Enter, Ashraf Ghani
Ghani’s ascendancy will not change geo-strategic picture of Afghanistan, not take it closer to a negotiated settlement
Dr Ashraf Ghani has been declared winner in the preliminary results announced by Afghanistan’s Independent Election commission after the second round of polls, which was held on June 14. As expected, his rival, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, has refused to accept the outcome, citing widespread malpractices that were allegedly committed by the government machinery in favour of Ashraf Ghani.
Allegations of rigging in a country that does not have a long tradition of people casting their ballots in support of a candidate they favour are not new. Nor would such claims of abuses translate into a people’s movement that would pose a huge challenge to the new president. And then there are counter-claims of electoral fraud by the opposite camp against Dr Abdullah — particularly in areas where the Tajiks are in clear majority.
But as so often in the past 12 years, the Americans would come into action — this time to ‘pressure‘ Abdullah to come to terms with the ‘ground realities‘ and work closely with Ghani to ‘consolidate the democratic transition‘ and help the new president launch the country on a trajectory of peace and stability’ as foreign forces draw down.
What does Ashraf Ghani — the urbane former World Bank official — offer to a people who have endured unspeakable pain and suffering over the past 30-plus years of conflict? His strength lies in his reputation for sustained hard work. His specialty lies in the realm of economic management. He hails from one of the biggest Pakhtun tribes — Ahmadzai. He is relied upon by the Americans, although they have deep suspicions about his capacity to deliver, partly because of his mercurial temperament as well as his physical limitations having gone through long bouts of illness in the past.
Ghani’s ability to deliver, however, would not solely be judged by his endeavours to continue to receive massive funding for the country’s security forces as well as for running the administration; although, that by itself, would be an uphill task. The country generates less than $2 billion a year in domestic revenue; it has to spend $5 billion annually to fund its security forces; it needs an additional two to three billion dollars for the administration and development. Unemployment is as high as 40 per cent; Afghanistan is also the largest opium producer — poppy sown in more than 125,000 hectares of land that produces more than 6,000 tons of opium. The number of drug users in the country is constantly rising.
The new president would hopefully do well in dealing with most of these issues since he has a vast administrative experience, both inside and outside Afghanistan. But the critical issue that confronts the country and its leaders is the ongoing insurgency. It is here that Ghani would feel handicapped because it falls outside his known areas of expertise. It is in dealing with that most intractable problem that his severe limitations would be exposed. Not only has he very limited expertise in dealing with an insurgency, he also has to acquiesce to a policy that has been formulated thousands of miles away with scant regard to the damage and losses it causes.
Peace talks with the resistance will not materialise any time soon. The resistance continues to insist that it will not talk or engage with any authority as long as foreign forces are stationed in the country. It also refuses to recognise the Afghan Constitution and the legality of any institutions, including Parliament, because in their view, these institutions were created while the country was ‘under foreign occupation’. It would be extremely difficult for a professional civil servant bring militants into the mainstream, and neither would Ghani’s tribe be of much help to him — for two reason: firstly because he does not have any real, solid roots in his tribe. He has never lived among them because he has been away. He returned to Afghanistan after a long absence in 2001 following the US invasion. Secondly, his tribe have already taken a position — some opposing the resistance, while a large majority either actively supporting them or prefers to be on the sidelines. The Pakhtuns voted for Ghani for the simple reason: they did not want to vote for a Panjsheri Tajik.
A great majority of people in Afghanistan would not make any real distinction between Abdullah and Ghani. Both don’t connect with the people; both are the product of an Afghanistan which was created out of an external military intervention; both are principal beneficiaries of a system the Americans brought to the country ; both have served long stints as ministers in Karzai’s government, and both have declared their resolve to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement with the US as soon as they assume charge.
The change of presidents would not bring any fundamental shift in policy either when dealing with the resistance or in handling the myriad challenges the country faces. Whether the attrition rate would jump to, say 20 or 25 per cent, (currently it is 10 per cent) remains to be seen. The resistance itself faces many problems — of local leadership, resources and clear objectives. But if the security forces come under strain and the rate of desertions increases, there will be a danger of the security infrastructure disintegrating. That will undermine whatever has been accomplished by way of ‘development’ in the last 12 years. Any dramatic increase in the rate of defections would have a snowballing effect on several other vital sectors, which could gravely destablise the country.
The Americans are not withdrawing completely. A force of 10,000 would stay behind to take part in counter-insurgency operations up until at least 2016. But they have another resource: the contractor’s security forces that number about 60,000. Of these, about 26,000 are civilians and the rest ex-military. When and how would they leave or what duties they will perform when the regular US forces leave has not been clarified.
Relations with Pakistan will likely improve in the immediate aftermath of Ghani’s presidency because he would attempt to portray himself as a shrewder politician. He will make some moves to earn the support of the country’s neighbours, like Iran, China, the three Central Asian countries and, of course, Pakistan, as well as regional countries like Turkey and India. The Americans will goad him to improve ties with Pakistan because the bulk of the US/Nato hardware will be transported out of the country via Pakistani territory. But issues like cross-border attacks, infiltrations, militant safe havens, etc. would soon sink in and interrupt the thawing of relations.
Ashraf Ghani’s ascendancy to power would not change the geo-strategic picture of the country and would not take the country any closer to a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the region cannot remain unaffected by the rapidly changing convulsive events that are unfolding in the Middle East. How, and to what extent, would the events and developments of the Middle East impinge on the evolving situation in Afghanistan could the be subject for another article.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 9th, 2014.
Allegations of rigging in a country that does not have a long tradition of people casting their ballots in support of a candidate they favour are not new. Nor would such claims of abuses translate into a people’s movement that would pose a huge challenge to the new president. And then there are counter-claims of electoral fraud by the opposite camp against Dr Abdullah — particularly in areas where the Tajiks are in clear majority.
But as so often in the past 12 years, the Americans would come into action — this time to ‘pressure‘ Abdullah to come to terms with the ‘ground realities‘ and work closely with Ghani to ‘consolidate the democratic transition‘ and help the new president launch the country on a trajectory of peace and stability’ as foreign forces draw down.
What does Ashraf Ghani — the urbane former World Bank official — offer to a people who have endured unspeakable pain and suffering over the past 30-plus years of conflict? His strength lies in his reputation for sustained hard work. His specialty lies in the realm of economic management. He hails from one of the biggest Pakhtun tribes — Ahmadzai. He is relied upon by the Americans, although they have deep suspicions about his capacity to deliver, partly because of his mercurial temperament as well as his physical limitations having gone through long bouts of illness in the past.
Ghani’s ability to deliver, however, would not solely be judged by his endeavours to continue to receive massive funding for the country’s security forces as well as for running the administration; although, that by itself, would be an uphill task. The country generates less than $2 billion a year in domestic revenue; it has to spend $5 billion annually to fund its security forces; it needs an additional two to three billion dollars for the administration and development. Unemployment is as high as 40 per cent; Afghanistan is also the largest opium producer — poppy sown in more than 125,000 hectares of land that produces more than 6,000 tons of opium. The number of drug users in the country is constantly rising.
The new president would hopefully do well in dealing with most of these issues since he has a vast administrative experience, both inside and outside Afghanistan. But the critical issue that confronts the country and its leaders is the ongoing insurgency. It is here that Ghani would feel handicapped because it falls outside his known areas of expertise. It is in dealing with that most intractable problem that his severe limitations would be exposed. Not only has he very limited expertise in dealing with an insurgency, he also has to acquiesce to a policy that has been formulated thousands of miles away with scant regard to the damage and losses it causes.
Peace talks with the resistance will not materialise any time soon. The resistance continues to insist that it will not talk or engage with any authority as long as foreign forces are stationed in the country. It also refuses to recognise the Afghan Constitution and the legality of any institutions, including Parliament, because in their view, these institutions were created while the country was ‘under foreign occupation’. It would be extremely difficult for a professional civil servant bring militants into the mainstream, and neither would Ghani’s tribe be of much help to him — for two reason: firstly because he does not have any real, solid roots in his tribe. He has never lived among them because he has been away. He returned to Afghanistan after a long absence in 2001 following the US invasion. Secondly, his tribe have already taken a position — some opposing the resistance, while a large majority either actively supporting them or prefers to be on the sidelines. The Pakhtuns voted for Ghani for the simple reason: they did not want to vote for a Panjsheri Tajik.
A great majority of people in Afghanistan would not make any real distinction between Abdullah and Ghani. Both don’t connect with the people; both are the product of an Afghanistan which was created out of an external military intervention; both are principal beneficiaries of a system the Americans brought to the country ; both have served long stints as ministers in Karzai’s government, and both have declared their resolve to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement with the US as soon as they assume charge.
The change of presidents would not bring any fundamental shift in policy either when dealing with the resistance or in handling the myriad challenges the country faces. Whether the attrition rate would jump to, say 20 or 25 per cent, (currently it is 10 per cent) remains to be seen. The resistance itself faces many problems — of local leadership, resources and clear objectives. But if the security forces come under strain and the rate of desertions increases, there will be a danger of the security infrastructure disintegrating. That will undermine whatever has been accomplished by way of ‘development’ in the last 12 years. Any dramatic increase in the rate of defections would have a snowballing effect on several other vital sectors, which could gravely destablise the country.
The Americans are not withdrawing completely. A force of 10,000 would stay behind to take part in counter-insurgency operations up until at least 2016. But they have another resource: the contractor’s security forces that number about 60,000. Of these, about 26,000 are civilians and the rest ex-military. When and how would they leave or what duties they will perform when the regular US forces leave has not been clarified.
Relations with Pakistan will likely improve in the immediate aftermath of Ghani’s presidency because he would attempt to portray himself as a shrewder politician. He will make some moves to earn the support of the country’s neighbours, like Iran, China, the three Central Asian countries and, of course, Pakistan, as well as regional countries like Turkey and India. The Americans will goad him to improve ties with Pakistan because the bulk of the US/Nato hardware will be transported out of the country via Pakistani territory. But issues like cross-border attacks, infiltrations, militant safe havens, etc. would soon sink in and interrupt the thawing of relations.
Ashraf Ghani’s ascendancy to power would not change the geo-strategic picture of the country and would not take the country any closer to a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the region cannot remain unaffected by the rapidly changing convulsive events that are unfolding in the Middle East. How, and to what extent, would the events and developments of the Middle East impinge on the evolving situation in Afghanistan could the be subject for another article.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 9th, 2014.