Magnificent delusion
A non-transactional relationship ought to engage govt in rethinking, revamping policies & take ownership of change.
The writer is an independent social scientist and author of Military Inc.
The other day, I happened to watch a debate at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, DC on counterterrorism in Pakistan, especially dealing with the American option in the Af-Pak region after 2014. Generally, opinion wavers between the possibility of disengagement and waning interest, and minimal engagement that could be manipulated at a later date when the need arises to expand links. Indeed, the debate was interesting as the panel showcased Pakistan and American establishments and their interests.
Rawalpindi’s perspective seemed to be that the US must retain its investments in the country. Furthermore, Pakistan should not be looked at through the prism of conflict in Kabul. America’s former ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, was forthcoming in endorsing this perspective. But the problem is that the US does not want to engage with Pakistan but with relatively reliable partners. Notwithstanding temporary tensions, Rawalpindi will remain top of the list because political governments appear inefficient. The maturing of politics is a slow process for which Washington has little patience. This political burger joint approach in itself contributes to failures in a relationship. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, which was meant to change the earlier approach, met with huge resistance in Pakistan from the powers that be. Moreover, the political government was too weak and was kept weak so that it couldn’t respond well to the proposed change (on a separate note the propaganda that we see regarding Saudi Arabia does not emanate from a genuine belief in Saudi help to militancy in Pakistan but the discomfort that the Kingdom is giving more attention to civilian players).
The writing on the wall is that post-2014 the earlier sheen in the bilateral relationship will go. However, Washington will keep its links with Rawalpindi and search for newer credible partners. Indeed, Munter, who has taken love for Pakistan’s military as elaborated in the book, Pakistan A Hard Country, to heart, would rather trust the GHQ than the corrupt and inefficient political government. Now, he wants to extend the circle of partnership to include the philanthropy sector.
I wonder if the former US ambassador realises that corruption and inefficiencies are also caused by transactional relationships, be it with the US or anyone else. Notwithstanding the argument that Pakistan tends to use the US, Washington is equally guilty of keeping the linkage tied to supply of resources. Of course, successive Pakistani governments have been inefficient. Their behaviour may not be pardonable but it is certainly explainable. Given the political instability, which shows no sign to dissipate, the state has weakened, a development that will impact on the health of a government. But it is the only sector that reaches out to all and has major structural capacity. The donors must engage the government in a dialogue, particularly if Islamabad shows signs of dependency, to restructure its systems and bring efficiency.
The problem is that international donors and multilateral aid organisations and the fleet of economists and experts they have hired have created the impression that going beyond the government is kosher. This policy is called public-private partnership. Resultantly, we saw the rise in the NGO sector that turned into a major industry. People with contacts in the government and their children and their children’s children all got into the business making heaps of money. Moreover, the NGO sector enriched a battery of foreign consultants and aid donors.
Munter and his men, of course, may never get to know that it’s the structure of the sector that has made ‘NGO’ a bad word. Go out into the field, which means beyond the main urban centres and without local partners, and you can find that people are happy taking American money but not its ideology. Nor has the money brought any structural shift as implementing partners do much less than what they show on paper. There are many NGOs on DFID and USAID lists that either have little capacity or are being deliberately run inefficiently, which further encourages corruption. In areas like south Punjab, for instance, lack of civil society’s capacity is noticeable. Building this capacity is the society’s job and not that of the international donors.
If we were to hear what Cameron Munter and General John Allen had to say at the aforementioned seminar, the American instinct is also to keep the relationship tied to financial give and take. When Munter talks about philanthropy, I am assuming that he doesn’t intend to build links with LeT/Jud or other religious networks, unless I am missing something. Many of the faces of the Pakistan establishment that interact with their American counterparts happily talk about madrassas as welfare networks. So, there is a possibility that money could get diverted to madrassas and militant outfits in the name of conversion. While the ideology itself may not change it could allow Washington to develop some inroads. But remember these inroads landed the US and Pakistan, in particular, in trouble before.
Perhaps, what Munter has in mind is linking up with seemingly non-religious philanthropy. For example, there are private universities that have started to attract foreign funding by showcasing programmes to educate youth from the lower socio-economic strata. Such flagship programmes tend to hide how some universities pay their lower staff poorly in the name of cost cutting. In any case, why can’t Pakistan’s private sector bankroll such projects itself? Or is it that they even want to do their philanthropy for free? If money must be invested it should be done through the government in areas that deserve attention like public-sector educational institutions. Sadly, there is a consistent effort of the government that dates back to Pervez Musharraf days of engaging donors to invest in private-sector education rather than the public sector.
A non-transactional relationship ought to engage the government in rethinking and revamping its policies and taking ownership of that change. But I am assuming that Washington would like to go beyond the magnificent delusion of its intent of establishing a non-transactional linkage. So, the new design may not help Pakistan but may create strategic assets for long-term interests.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 1st, 2014.
Rawalpindi’s perspective seemed to be that the US must retain its investments in the country. Furthermore, Pakistan should not be looked at through the prism of conflict in Kabul. America’s former ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, was forthcoming in endorsing this perspective. But the problem is that the US does not want to engage with Pakistan but with relatively reliable partners. Notwithstanding temporary tensions, Rawalpindi will remain top of the list because political governments appear inefficient. The maturing of politics is a slow process for which Washington has little patience. This political burger joint approach in itself contributes to failures in a relationship. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, which was meant to change the earlier approach, met with huge resistance in Pakistan from the powers that be. Moreover, the political government was too weak and was kept weak so that it couldn’t respond well to the proposed change (on a separate note the propaganda that we see regarding Saudi Arabia does not emanate from a genuine belief in Saudi help to militancy in Pakistan but the discomfort that the Kingdom is giving more attention to civilian players).
The writing on the wall is that post-2014 the earlier sheen in the bilateral relationship will go. However, Washington will keep its links with Rawalpindi and search for newer credible partners. Indeed, Munter, who has taken love for Pakistan’s military as elaborated in the book, Pakistan A Hard Country, to heart, would rather trust the GHQ than the corrupt and inefficient political government. Now, he wants to extend the circle of partnership to include the philanthropy sector.
I wonder if the former US ambassador realises that corruption and inefficiencies are also caused by transactional relationships, be it with the US or anyone else. Notwithstanding the argument that Pakistan tends to use the US, Washington is equally guilty of keeping the linkage tied to supply of resources. Of course, successive Pakistani governments have been inefficient. Their behaviour may not be pardonable but it is certainly explainable. Given the political instability, which shows no sign to dissipate, the state has weakened, a development that will impact on the health of a government. But it is the only sector that reaches out to all and has major structural capacity. The donors must engage the government in a dialogue, particularly if Islamabad shows signs of dependency, to restructure its systems and bring efficiency.
The problem is that international donors and multilateral aid organisations and the fleet of economists and experts they have hired have created the impression that going beyond the government is kosher. This policy is called public-private partnership. Resultantly, we saw the rise in the NGO sector that turned into a major industry. People with contacts in the government and their children and their children’s children all got into the business making heaps of money. Moreover, the NGO sector enriched a battery of foreign consultants and aid donors.
Munter and his men, of course, may never get to know that it’s the structure of the sector that has made ‘NGO’ a bad word. Go out into the field, which means beyond the main urban centres and without local partners, and you can find that people are happy taking American money but not its ideology. Nor has the money brought any structural shift as implementing partners do much less than what they show on paper. There are many NGOs on DFID and USAID lists that either have little capacity or are being deliberately run inefficiently, which further encourages corruption. In areas like south Punjab, for instance, lack of civil society’s capacity is noticeable. Building this capacity is the society’s job and not that of the international donors.
If we were to hear what Cameron Munter and General John Allen had to say at the aforementioned seminar, the American instinct is also to keep the relationship tied to financial give and take. When Munter talks about philanthropy, I am assuming that he doesn’t intend to build links with LeT/Jud or other religious networks, unless I am missing something. Many of the faces of the Pakistan establishment that interact with their American counterparts happily talk about madrassas as welfare networks. So, there is a possibility that money could get diverted to madrassas and militant outfits in the name of conversion. While the ideology itself may not change it could allow Washington to develop some inroads. But remember these inroads landed the US and Pakistan, in particular, in trouble before.
Perhaps, what Munter has in mind is linking up with seemingly non-religious philanthropy. For example, there are private universities that have started to attract foreign funding by showcasing programmes to educate youth from the lower socio-economic strata. Such flagship programmes tend to hide how some universities pay their lower staff poorly in the name of cost cutting. In any case, why can’t Pakistan’s private sector bankroll such projects itself? Or is it that they even want to do their philanthropy for free? If money must be invested it should be done through the government in areas that deserve attention like public-sector educational institutions. Sadly, there is a consistent effort of the government that dates back to Pervez Musharraf days of engaging donors to invest in private-sector education rather than the public sector.
A non-transactional relationship ought to engage the government in rethinking and revamping its policies and taking ownership of that change. But I am assuming that Washington would like to go beyond the magnificent delusion of its intent of establishing a non-transactional linkage. So, the new design may not help Pakistan but may create strategic assets for long-term interests.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 1st, 2014.