Spilling the beans
If decisions are as personal as interview makes it sound, then it is important to increase the level of accountability
A latest interview of the former DG ISPR to the BBC seems to have turned the general into an instant celebrity. He spilt sufficient beans for people to pick up and introspect for at least a couple of days. In the absence of any other ‘breaking news’ material, this certainly filled the appetite of television channels. Given that the Tahirul Qadri drama is pretty much over and the operation in North Waziristan is on its way with little information coming out except for the military reported body count, Major General (retd) Athar Abbas’s revelations made the day.
It would still be interesting to find out why the general found it appropriate to spill the beans now and not earlier. It is not as if the official secrecy act that binds former bureaucrats to silence for at least a certain period had lapsed. He has been out of service for less than two years. There are many questions that come to mind such as, was the story that General (retd) Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was not ready to launch an operation, told to make the current top management look good in comparison with the former army chief? Or did it simply indicate an ongoing tension between the two former generals, Musharraf and Kayani, whose allies are engaged in mud-slinging to make their side look better? Or is it to make the world believe in the new theory, which is being actively expounded by some in military circles, that there is a fundamental shift in military thinking regarding militancy and Talibanisation of the country? There is a lot more stuck between the lines in that BBC interview than meets the eye.
We now know that military matters are totally controlled by the generals, with little regard for the civilian leadership. According to the former DG ISPR, a decision was taken in 2010 by the government to launch an operation in 2011. But then General (retd) Kayani balked. Although Major General (retd) Abbas claims that this was partly due to American pressure, he did also in passing mentioned the Haqqani Network. We can assume from this information what we knew all along that the former army chief was worried about his inability to secure a friendly neighbourhood after the 2014 withdrawal without the help of the Haqqani Network. This is a modified version of the concept of ‘strategic depth’, which is not about a territory where the Pakistan military can withdraw and regroup if under an attack by India. This is about a neighbouring country that would either help Pakistan in its war efforts or remain silent and not add to the military’s aggravation at the time of conflict. Has the concept been abandoned now as we may wonder after the above-mentioned BBC interview? The answer is, not entirely, as the North Waziristan operation continues to not target the Haqqani network or various other forms of militants.
Latest reports from Bannu suggest that militant and religious outfits like the JuD, the JI and the JeM dominate welfare activities in the area. The services provided thus, will pave the way for recruitment of more jihadis from amongst the IDPs or build greater sympathy for these outfits amongst the displaced people. This is not an ethnic issue — the IDPs are physically, psychologically and emotionally vulnerable, which makes them easy targets for exploitation. Intriguingly, non-religious NGOs are finding it comparatively difficult to set up base. This pattern certainly does not indicate a reversal of the ‘strategic depth’ policy. Thus, it may be criticised by a few military commentators, but not abandoned as a dominant strategic framework that depends on building a partnership with private warriors to pursue the goals of the state. We are still confused about where we are headed and what will be the fate of hundreds of soldiers deployed in the battle.
But in case we are actually viewing a reversal of policy, then it would be imperative for the government to debate the new direction. What will be Pakistan’s options in case of not hedging bets on the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban or not using Pakistan-based jihadis in Afghanistan? Who will be Pakistan’s possible new partners and how will they protect Pakistan’s interests? If a decision has been taken to accept the democratic process in Afghanistan, then which players will ensure that the anxiety average Afghans feel towards Pakistan does not hurt Islamabad’s interests? For a long time, Rawalpindi’s Afghan policy was tied with its India policy. The generals are concerned about not having dependable partners who will protect them against Indian influence in Kabul. The question is that has this perception changed because the perception on this count will determine in which basket Pakistan lay its eggs? A fundamental shift in policy on Afghanistan will have serious repercussions for Pakistan’s relations on both the western and eastern borders. In fact, a shift does not become fundamental unless we take into view the overall national strategic framework.
Referring to the interview, it certainly is a lesson about institutional culture in the army and its inherent weaknesses. A decision in 2010 not only indicates an agreement by the civilian government, but also by the military. This means that the armed forces made an assessment about the costs and benefits of such a venture. Other sources even claim that the then DG ISI had updated General (retd) Kayani about ways of containing repercussions in Punjab where a lot of militants are holed up. Yet, it seems that one man at the top decided for inaction.
The most important lesson, however, is the need for institutionalising accountability in military decision-making. If decisions are as personal as the interview makes it sound, then it is important that we increase the level of accountability of the institution at least to Parliament. This also means that the political class would also have to prepare for a more intelligent engagement with the defence services. Technologically modern militaries are politically very tricky. To harness them requires building institutional capacity that we lack today.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 3rd, 2014.
It would still be interesting to find out why the general found it appropriate to spill the beans now and not earlier. It is not as if the official secrecy act that binds former bureaucrats to silence for at least a certain period had lapsed. He has been out of service for less than two years. There are many questions that come to mind such as, was the story that General (retd) Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was not ready to launch an operation, told to make the current top management look good in comparison with the former army chief? Or did it simply indicate an ongoing tension between the two former generals, Musharraf and Kayani, whose allies are engaged in mud-slinging to make their side look better? Or is it to make the world believe in the new theory, which is being actively expounded by some in military circles, that there is a fundamental shift in military thinking regarding militancy and Talibanisation of the country? There is a lot more stuck between the lines in that BBC interview than meets the eye.
We now know that military matters are totally controlled by the generals, with little regard for the civilian leadership. According to the former DG ISPR, a decision was taken in 2010 by the government to launch an operation in 2011. But then General (retd) Kayani balked. Although Major General (retd) Abbas claims that this was partly due to American pressure, he did also in passing mentioned the Haqqani Network. We can assume from this information what we knew all along that the former army chief was worried about his inability to secure a friendly neighbourhood after the 2014 withdrawal without the help of the Haqqani Network. This is a modified version of the concept of ‘strategic depth’, which is not about a territory where the Pakistan military can withdraw and regroup if under an attack by India. This is about a neighbouring country that would either help Pakistan in its war efforts or remain silent and not add to the military’s aggravation at the time of conflict. Has the concept been abandoned now as we may wonder after the above-mentioned BBC interview? The answer is, not entirely, as the North Waziristan operation continues to not target the Haqqani network or various other forms of militants.
Latest reports from Bannu suggest that militant and religious outfits like the JuD, the JI and the JeM dominate welfare activities in the area. The services provided thus, will pave the way for recruitment of more jihadis from amongst the IDPs or build greater sympathy for these outfits amongst the displaced people. This is not an ethnic issue — the IDPs are physically, psychologically and emotionally vulnerable, which makes them easy targets for exploitation. Intriguingly, non-religious NGOs are finding it comparatively difficult to set up base. This pattern certainly does not indicate a reversal of the ‘strategic depth’ policy. Thus, it may be criticised by a few military commentators, but not abandoned as a dominant strategic framework that depends on building a partnership with private warriors to pursue the goals of the state. We are still confused about where we are headed and what will be the fate of hundreds of soldiers deployed in the battle.
But in case we are actually viewing a reversal of policy, then it would be imperative for the government to debate the new direction. What will be Pakistan’s options in case of not hedging bets on the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban or not using Pakistan-based jihadis in Afghanistan? Who will be Pakistan’s possible new partners and how will they protect Pakistan’s interests? If a decision has been taken to accept the democratic process in Afghanistan, then which players will ensure that the anxiety average Afghans feel towards Pakistan does not hurt Islamabad’s interests? For a long time, Rawalpindi’s Afghan policy was tied with its India policy. The generals are concerned about not having dependable partners who will protect them against Indian influence in Kabul. The question is that has this perception changed because the perception on this count will determine in which basket Pakistan lay its eggs? A fundamental shift in policy on Afghanistan will have serious repercussions for Pakistan’s relations on both the western and eastern borders. In fact, a shift does not become fundamental unless we take into view the overall national strategic framework.
Referring to the interview, it certainly is a lesson about institutional culture in the army and its inherent weaknesses. A decision in 2010 not only indicates an agreement by the civilian government, but also by the military. This means that the armed forces made an assessment about the costs and benefits of such a venture. Other sources even claim that the then DG ISI had updated General (retd) Kayani about ways of containing repercussions in Punjab where a lot of militants are holed up. Yet, it seems that one man at the top decided for inaction.
The most important lesson, however, is the need for institutionalising accountability in military decision-making. If decisions are as personal as the interview makes it sound, then it is important that we increase the level of accountability of the institution at least to Parliament. This also means that the political class would also have to prepare for a more intelligent engagement with the defence services. Technologically modern militaries are politically very tricky. To harness them requires building institutional capacity that we lack today.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 3rd, 2014.