How powerful is the TTP really?
As long as the splinter groups of the TTP reject the talks and are on the loose, violence is likely to continue.
The writer is Special Assistant to Federal Minister at the Ministry of Planning, Development & Reforms. He tweets @HNadim87
The drones are gone and the Government of Pakistan is engaged in talks with the militants; even the TTP is talking about the talks, but the suicide bombings and the violence don’t appear to have stopped. The fact that militants attacked Islamabad — first, a court and then the Sabzi Mandi — has confused ordinary people and security experts alike. The reality, however, is shrouded in dense layers of intelligence ops and confidential agreements that were signed back during the Musharraf days.
According to one of the key persons from Pakistan’s security establishment, “While the TTP might claim that they represent the entire anti-state insurgency, they really don’t. The TTP only represents a portion of the anti-state elements operating in Pakistan.” According to the source, because of the ongoing talks with the government, the TTP has lost ground amongst the militant groups who are now looking at the TTP’s overtures with the government with suspicion. Many of the insurgent groups are worried that the TTP might strike a confidential deal with the government and shift sides.
On the other hand, the TTP is also slowly losing credibility within the security establishment that can now gauge how much control it really exerts among the militants. The recent attack in Peshawar by a local TTP commander, the Islamabad court attack by the Ahrarul Hind and several other such incidents have been without the TTP’s approval and knowledge, putting a serious question on its clout in the militant circles. The organisation, it appears, had to forcefully accept responsibility of some of these attacks out of compulsion as to not make itself appear powerless and clueless. After all, if the TTP doesn’t have a monopoly on militant violence, why is the government even talking to it?
The Islamabad court attack, more than the TTP’s duplicity and backstabbing, is a clear sign of its weakening control. According to a source in the intelligence community, the Ahrarul Hind recently went at odds with the TTP on the subject of the enforcement of Sharia. The TTP, according to the source, had compromised on the demand of the enforcement of Sharia throughout Pakistan and instead was ready to restrict it only to the tribal areas. “Hind, however, stayed adamant to its demand of enforcing Sharia all over Pakistan and took the violent road,” said a senior security official.
The attack on the court is direct message to the government, not by the TTP, but by other militant groups that it’s not just the TTP that is out there; there are other powerful groups that must be taken seriously.
It’s not out of nowhere that the TTP has started losing its power and has suddenly been opening up to the government. A civilian security official was of the view that: “What happened behind the scenes in past several months is a product of covert operations by the security agencies in Pakistan that altered the militant leadership”. The intelligence agencies in Pakistan, it appears, have changed Pakistan’s militant landscape. It has deprived the TTP from its original fabric — the Mehsuds. What was originally the TNSM became the TTP and what used to be the TTP is now nothing.
Insurgencies survive and thrive on the brand name. The TTP, in that sense, developed itself as a strong brand under the Mehsuds. Instead of fighting the brand, and giving it further legitimacy, security agencies have stripped the Mehsud’s off the TTP brand and allowed those militants to take charge that they (the security agencies) thought they could negotiate with. Enter Fazlullah, the new leader of the TTP, with whom the security establishment probably thinks they can negotiate.
Whatever will come out of peace talks with the TTP under Fazlullah, the violence will only be reduced, it won’t completely stop. As long as the splinter groups of the TTP reject the talks and are on the loose, violence is likely to continue. Does the TTP possess the power to ensure ceasefire and deliver peace from these splinter groups is a question that is central to the government’s peace committee.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 19th, 2014.
According to one of the key persons from Pakistan’s security establishment, “While the TTP might claim that they represent the entire anti-state insurgency, they really don’t. The TTP only represents a portion of the anti-state elements operating in Pakistan.” According to the source, because of the ongoing talks with the government, the TTP has lost ground amongst the militant groups who are now looking at the TTP’s overtures with the government with suspicion. Many of the insurgent groups are worried that the TTP might strike a confidential deal with the government and shift sides.
On the other hand, the TTP is also slowly losing credibility within the security establishment that can now gauge how much control it really exerts among the militants. The recent attack in Peshawar by a local TTP commander, the Islamabad court attack by the Ahrarul Hind and several other such incidents have been without the TTP’s approval and knowledge, putting a serious question on its clout in the militant circles. The organisation, it appears, had to forcefully accept responsibility of some of these attacks out of compulsion as to not make itself appear powerless and clueless. After all, if the TTP doesn’t have a monopoly on militant violence, why is the government even talking to it?
The Islamabad court attack, more than the TTP’s duplicity and backstabbing, is a clear sign of its weakening control. According to a source in the intelligence community, the Ahrarul Hind recently went at odds with the TTP on the subject of the enforcement of Sharia. The TTP, according to the source, had compromised on the demand of the enforcement of Sharia throughout Pakistan and instead was ready to restrict it only to the tribal areas. “Hind, however, stayed adamant to its demand of enforcing Sharia all over Pakistan and took the violent road,” said a senior security official.
The attack on the court is direct message to the government, not by the TTP, but by other militant groups that it’s not just the TTP that is out there; there are other powerful groups that must be taken seriously.
It’s not out of nowhere that the TTP has started losing its power and has suddenly been opening up to the government. A civilian security official was of the view that: “What happened behind the scenes in past several months is a product of covert operations by the security agencies in Pakistan that altered the militant leadership”. The intelligence agencies in Pakistan, it appears, have changed Pakistan’s militant landscape. It has deprived the TTP from its original fabric — the Mehsuds. What was originally the TNSM became the TTP and what used to be the TTP is now nothing.
Insurgencies survive and thrive on the brand name. The TTP, in that sense, developed itself as a strong brand under the Mehsuds. Instead of fighting the brand, and giving it further legitimacy, security agencies have stripped the Mehsud’s off the TTP brand and allowed those militants to take charge that they (the security agencies) thought they could negotiate with. Enter Fazlullah, the new leader of the TTP, with whom the security establishment probably thinks they can negotiate.
Whatever will come out of peace talks with the TTP under Fazlullah, the violence will only be reduced, it won’t completely stop. As long as the splinter groups of the TTP reject the talks and are on the loose, violence is likely to continue. Does the TTP possess the power to ensure ceasefire and deliver peace from these splinter groups is a question that is central to the government’s peace committee.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 19th, 2014.