Afridi’s Sixer

We are a people given to the easy way up. As in cricket, so in our lives, a Six is just round the corner.

The writer is a defence analyst who retired as an air vice-marshal in the Pakistan Air Force

Mohammad Yousaf, Pakistan’s former Test cricketer and captain, is a staid fellow, laid-back and unassuming in his style of practically everything that he does. He always worked himself into his innings, building it slowly as he grafted his runs and let his body and mind find that essential coordination to perform at exceptional levels. Anyone wanting him out therefore always focused on his initial stay at the wicket when he could be at his most vulnerable. But past that, with his body and mind now revved up to the optimal level he became an artisan, flowing in his style and effortless with his strokes.

In his second avatar then as a commentator he has been rightly exhorting his countrymen to be wary of being lured into the excitement of the kind of game that seeks rapid recompense. Something that Afridi embodies with his flurry of activity at the crease. By his count, the once- in-a-blue-moon explosion of Afridi’s capacity, slower and infrequent as he ages, hardly qualifies him to gain the fancy of cricket lovers. His second lament is that the Pakistanis tend to forgive all - failures, amateurism, et al - once a player has performed even once. Despite the most embarrassing thrashing at the hands of the Windies this week there are calls already to appoint Afridi as the captain.

Yousaf, of the patience and application school of thought, who believes in grafting and nurturing an innings for a batsman of class to develop dependability and credibility, is averse to someone walking into the middle and vying for glory simply by his swashbuckling presence. He does not even consider Afridi a batsman. Yet, the people, almost to the point of faith, believe that Afridi alone will win them games. To them if Afridi fires, but Pakistan lose, is a fair trade. Yousaf rightly wonders what then is the role of the other ten in a team. He, sadly, is not cutting any ice here on this issue.

Same is true when Pakistan must play another formidable opposition; like the West Indies. The usual refrain: get rid of Chris Gayle and the match is virtually won. Is that so? And what of the other ten? Following Pakistan’s last match in the World T20 against the West Indies we will do better to review such proclivity in thought. Though Afridi did not hit his sixes, we did get Gayle off pretty easily; yet see the humiliation. We may have then realised, and hopefully learnt, that there is life beyond Afridi and Gayle, and there happen to be twenty other players who can prove as much or an even greater pain in the neck.

Not to us though. We live in very simple formulations and under illusive assumptions. Industry, hard work and building an innings are not our national characteristics. We do not believe as a people that the only way up is to begin from the bottom; somehow our entrenched belief is that out there someone will always help us propel to the top with less than half the effort; like Afridi’s Six. We are a people given to the easy way up. As in cricket, so in our lives, a Six is just round the corner.


Consider. Dialogue with the TTP is a noble thought if indeed it succeeds, but note the extended imagination that has us convinced that when problems with the TTP are resolved, Pakistan will be a terror-free place. Is saadgi pe kaun na mar jae ae khuda. But, then, we as a nation are driven by this simplistic formulation in our minds. Whatever happened to the Federal Counterterrorism Force, or the need to revamp the police, administration and intelligence to fight urban terror and its various manifestations that are likely to remain this nation’s bane for years to come? What of the need to cut off foreign funding of these militant outfits? The Madrassa reforms? What of the National Internal Security Policy? Is the debate in parliament to flesh out distortions, and fill in the inadequacies, already over? Have the political parties each submitted their inputs to convert it into an all encompassing document to guide policy in the long run? Or, true to our national character we remain loud on our pronouncements, but empty in substance? There is only one way up — ground up. And that needs toil, and sweat, and application, and knowledge, and skill, and putting them all together. An Afridi Six won’t do. Plain brass-tacks, hands-on, approach alone will.

Ditto with Musharraf’s indictment. This is proudly propounded as “one-size-fits-all” solution. It implies that if Musharraf is tried for violating the Constitution for his November 03, 2007 Emergency, a dictator, inter-alia a traitor, would have been delivered an exemplary punishment that will: one, ensure that the act is never repeated by another military adventurist to overthrow a civilian political rule; and two, will restore the civil-military balance that stands skewed distastefully against the civilian governments. There remain other unanswered questions even as we venture into the unknown: what underlies as the edifying objective that the trial will deliver? Rule of Law, or selective justice? Punishing for the minor sin (03 Nov) while the original sin, October 12, haunts; and remains unattended. Action against Musharraf, the man; or against army, the institution, because that only delivers deterrence and restores the civil-military balance. If it is the man, it can only reek of distasteful vengeance; if it is the institution we are in for some interesting times. At least that is how it will be largely perceived, except in few pockets. The approach then to the trial is patently that of an Afridi Six, but in real value it is as significant as an amateurish slog.

Was Ziaul Haq not aware of the Article 6 in the Constitution when he ventured to coup against ZAB’s rule? Was Musharraf not aware of the consequences of what he indulged in on October 12, 1999? And yet, they proceeded with their plans. We had already by then declared Yahya a usurper. What is it, then, that still overrides the need for army commanders to overthrow civilian set-ups? Yet not all indulge in such excursions. A deeper introspection is in order. The state, nation, and the government are still not melded enough together in a cohesive entity. They remain distinctly separated in policy, governance and the returns to each component of the Pakistani nation-state. With such dissonance, governments tend to fault often. That is when elements of state intervene to preserve the state. A Musharraf trial, or an Afridi Six, alone won’t do.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 3rd, 2014.

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