Can Musharraf’s trial sustain democracy?
There is no guarantee that Musharraf’s conviction will secure democracy and reduce the military’s role in politics.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst. He is also the author of several books, monographs and articles on Pakistan and South Asian Affairs
One month has passed since the federal government initiated the trial of former president and army chief General (retd) Pervez Musharraf under Article 6 of the Constitution. The federal government and the top leaders of the ruling PML-N are confident that this case will be dealt with as a purely legal and constitutional issue and that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has no personal interest in pursuing the Musharraf case. A number of political activists think that Musharraf’s conviction will deter other generals from engaging in political adventurism.
The first month of the trial shows that it will not be an easy task for the federal government to contain its political impact and keep it as a purely legal and constitutional issue to get only one person, Musharraf, convicted. It is going to be long-drawn legal battle that is expected to spread out to include other people and the earlier overthrows of civilian governments, especially the October 1999 coup.
The trial has already generated controversies. The prosecution and defence lawyers often engage in political polemics inside and outside the court. The electronic and print media is giving a lot of attention to it and different political leaders have issued statements in pursuance of their partisan political interests. Ex-servicemen appear divided on the trial issue.
Pervez Musharraf will expand the domain of the case. This is expected to happen when he records his statement (if that ever happens). He is expected to talk about several people in the civilian and military circles. One of the arguments of the defence lawyers is going to be that the November 3 decision was not made solely by him.
There are demands within political circles to take up the October 1999 coup and all those who supported and helped stage it, including the superior judiciary that gave it legal cover in May 2000. When all this starts unfolding, the army is likely to find it difficult to stay aloof.
The experience of other countries where military commanders assumed power in the post-Second World War period provides two important lessons that need to be remembered in Pakistan. First, there are only a couple of examples of prosecution of ex-military rulers by civilian governments on charges of overthrowing civilian governments. Some ex-military rulers were put on trial by another set of military rulers. In some cases, civilian governments tried them on other charges, i.e., corruption, misuse of power, human rights violations, including deaths and disappearances of people without due process of law.
Second, the success of democracy in the post-military rule period does not depend on taking punitive action against ex-military rulers. The key to securing democracy in the post-military rule period is the performance of civilian and political governments. Can the elected civilian leaders create a credible civilian alternative to military rule? Can a civilian government deliver services, security and better future prospects to the people? Any civilian government that replaces a military ruler needs to prove by action that it is more successful in addressing the problems of the people, especially economic issues and internal security. How far do the major sections of the population feel that the civilian leadership has reduced their economic pressures and made their life and property secure against state institutions and powerful societal groups or individuals?
A military ruler derives his authority from the military’s organisation, discipline and coercive power. He presides over a task-oriented institution and human power. Civilian leaders derive their legitimacy from the support of the people, and political and societal groups. This support cannot be cultivated and sustained by a civilian government without performing satisfactorily in state and societal affairs.
Pakistan’s civilian leaders need to learn from Turkey’s experience. The current ruling party, the AKP, came to power after winning the elections in November 2002 and it won two more general elections in July 2007 and June 2011. It devoted its initial attention to improving the internal economic and political situation, controlling internal violence and strengthening Turkey’s role in regional politics. It initiated controversial trials of a number of serving and retired military officers, civilian leaders and the media people in 2008 for their involvement in an alleged plan to dislodge the AKP government in 2003. This was done over five years after coming to power and winning two general elections. The first set of convictions of this trial took place in December 2012 and then in August 2013. Another trial with reference to the 1980 military takeover was initiated in January 2012. The case is still pending. In the first case, the appeal stage is still to be dealt with. With the AKP government’s new political problems emerging in December 2013 and January 2014, it is not clear if the Turkish government will be able to push forward these cases with the kind of enthusiasm it displayed initially.
The lesson from the Turkish experience is that Pakistan’s federal government should assign a high priority to addressing the problems of the economy, especially the energy crisis, inflation and price hikes, as well as internal terrorism and religious extremism that have hit all sections of the population. The federal government needs to cope with the threat of extremism and terrorism that has threatened the Pakistani state and society.
The military will continue to be important in Pakistan if the country’s internal and external security profile continues to remain troubled. Pakistan needs peace on its borders and security within them in order to create sustainable political space for civilian leaders.
The federal government needs to fix its priorities. It should first put its economic and political house in order and control violence by non-state groups that challenge the Pakistani state. This will secure democracy and sustain the PML-N in power. There is no guarantee that Musharraf’s conviction will secure democracy and reduce the military’s role as a political force.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 27th, 2014.
The first month of the trial shows that it will not be an easy task for the federal government to contain its political impact and keep it as a purely legal and constitutional issue to get only one person, Musharraf, convicted. It is going to be long-drawn legal battle that is expected to spread out to include other people and the earlier overthrows of civilian governments, especially the October 1999 coup.
The trial has already generated controversies. The prosecution and defence lawyers often engage in political polemics inside and outside the court. The electronic and print media is giving a lot of attention to it and different political leaders have issued statements in pursuance of their partisan political interests. Ex-servicemen appear divided on the trial issue.
Pervez Musharraf will expand the domain of the case. This is expected to happen when he records his statement (if that ever happens). He is expected to talk about several people in the civilian and military circles. One of the arguments of the defence lawyers is going to be that the November 3 decision was not made solely by him.
There are demands within political circles to take up the October 1999 coup and all those who supported and helped stage it, including the superior judiciary that gave it legal cover in May 2000. When all this starts unfolding, the army is likely to find it difficult to stay aloof.
The experience of other countries where military commanders assumed power in the post-Second World War period provides two important lessons that need to be remembered in Pakistan. First, there are only a couple of examples of prosecution of ex-military rulers by civilian governments on charges of overthrowing civilian governments. Some ex-military rulers were put on trial by another set of military rulers. In some cases, civilian governments tried them on other charges, i.e., corruption, misuse of power, human rights violations, including deaths and disappearances of people without due process of law.
Second, the success of democracy in the post-military rule period does not depend on taking punitive action against ex-military rulers. The key to securing democracy in the post-military rule period is the performance of civilian and political governments. Can the elected civilian leaders create a credible civilian alternative to military rule? Can a civilian government deliver services, security and better future prospects to the people? Any civilian government that replaces a military ruler needs to prove by action that it is more successful in addressing the problems of the people, especially economic issues and internal security. How far do the major sections of the population feel that the civilian leadership has reduced their economic pressures and made their life and property secure against state institutions and powerful societal groups or individuals?
A military ruler derives his authority from the military’s organisation, discipline and coercive power. He presides over a task-oriented institution and human power. Civilian leaders derive their legitimacy from the support of the people, and political and societal groups. This support cannot be cultivated and sustained by a civilian government without performing satisfactorily in state and societal affairs.
Pakistan’s civilian leaders need to learn from Turkey’s experience. The current ruling party, the AKP, came to power after winning the elections in November 2002 and it won two more general elections in July 2007 and June 2011. It devoted its initial attention to improving the internal economic and political situation, controlling internal violence and strengthening Turkey’s role in regional politics. It initiated controversial trials of a number of serving and retired military officers, civilian leaders and the media people in 2008 for their involvement in an alleged plan to dislodge the AKP government in 2003. This was done over five years after coming to power and winning two general elections. The first set of convictions of this trial took place in December 2012 and then in August 2013. Another trial with reference to the 1980 military takeover was initiated in January 2012. The case is still pending. In the first case, the appeal stage is still to be dealt with. With the AKP government’s new political problems emerging in December 2013 and January 2014, it is not clear if the Turkish government will be able to push forward these cases with the kind of enthusiasm it displayed initially.
The lesson from the Turkish experience is that Pakistan’s federal government should assign a high priority to addressing the problems of the economy, especially the energy crisis, inflation and price hikes, as well as internal terrorism and religious extremism that have hit all sections of the population. The federal government needs to cope with the threat of extremism and terrorism that has threatened the Pakistani state and society.
The military will continue to be important in Pakistan if the country’s internal and external security profile continues to remain troubled. Pakistan needs peace on its borders and security within them in order to create sustainable political space for civilian leaders.
The federal government needs to fix its priorities. It should first put its economic and political house in order and control violence by non-state groups that challenge the Pakistani state. This will secure democracy and sustain the PML-N in power. There is no guarantee that Musharraf’s conviction will secure democracy and reduce the military’s role as a political force.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 27th, 2014.