Will the talks with the TTP deliver?
Can the two sides work out a permanent peace deal without the government compromising on sovereignty?
The writer is a retired lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army and served as chairman of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board
The government has displayed extraordinary perseverance in its efforts to engage in dialogue with the TTP, despite serious reservations about its policy of appeasement. To its credit, the government has been able to extract a temporary ceasefire with the possibility of it being extended for a longer duration. Clearly, the accurate air strikes on militant hideouts and the looming threat of a follow-up with a major operation were in all probability the contributing factor for the peace offer by the militants. It makes perfect sense from the TTP point of view to break the momentum of military operations and gain respite, even if these were intended to be limited in scope. The question is, can the two sides work out a permanent peace deal without the government compromising on the country’s sovereignty and democratic norms?
The other troubling aspect is that some of the outliers (or affiliates of the TTP), like the Ahrarul Hind group, are not abiding by the ceasefire and have brazenly admitted to the gruesome suicide attack on Islamabad District Courts. Each act of violence perpetrated by such defiant groups pushes prospects of peace further and makes negotiations more arduous because the TTP is not a coherent entity.
Various militant groups and subgroups with multiple identities use the TTP as a franchise and operate independently or in unison, depending on what suits them best. Moreover, when militants want to hide the identity of the group that perpetrates violence, it is a good tactic to mislead the public and the government with some unknown militant organisation taking responsibility for the attack.
The TTP, having agreed to halt their violent activities, how is the government going to tackle the several autonomous militant groups that are not willing to abide by this agreement? Will the government deal with them militarily or merely contain them while talks with the TTP are in progress? Firstly, is it even feasible to deal with them autonomously due to constraints of location and the nebulous nature of their identity? And to what extent will the government be seeking the support of the TTP in subduing these groups? Reliance on the TTP for neutralising splinter groups could eventually result in enhancing its power base.
Three demands of the TTP have appeared in the media: imposition of Sharia; withdrawal of military from South Waziristan; and release of prisoners.
The Taliban, by insisting on imposing their version of Sharia, are seeking to define their identity through Islam and not by the Constitution. Despite owning up to many acts of terrorism, in a very subtle manner, by talking about Sharia, they are projecting themselves as foot soldiers of Islam and the government as un-Islamic. Indeed, this is a clever manoeuvre to bring in competing legitimacy on the basis of religion versus the Constitution and use it to elevate their status and eventually capture power. It appears they have taken a cue from the Afghan Taliban.
The second demand that the army be withdrawn from South Waziristan would be impossible to accept in the present circumstances. Unless peace is fully restored and the government regains full control in the tribal agencies, it cannot give an easy run over to the Taliban. Deployment of the army in Fata, in addition to acting as a bulwark against insurgency, is also meant to guard the border during the US and Nato withdrawal from Afghanistan. The presence of troops is also necessary for a limited application of military force (or a major offensive), depending on how the TTP and other militant groups respond to the government’s peace initiative. The TTP’s coercive tactics cannot give them the monopoly of representing the voice of the people. Moreover, the Pakistan Army is present in every province and the tribal region is not an alien country or the army an occupation force that has to withdraw as in the case of Afghanistan. Those right-wing politicians, who advocate withdrawal of the army, forget that ever since the government lost its control of North Waziristan, the area is being used as a launching pad for attacks, both inside Pakistan and against Afghanistan. It also cannot be ruled out that once the army has been withdrawn, the TTP might declare areas under its control as the ‘Islamic Emirate of Taliban’. It is already behaving as a state within a state. Pakistan clearly has only one option — that is to regain control over North Waziristan, preferably through talks, failing which, by military action.
Release of prisoners at this preliminary stage would be an unwise step. It could be considered later, provided a binding peace agreement is reached. Prisoners who have not committed any heinous crimes could be granted general amnesty as a part of the broader de-radicalisation programme. Of course, if it is true that there are some women and minors being held in custody, these should be released soon.
The challenge of fighting terrorism, extremism and asymmetric forces is not confined to Fata alone. It is now a full-blown national threat. Unless the government demonstrates strong leadership in dealing with this curse, Pakistan will not be able to extricate itself from this quagmire. Merely being sincere about engaging in dialogue is not enough for a country that is potentially being seen at “risk of rapid and sudden collapse”, as Time magazine alluded to a recent Pentagon report.
The reality is that we are fighting an asymmetrical war that needs broad support of the people. And the response of the government and the civil society is fragmented, which makes it difficult to create a national consensus, whereas terrorism can be beaten when moderate forces mobilise themselves to isolate and defeat its perpetrators. The TTP and other militant groups have become media savvy and are putting across their narrative effectively. In sharp contrast, the government has no narrative other than the mantra of talks. There is a need to develop a forceful and positive narrative that reflects mainstream values to counter the militant’s psychological offensive.
To treat Fata as an island and accede to unreasonable demands of those who do not even legally represent the people of that area would be dangerous. It would amount to converting Fata into a permanent sanctuary for all types of illegal activities. Clearly, the state has failed miserably in providing even the most basic facilities in Fata and has never taken its people in confidence and only used them to promote its warped foreign policy goals. All this has to change.
Unless the government acts boldly, the misery of the people of Fata would further aggravate, as militants are destroying schools, attacking polio workers and engaging in activities that could take people back into medieval times.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 19th, 2014.
The other troubling aspect is that some of the outliers (or affiliates of the TTP), like the Ahrarul Hind group, are not abiding by the ceasefire and have brazenly admitted to the gruesome suicide attack on Islamabad District Courts. Each act of violence perpetrated by such defiant groups pushes prospects of peace further and makes negotiations more arduous because the TTP is not a coherent entity.
Various militant groups and subgroups with multiple identities use the TTP as a franchise and operate independently or in unison, depending on what suits them best. Moreover, when militants want to hide the identity of the group that perpetrates violence, it is a good tactic to mislead the public and the government with some unknown militant organisation taking responsibility for the attack.
The TTP, having agreed to halt their violent activities, how is the government going to tackle the several autonomous militant groups that are not willing to abide by this agreement? Will the government deal with them militarily or merely contain them while talks with the TTP are in progress? Firstly, is it even feasible to deal with them autonomously due to constraints of location and the nebulous nature of their identity? And to what extent will the government be seeking the support of the TTP in subduing these groups? Reliance on the TTP for neutralising splinter groups could eventually result in enhancing its power base.
Three demands of the TTP have appeared in the media: imposition of Sharia; withdrawal of military from South Waziristan; and release of prisoners.
The Taliban, by insisting on imposing their version of Sharia, are seeking to define their identity through Islam and not by the Constitution. Despite owning up to many acts of terrorism, in a very subtle manner, by talking about Sharia, they are projecting themselves as foot soldiers of Islam and the government as un-Islamic. Indeed, this is a clever manoeuvre to bring in competing legitimacy on the basis of religion versus the Constitution and use it to elevate their status and eventually capture power. It appears they have taken a cue from the Afghan Taliban.
The second demand that the army be withdrawn from South Waziristan would be impossible to accept in the present circumstances. Unless peace is fully restored and the government regains full control in the tribal agencies, it cannot give an easy run over to the Taliban. Deployment of the army in Fata, in addition to acting as a bulwark against insurgency, is also meant to guard the border during the US and Nato withdrawal from Afghanistan. The presence of troops is also necessary for a limited application of military force (or a major offensive), depending on how the TTP and other militant groups respond to the government’s peace initiative. The TTP’s coercive tactics cannot give them the monopoly of representing the voice of the people. Moreover, the Pakistan Army is present in every province and the tribal region is not an alien country or the army an occupation force that has to withdraw as in the case of Afghanistan. Those right-wing politicians, who advocate withdrawal of the army, forget that ever since the government lost its control of North Waziristan, the area is being used as a launching pad for attacks, both inside Pakistan and against Afghanistan. It also cannot be ruled out that once the army has been withdrawn, the TTP might declare areas under its control as the ‘Islamic Emirate of Taliban’. It is already behaving as a state within a state. Pakistan clearly has only one option — that is to regain control over North Waziristan, preferably through talks, failing which, by military action.
Release of prisoners at this preliminary stage would be an unwise step. It could be considered later, provided a binding peace agreement is reached. Prisoners who have not committed any heinous crimes could be granted general amnesty as a part of the broader de-radicalisation programme. Of course, if it is true that there are some women and minors being held in custody, these should be released soon.
The challenge of fighting terrorism, extremism and asymmetric forces is not confined to Fata alone. It is now a full-blown national threat. Unless the government demonstrates strong leadership in dealing with this curse, Pakistan will not be able to extricate itself from this quagmire. Merely being sincere about engaging in dialogue is not enough for a country that is potentially being seen at “risk of rapid and sudden collapse”, as Time magazine alluded to a recent Pentagon report.
The reality is that we are fighting an asymmetrical war that needs broad support of the people. And the response of the government and the civil society is fragmented, which makes it difficult to create a national consensus, whereas terrorism can be beaten when moderate forces mobilise themselves to isolate and defeat its perpetrators. The TTP and other militant groups have become media savvy and are putting across their narrative effectively. In sharp contrast, the government has no narrative other than the mantra of talks. There is a need to develop a forceful and positive narrative that reflects mainstream values to counter the militant’s psychological offensive.
To treat Fata as an island and accede to unreasonable demands of those who do not even legally represent the people of that area would be dangerous. It would amount to converting Fata into a permanent sanctuary for all types of illegal activities. Clearly, the state has failed miserably in providing even the most basic facilities in Fata and has never taken its people in confidence and only used them to promote its warped foreign policy goals. All this has to change.
Unless the government acts boldly, the misery of the people of Fata would further aggravate, as militants are destroying schools, attacking polio workers and engaging in activities that could take people back into medieval times.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 19th, 2014.