Revisiting Afghanistan policy
The withdrawal of US and Nato forces from Afghanistan in 2014 poses a new set of challenges for Pakistan.
The writer is a retired lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army and served as chairman of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board
The withdrawal of US and Nato forces from Afghanistan in 2014 poses a new set of challenges for Pakistan. The presence of US forces in Afghanistan triggered its own dynamics of resistance within the country but in some ways, it did help Kabul and Islamabad to work together, although on several occasions serious tension prevailed. Very soon the two countries will have to directly deal with each other to coordinate and cooperate at the border and show greater maturity in their overall relations.
Border management is critical for ensuring peace and stability in the region. The greatest challenge is security governance and for that Pakistan will have to establish the writ of the state in North Waziristan and clear pockets of resistance in South Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber. Similarly, Afghanistan should take control over areas adjacent to the Pakistan border where mostly the Taliban exercise control. Pakistan and Afghanistan have no other option than to cooperate and compromise in order to address shared security concerns. But the question remains: is there a consensus for taking action against the militant groups that are in control of those areas and continue to commit cross-border raids with impunity? And are the two countries capable and willing to fortify the border? So far, both sides have been unable to clear the sanctuaries and contain the insurgency in their respective countries.
While this remains a major hurdle, the other area where both countries should cooperate is by regulating the movement at main crossing points on the border. They should introduce the biometric system and only permit those persons to cross over who are legally authorised. True, there are innumerable unauthorised crossing places, but due to difficult terrain, these take longer to cross and are more problematic when it comes to carrying weapons or moving fighters. The question of the Durand Line should also not be an obstacle to regulating the border.
Pakistan’s and the region’s interest lies in a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government. In the past, Islamabad had been making efforts with the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani group, but with little success. If some compromise can be worked out even at this late stage, it will greatly contribute towards stabilising the border. If we are unable to convince the Haqqani leadership and Quetta Shura that they should work out a negotiated settlement with the Afghan government, then what have we gained by hosting these groups apart from inviting the hostility of the Afghan government and the international community and much worse? For it has bred a culture of militancy within our country and given an excuse to Afghanistan and India to harbour and promote anti-Pakistan militants most prominent among them being Fazlullah, the nominal chief of the TTP. What we must recognise is that for the militants, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border presents an integrated theatre of operations and we should strategise our response accordingly. And this is only possible if both countries address their own insurgency problems and cooperate with each other. The sanctuaries present are a great challenge as was experienced in Vietnam, Cambodia and Algeria. When insurgencies enjoyed protection and support from neighbouring countries, it became difficult to crush them.
Thus the evolving strategic and political scenario demands that Pakistan should revisit its policy with neighbours. It should be based exclusively on state-to-state relations and not rely on a mix of state-to-state and state-to-militant relations that has been the practice in the past. Even if the fluid situation in Afghanistan did make sense of that policy in the 1990s it has totally lost its relevance in the post-2014 situation.
There are two major factors that will require a shift in the policy. In order to contribute towards Afghanistan and regional stability, the support to Afghan Taliban and its affiliates has to cease. The Taliban cannot be considered a convenient hedge even if there is no negotiated settlement that results in civil war. The previous policy of using insurgent groups as allies and using them as proxies against India and Afghanistan has been a huge failure. There are still doubts whether the Pakistan military is willing and capable of acting against these groups. But we cannot continue to ignore the presence of Afghan and foreign militant groups along with the TTP that are using North Waziristan to launch attacks against Afghanistan and within Pakistan. If Pakistan and Afghanistan were to take each other’s insurgencies seriously and cooperate, it would be far easier to counter them. This cooperative approach will also solicit international support and goodwill that Pakistan needs badly.
With the withdrawal of US and Nato forces, Afghanistan will be undergoing a political, economic and military transition. This poses a great challenge for the new Afghan government for its stability and much will depend on how well it handles these transitions. Interestingly, the fluid situation poses many uncertainties but it also opens up new prospects of cooperation. The election of a new president provides an opportunity for Pakistan to place the relationship on a stable and more enduring basis. For it would be in the interest of the Afghan president to seek good relations with Pakistan to succeed at home, notwithstanding that Afghan presidential front-runner Abdullah Abdullah had an adversarial relationship with Islamabad in the past.
There are doubts raised about the US’s and the international community’s commitment to provide funds to sustain the Afghan armed forces for nearly a decade. In all likelihood they would, because Washington realises the dangers inherent in abandoning Afghanistan. Without a viable Afghan economy and adequate security there can be no development, which is so necessary in order to give credibility and authority to the incoming government in Kabul. The financial commitment by the international community will also signal a powerful message that the US and other countries are committed and have a long-term interest in the region. It will also give Pakistan and other neighbouring countries greater confidence in the future of Afghanistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 11th, 2014.
Border management is critical for ensuring peace and stability in the region. The greatest challenge is security governance and for that Pakistan will have to establish the writ of the state in North Waziristan and clear pockets of resistance in South Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber. Similarly, Afghanistan should take control over areas adjacent to the Pakistan border where mostly the Taliban exercise control. Pakistan and Afghanistan have no other option than to cooperate and compromise in order to address shared security concerns. But the question remains: is there a consensus for taking action against the militant groups that are in control of those areas and continue to commit cross-border raids with impunity? And are the two countries capable and willing to fortify the border? So far, both sides have been unable to clear the sanctuaries and contain the insurgency in their respective countries.
While this remains a major hurdle, the other area where both countries should cooperate is by regulating the movement at main crossing points on the border. They should introduce the biometric system and only permit those persons to cross over who are legally authorised. True, there are innumerable unauthorised crossing places, but due to difficult terrain, these take longer to cross and are more problematic when it comes to carrying weapons or moving fighters. The question of the Durand Line should also not be an obstacle to regulating the border.
Pakistan’s and the region’s interest lies in a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government. In the past, Islamabad had been making efforts with the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani group, but with little success. If some compromise can be worked out even at this late stage, it will greatly contribute towards stabilising the border. If we are unable to convince the Haqqani leadership and Quetta Shura that they should work out a negotiated settlement with the Afghan government, then what have we gained by hosting these groups apart from inviting the hostility of the Afghan government and the international community and much worse? For it has bred a culture of militancy within our country and given an excuse to Afghanistan and India to harbour and promote anti-Pakistan militants most prominent among them being Fazlullah, the nominal chief of the TTP. What we must recognise is that for the militants, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border presents an integrated theatre of operations and we should strategise our response accordingly. And this is only possible if both countries address their own insurgency problems and cooperate with each other. The sanctuaries present are a great challenge as was experienced in Vietnam, Cambodia and Algeria. When insurgencies enjoyed protection and support from neighbouring countries, it became difficult to crush them.
Thus the evolving strategic and political scenario demands that Pakistan should revisit its policy with neighbours. It should be based exclusively on state-to-state relations and not rely on a mix of state-to-state and state-to-militant relations that has been the practice in the past. Even if the fluid situation in Afghanistan did make sense of that policy in the 1990s it has totally lost its relevance in the post-2014 situation.
There are two major factors that will require a shift in the policy. In order to contribute towards Afghanistan and regional stability, the support to Afghan Taliban and its affiliates has to cease. The Taliban cannot be considered a convenient hedge even if there is no negotiated settlement that results in civil war. The previous policy of using insurgent groups as allies and using them as proxies against India and Afghanistan has been a huge failure. There are still doubts whether the Pakistan military is willing and capable of acting against these groups. But we cannot continue to ignore the presence of Afghan and foreign militant groups along with the TTP that are using North Waziristan to launch attacks against Afghanistan and within Pakistan. If Pakistan and Afghanistan were to take each other’s insurgencies seriously and cooperate, it would be far easier to counter them. This cooperative approach will also solicit international support and goodwill that Pakistan needs badly.
With the withdrawal of US and Nato forces, Afghanistan will be undergoing a political, economic and military transition. This poses a great challenge for the new Afghan government for its stability and much will depend on how well it handles these transitions. Interestingly, the fluid situation poses many uncertainties but it also opens up new prospects of cooperation. The election of a new president provides an opportunity for Pakistan to place the relationship on a stable and more enduring basis. For it would be in the interest of the Afghan president to seek good relations with Pakistan to succeed at home, notwithstanding that Afghan presidential front-runner Abdullah Abdullah had an adversarial relationship with Islamabad in the past.
There are doubts raised about the US’s and the international community’s commitment to provide funds to sustain the Afghan armed forces for nearly a decade. In all likelihood they would, because Washington realises the dangers inherent in abandoning Afghanistan. Without a viable Afghan economy and adequate security there can be no development, which is so necessary in order to give credibility and authority to the incoming government in Kabul. The financial commitment by the international community will also signal a powerful message that the US and other countries are committed and have a long-term interest in the region. It will also give Pakistan and other neighbouring countries greater confidence in the future of Afghanistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 11th, 2014.