Negotiating with non-state actors
When party on the other side refuses to recognise architect of state, then any peace-building effort becomes suspect.
The writer is a lawyer who works in the private sector and currently lives between Islamabad and the Middle East
Is there any justification for the current negotiation model being followed in Pakistan? We are trying to negotiate with armed non-state actors and this has been done before. Governments have negotiated with armed non-state actors on questions of regional or national identity or for the devolution of powers and for providing universal access for healthcare or vaccination programmes or for getting access to its remote people. But have such negotiations led to lasting peace and security? Let us consider two examples.
The Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had a simple demand. They wanted a separate state of Tamil Eelam, carved out from the Sri Lankan north and east. Their demand led to a civil war that lasted for 26 years. Did the Sri Lankan government try to negotiate with the LTTE? Yes it did. In 2001, through international mediation, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, but only once the latter dropped its demands for a separate state and asked instead for provincial autonomy. However, after approximately 10,000 violations of the ceasefire agreement, the government realised that the solution to this armed conflict was not civil or mediative, but this essentially ethnic conflict required a military solution and the only option was to wipe out the LTTE. In 2009, Sri Lanka achieved its goal. However, between 1981 and 2009, it lost approximately 100,000 people. Due to the ceaseless violations of the agreement, in 2008, the Sri Lankan government had formally announced its withdrawal from the ceasefire agreement and started a military action that resulted in the LTTE being wiped out.
What did the LTTE have in common with our armed non-state actors? A well-developed militia? Check. High profile attacks? Check. Suicide attacks? Check. The thing to note is that the LTTE’s demands formed the basis of a liberation movement, which may have evoked some principles of freedom to self-govern. They tried and lost a war. They also pulled out on a failed ceasefire but did have a centralised command unit and a process of accountability within their ranks. Could the Sri Lankan government have trusted that in 2001 when it was negotiating with the LTTE that it would be able to hold it accountable to the agreement? Yes it could. Theirs was a national liberation movement and their status as a terrorist organisation could have been subjected to counter arguments. They did not ask the Sri Lankan government to abrogate its Constitution. They did not wish to enforce a new criminal code in the Sri Lankan state. They simply wished to have a state for all people identified as Tamil. Did the ceasefire make sense at the time? It did. It was crucial for the government to recognise the ethnic imbalance and most importantly, in 2001, the LTTE was no longer asking for a separate state.
Let’s shift our focus to another conflict. Almost 4,000 people died in the political unrest in Northern Ireland. Eventually, due to the willingness of the British government to negotiate with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and strike the Good Friday agreement, a devolved government in Ireland was formed, to which were signatories, not just the governments of Ireland and the UK, but also approximately 10 political parties. The agreement had contained provisions for disarmament and it is perhaps, the single-most relevant document that may justify any kind of negotiation with armed non-state actors for arriving at a peaceful settlement. However, though signed in 1998, it did not lead to a complete cessation of all terrorist activities because of the lack of satisfaction Sinn Fein felt at the power transference. Regardless, many engagements with armed non-state actors have been justified using the analogy of Good Friday. Should we rely on the same analogy for going ahead with negotiations? The IRA was also a separatist group, but never asked to annihilate the state of UK.
When do negotiations work? I do not think there is a single good answer to the question. Negotiations with armed groups are often cited as the only method to provide aid to people under their control. When the question of protecting a community becomes paramount, then it does become very important to negotiate with an armed insurgent. But before this engagement begins, governments or legitimate stakeholders are required to make a concentrated effort to realistically determine whether the armed insurgent will deliver on the commitment of peace, control its own dissidents within its group, and what are its areas of influence and its post-negotiations policy. Most importantly, the government should be in a position to answer what shapes this rebellion. Ethnicity? Regional separation? Desire to self-govern? And on what grounds? An answer to the last question also aids the government to determine whether fringe lunacy is at play.
What of our non-state actors? Do they have a ground for rebellion? While making their demands, have our non-state actors shown a compassion for the civilian population? Have they demonstrated a use of indiscriminate force? Have they respected children and women? Have they shown that they use violence selectively? Are their demands legitimate? Do they show a commitment to uphold the rule of law? And if yes, which rule of law? Do they share values of any identified group within Pakistan? Are they motivated by principles of international laws of statehood or nationhood? Would they be able to show transparency in their accounts and resources? If the answer to these questions is a no, then what is the ultimate goal of our government to engage with a group that has not shown any willingness to honour the peace process even after the commencement of the negotiation?
The IRA and the LTTE both, though having borderline legitimacy to their demands, ultimately ended violating the peace commitments. The international community may have developed an alternative to managing insurgencies through peaceful processes, which have relied in huge part on the players on the other side willing to develop infrastructure, honouring the legal systems, allowing for humanitarian aid and working towards empowering a civilian administration. However, when the party on the other side refuses to recognise the architect of the state, then any reconstruction activity or peace-building effort becomes suspect.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 6th, 2014.
The Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had a simple demand. They wanted a separate state of Tamil Eelam, carved out from the Sri Lankan north and east. Their demand led to a civil war that lasted for 26 years. Did the Sri Lankan government try to negotiate with the LTTE? Yes it did. In 2001, through international mediation, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, but only once the latter dropped its demands for a separate state and asked instead for provincial autonomy. However, after approximately 10,000 violations of the ceasefire agreement, the government realised that the solution to this armed conflict was not civil or mediative, but this essentially ethnic conflict required a military solution and the only option was to wipe out the LTTE. In 2009, Sri Lanka achieved its goal. However, between 1981 and 2009, it lost approximately 100,000 people. Due to the ceaseless violations of the agreement, in 2008, the Sri Lankan government had formally announced its withdrawal from the ceasefire agreement and started a military action that resulted in the LTTE being wiped out.
What did the LTTE have in common with our armed non-state actors? A well-developed militia? Check. High profile attacks? Check. Suicide attacks? Check. The thing to note is that the LTTE’s demands formed the basis of a liberation movement, which may have evoked some principles of freedom to self-govern. They tried and lost a war. They also pulled out on a failed ceasefire but did have a centralised command unit and a process of accountability within their ranks. Could the Sri Lankan government have trusted that in 2001 when it was negotiating with the LTTE that it would be able to hold it accountable to the agreement? Yes it could. Theirs was a national liberation movement and their status as a terrorist organisation could have been subjected to counter arguments. They did not ask the Sri Lankan government to abrogate its Constitution. They did not wish to enforce a new criminal code in the Sri Lankan state. They simply wished to have a state for all people identified as Tamil. Did the ceasefire make sense at the time? It did. It was crucial for the government to recognise the ethnic imbalance and most importantly, in 2001, the LTTE was no longer asking for a separate state.
Let’s shift our focus to another conflict. Almost 4,000 people died in the political unrest in Northern Ireland. Eventually, due to the willingness of the British government to negotiate with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and strike the Good Friday agreement, a devolved government in Ireland was formed, to which were signatories, not just the governments of Ireland and the UK, but also approximately 10 political parties. The agreement had contained provisions for disarmament and it is perhaps, the single-most relevant document that may justify any kind of negotiation with armed non-state actors for arriving at a peaceful settlement. However, though signed in 1998, it did not lead to a complete cessation of all terrorist activities because of the lack of satisfaction Sinn Fein felt at the power transference. Regardless, many engagements with armed non-state actors have been justified using the analogy of Good Friday. Should we rely on the same analogy for going ahead with negotiations? The IRA was also a separatist group, but never asked to annihilate the state of UK.
When do negotiations work? I do not think there is a single good answer to the question. Negotiations with armed groups are often cited as the only method to provide aid to people under their control. When the question of protecting a community becomes paramount, then it does become very important to negotiate with an armed insurgent. But before this engagement begins, governments or legitimate stakeholders are required to make a concentrated effort to realistically determine whether the armed insurgent will deliver on the commitment of peace, control its own dissidents within its group, and what are its areas of influence and its post-negotiations policy. Most importantly, the government should be in a position to answer what shapes this rebellion. Ethnicity? Regional separation? Desire to self-govern? And on what grounds? An answer to the last question also aids the government to determine whether fringe lunacy is at play.
What of our non-state actors? Do they have a ground for rebellion? While making their demands, have our non-state actors shown a compassion for the civilian population? Have they demonstrated a use of indiscriminate force? Have they respected children and women? Have they shown that they use violence selectively? Are their demands legitimate? Do they show a commitment to uphold the rule of law? And if yes, which rule of law? Do they share values of any identified group within Pakistan? Are they motivated by principles of international laws of statehood or nationhood? Would they be able to show transparency in their accounts and resources? If the answer to these questions is a no, then what is the ultimate goal of our government to engage with a group that has not shown any willingness to honour the peace process even after the commencement of the negotiation?
The IRA and the LTTE both, though having borderline legitimacy to their demands, ultimately ended violating the peace commitments. The international community may have developed an alternative to managing insurgencies through peaceful processes, which have relied in huge part on the players on the other side willing to develop infrastructure, honouring the legal systems, allowing for humanitarian aid and working towards empowering a civilian administration. However, when the party on the other side refuses to recognise the architect of the state, then any reconstruction activity or peace-building effort becomes suspect.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 6th, 2014.