Finally taking the plunge
For a durable and sustainable peace, the threat of militancy and militants has to be overcome.
The writer has served as ambassador to Afghanistan and chief secretary of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. He represented the Government of Pakistan in talks with the TTP
The government has finally taken the plunge and the military has launched a full-scale operation in North Waziristan Agency of the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan. The major ground offensive was preceded, as usual, by aerial bombing via jet aircraft on suspected positions of militants — both local and foreign. In the bombing raids, scores of people have been killed and wounded. Authorities have claimed that all those killed were either foreign or local militants.
The operation appears to be a direct consequence of the attack on Karachi airport that happened just a few days ago. Quite understandably, no government could ignore a threat to its vital installations. And since the attackers had proven links to their bases or hideouts in the tribal area of North Waziristan, no government could look the other way.
As a matter of fact, the Karachi airport attack may define Pakistan’s approach to the menace of terrorism for many months to come. But an important question is whether the Karachi attacks or the one near Fateh Jang could have been avoided had negotiations between the government and the TTP made progress. Were the negotiations doomed to fail and were they an exercise in futility? Not quite. The negotiators never got down to discussing contentious issues like the release of prisoners, disposal of foreign militants, amnesty and gradual withdrawal of security forces. They were only talking of trust-building, ceasefire and the symbolic release of some prisoners.
After a marathon session of negotiations lasting seven hours on March 26, at a location on the border of North Waziristan and the Orakzai tribal area, there was an agreement in principle to begin the release of non-combatants held by the government. It was expected that the TTP would reciprocate by releasing some high-profile prisoners held by them, including the sons of former prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and the late Punjab governor Salman Taseer.
This was no big deal for the government. Releasing just about 10 non-combatants against whom there was no evidence whatsoever for involvement in violence, out of hundreds of such detainees, should have been conceded at the throw of a hat. The government deliberated and oscillated and remained uncommitted to the issue. There was an eerie lack of sense of urgency and a fatal complacency.
This procrastination on the part of the government led to doubts and suspicions in the ranks of the TTP about the sincerity of the authorities in pursuing the course of negotiations. Frustration mounted and despondency took hold. Attitudes hardened. And finally there was desperation. The future of the talks became hostage to indecisiveness at a time when firm and unequivocal positions were needed to be taken on relatively simple issues like the release of just a few prisoners.
The operation now underway in the North Waziristan Agency and in a few other areas notably Khyber Agency and parts of Orakzai Agency will undoubtedly cause a huge dislocation of population. In addition, there may be extensive damage to property, houses, markets and other infrastructure. Civilian casualties would result from bombing and shelling as well as from artillery and rocket fire.
One objective that the government would achieve for sure is that most foreign militants would leave the tribal agency for good. Because even if the security forces begin to withdraw (of which there are no signs as yet), the local population would not allow foreign militants to cut into their territory once again due to the enormous suffering they had to endure because of the presence of such ‘guests’. That would be a positive gain for the government.
But the cost to the people and the area would be unquantifiable. The agony and pain of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons would leave deep scars on many lives, with children being the worst affected. As usual, the government would announce the creation of facilities to accommodate and look after the victims but such pledges are seldom honoured. Hundreds of thousands of displaced tribesmen of the many previous government operations are still languishing in utter misery and live a wretched life based on charity. These operations have taken a toll — cultural, social and economic besides causing health hazards because of sleepless nights for fear of drones and a generation losing out on education.
For a durable and sustainable peace, the threat of militancy and militants has to be overcome. Military operations are only part of the solution. Soon the tribes have to be empowered and the systems reinvigorated to confront militants and militancy. But before doing that, the government must make its position clear on issues like its support for an unpopular war in Afghanistan, how to deal with hundreds of prisoners, what policy to design on strengthening the role of the political agent and after having reached agreements with the tribes, how to manage a phased withdrawal of security forces from the area.
Unless a policy is crafted that not only incorporates the objective realities of the situation but also reflects the aspirations of the people, no action in the tribal areas will deliver. Reforms in the tribal area are not an immediate priority. The most urgent business is to stabilise the area, restore peace, reestablish the writ of the government, launch major development initiatives that can deliver in a short period of time, create economic opportunities, rehabilitate the displaced people, repair and reconstruct houses, infrastructure and markets on a crash programme basis.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 17th, 2014.
The operation appears to be a direct consequence of the attack on Karachi airport that happened just a few days ago. Quite understandably, no government could ignore a threat to its vital installations. And since the attackers had proven links to their bases or hideouts in the tribal area of North Waziristan, no government could look the other way.
As a matter of fact, the Karachi airport attack may define Pakistan’s approach to the menace of terrorism for many months to come. But an important question is whether the Karachi attacks or the one near Fateh Jang could have been avoided had negotiations between the government and the TTP made progress. Were the negotiations doomed to fail and were they an exercise in futility? Not quite. The negotiators never got down to discussing contentious issues like the release of prisoners, disposal of foreign militants, amnesty and gradual withdrawal of security forces. They were only talking of trust-building, ceasefire and the symbolic release of some prisoners.
After a marathon session of negotiations lasting seven hours on March 26, at a location on the border of North Waziristan and the Orakzai tribal area, there was an agreement in principle to begin the release of non-combatants held by the government. It was expected that the TTP would reciprocate by releasing some high-profile prisoners held by them, including the sons of former prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and the late Punjab governor Salman Taseer.
This was no big deal for the government. Releasing just about 10 non-combatants against whom there was no evidence whatsoever for involvement in violence, out of hundreds of such detainees, should have been conceded at the throw of a hat. The government deliberated and oscillated and remained uncommitted to the issue. There was an eerie lack of sense of urgency and a fatal complacency.
This procrastination on the part of the government led to doubts and suspicions in the ranks of the TTP about the sincerity of the authorities in pursuing the course of negotiations. Frustration mounted and despondency took hold. Attitudes hardened. And finally there was desperation. The future of the talks became hostage to indecisiveness at a time when firm and unequivocal positions were needed to be taken on relatively simple issues like the release of just a few prisoners.
The operation now underway in the North Waziristan Agency and in a few other areas notably Khyber Agency and parts of Orakzai Agency will undoubtedly cause a huge dislocation of population. In addition, there may be extensive damage to property, houses, markets and other infrastructure. Civilian casualties would result from bombing and shelling as well as from artillery and rocket fire.
One objective that the government would achieve for sure is that most foreign militants would leave the tribal agency for good. Because even if the security forces begin to withdraw (of which there are no signs as yet), the local population would not allow foreign militants to cut into their territory once again due to the enormous suffering they had to endure because of the presence of such ‘guests’. That would be a positive gain for the government.
But the cost to the people and the area would be unquantifiable. The agony and pain of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons would leave deep scars on many lives, with children being the worst affected. As usual, the government would announce the creation of facilities to accommodate and look after the victims but such pledges are seldom honoured. Hundreds of thousands of displaced tribesmen of the many previous government operations are still languishing in utter misery and live a wretched life based on charity. These operations have taken a toll — cultural, social and economic besides causing health hazards because of sleepless nights for fear of drones and a generation losing out on education.
For a durable and sustainable peace, the threat of militancy and militants has to be overcome. Military operations are only part of the solution. Soon the tribes have to be empowered and the systems reinvigorated to confront militants and militancy. But before doing that, the government must make its position clear on issues like its support for an unpopular war in Afghanistan, how to deal with hundreds of prisoners, what policy to design on strengthening the role of the political agent and after having reached agreements with the tribes, how to manage a phased withdrawal of security forces from the area.
Unless a policy is crafted that not only incorporates the objective realities of the situation but also reflects the aspirations of the people, no action in the tribal areas will deliver. Reforms in the tribal area are not an immediate priority. The most urgent business is to stabilise the area, restore peace, reestablish the writ of the government, launch major development initiatives that can deliver in a short period of time, create economic opportunities, rehabilitate the displaced people, repair and reconstruct houses, infrastructure and markets on a crash programme basis.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 17th, 2014.