Analysis: The last line of defence
Thus I say that the attackers’ objective was to cause embarrassment and confusion.
Smoke rises after militants launched an assault at Jinnah International Airport in Karachi. PHOTO: AFP
At midnight on Sunday, 11 to 12 heavily armed young men targeted the Karachi airport with a mission to breach a well-defended key installation and, in the process, draw the world’s attention, embarrass the government and close down Pakistan’s most essential and frequented airport.
In this, they succeeded. CNN and BBC interrupted their scheduled programs to inform the world that Pakistan is unsafe and unable to protect its vital assets, let alone its people or businesses. It will take time to tweak this perspective.
The ASF put up a gallant fight on Sunday night and into the early hours of Monday morning. Losing 10 men in 4 to 5 hours is a great sacrifice. The ASF quickly realised where the breach had been made as four of its men manning a post were ‘stormed’ and killed by the militants. They were sitting ducks. Within 2 or 3 minutes these attackers were on the runway. Once inside, they split into three groups – one headed straight across the runway to take control of it, and a second group turned left and made its way to the Ispahani (engineering) hangar, where almost 40 aircraft were stationed, 90 per cent of which were junk. The third group turned right and headed to the cargo hangar.
Serious damage could have been done by this group. The operation thus seemed to be more motivational than rooted in any higher planning, for if all the militants (10-12) had turned right, towards the main Jinnah Terminal, only five minutes away, they could have caused serious damage.
At least one brand new Emirates airliner with over 300 passengers was within range of an RPG launcher during the attack. There were other passenger jets parked here and a hijack could have been engineered. No such plan, it appears, was the objective. Thus I say that the attackers’ objective was to cause embarrassment and confusion. Any losses to life or property were a bonus.
The ASF must be complimented, for they thwarted any movement towards the Jinnah Terminal for 60-90 precious minutes as they waited to receive back up from the army, Rangers and police teams.
The government must immediately revisit the security of such essential installations. A thorough survey of each must be carried out. A perimeter will only deter an attacker but a determined effort will enable a breach. Means of detection, including CCTV cameras, alarms and sensors must be installed with guaranteed power supply. The number of entry points must be limited to very few.
The ATC has a great survey of the space but their attention is focused on the skies and not the ground. The ASF must have an operational Control Room, unlike the present one, where a complete monitoring of the perimeter, all entry points, buildings and aircraft is possible.
No intruder must be able to get to the last line of defence unchecked. The VIP Terminal is a soft spot and its security is only in focus when VIP movement is scheduled here. On that fateful Sunday night, there was no VIP due to travel. The terrorists were thus able to drive straight up to the last line of defence.
The writer is an ex-Director General Airport Security Force
Published in The Express Tribune, June 10th, 2014.