of the population. Eight per cent means a whopping 15 million (assuming that the national population next year will be reaching 190 million). No wonder the TTP et al have been acting with impunity.
But let us also factor into this equation the 33 per cent who do not have an opinion about the medievalist insurrectionists. We are talking a little under 63 million people, who may or may not support the militants but they are also not supportive of the struggle against them. Militants are able to exploit this significant minority to their advantage by leveraging the lack of clarity within this group of people.
Of course, Operation Zarb-e-Azb is now in full swing and it is going to be much more than simply denying the terrorists a sanctuary in the country’s last major militant bastion in North Waziristan. But counter-insurgency offensives and counter-terrorism initiatives alone can only neutralise the war-making capabilities of the militants and many times temporarily. Even deradicalisation is not sufficient and for two separate reasons.
First, deradicalisation largely is about getting combatants to abandon armed struggle, which is not the same as purging them from radical ideas. There are many former militants who have renounced violence as a means towards a political end but they have not given up their radical ideas. Second, deradicalisation is about bringing those back into the mainstream who have already been contaminated by extremism.
In other words, we are talking about reactive measures, which will not be enough to win this war. The need is to go on the offence and here I mean ideologically (in addition to militarily). What we need is an anti-extremism campaign, which in turn cannot be waged without the development of an anti-extremism ethic at the national level. This is why some 33 per cent of the population, having an ambivalent attitude towards the Taliban, is far more significant of a statistic than the 59 per cent. The Taliban can wreak havoc even with the support of a minority of people, but Pakistan cannot fight them back effectively without constructing the appropriate social norms.
Long after Operation Zarb-e-Azb has achieved its objectives, the Pakistani nation will still be dealing with the challenge of countering violent extremism. And an end to this cannot be accomplished without a national consensus on a discourse that can successfully combat the extremist narrative. Counter-extremism is thus the most critical building block of a prosperous Pakistan that we can leave behind for the coming generations.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 11th, 2014.