The challenge of 2014
The civil and military authorities need to work together to assert the state’s primacy before it is too late.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst. He is also the author of several books, monographs and articles on Pakistan and South Asian Affairs
The year 2014 is expected to cause several significant changes in and around Pakistan, which will go a long way towards impacting the politics of this region in the years to come. No matter what the ultimate impact of these changes is, a major Pakistani myth is going to explode. A large number of people in Pakistan’s political class maintain that the exit of US/Nato troops from Afghanistan will end militancy and terrorism in Pakistan as the main grievance of American military presence in the region is removed. This is a naive view and shows a lack of knowledge of how the insurgent groups function.
Pakistan is not the only country in the world where some groups challenge the writ of the state or want to overwhelm the state structure. The experience of other countries shows that once such groups come into existence, they continue to function even if the original reason is partially or totally removed. These groups develop a sense of power and find it difficult to give up the habit of violence and new justifications are evolved for their continued existence. Insurgencies and challenges to state authorities come to an end either when one party loses to the other or the competing entities come to a political understanding.
Dialogue is an option for coming out of an internal conflict situation. However, dialogue is only possible when both sides come to the conclusion that none can get a clear victory and that the situation is stalemated. The other chance for a dialogue exists when one competing entity perceives its defeat or total elimination.
The possibilities of a political settlement between the government of Pakistan and the militants in our tribal belt are minimal because they do not feel stalemated in their efforts to project their power in the tribal areas and mainland Pakistan. They appear quite confident that they can pursue their agenda of implementing their perception of the Sharia rule and world view because they are not only entrenched in the tribal areas but have also developed strong linkages with militant groups in mainland Pakistan. These linkages have strengthened the Punjab-based militant and sectarian groups and also helped the militants based in the tribal belt to spread their network in mainland Pakistan. This networking and spread of their activists in mainland Pakistan enables them to count on sympathy, if not support, for their political agenda in mainland Pakistan. This is coupled with the ascendancy of those political parties in Pakistan that have rightist orientations (the PML-N, the PTI and their allies). All this makes it difficult for the civilian government to adopt a tough policy towards the militancy.
Pakistan’s federal government is leaning towards bringing the militants to the dialogue table. The militants, on the other hand, have set out preconditions for the talks rather than starting the dialogue and then raising these demands. This shows that they are not in any hurry to start a dialogue with the Pakistani government.
The militants in the tribal belt do not think that they are losing against Pakistan’s state apparatus. Their leadership also thinks that given their linkages with the mainland groups and the right-wing orientations of the federal government, there is an inbuilt pressure on the civilian government for not going for a tough action against them. As long as the ground political realities do not turn against the militants, they will not avail of the federal government’s offer for talks.
The army top brass is looking towards the civilian government for seeking a political solution to the problem of militancy. The army cannot sit back for an indefinite period for the civilian leaders to continue toying with the notion of dialogue. Perhaps, it can wait for three to four months. If nothing comes out of the dialogue, what would be its disposition? The army may be inclined to go for a security operation in the tribal areas to secure the region before the end of 2014. It would seek the cooperation of the civilian government for backing up the security operation. Without the availability of full political support, the army may be reluctant to go for a security operation. This kind of divergence can cause a strain in civil-military relations.
The federal government faces another serious challenge. The militant groups based in the tribal belt can encourage the mainland groups to resort to sectarian violence in Punjab to cause internal instability. In fact, the tribal belt-based militant groups can also directly launch attacks in Punjab. All this will be done to divert the attention of the federal government from the tribal areas towards security issues in Punjab.
If Pakistan cannot contain all these militant groups either by talks or through security action before the end of 2014, it will face greater problems after most of the US/Nato troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. If the Afghan Taliban gain strength in southern Afghanistan, militants on the Pakistani side will be more confident of challenging the state and if the military takes action against them, they can easily cross over to Afghanistan.
It is important that Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities adopt a joint strategy to cope with the challenge posed by these militant-sectarian groups. The criterion should be that any group using violence against the Pakistani state or its citizens must be dealt with firmly.
Pakistan should also help the Kabul government to hold a dialogue with the Afghan Taliban. These two countries should cooperate with each other for the adoption of a shared security arrangement to curb the two-way movement of such elements across the Pakistan-Afghan border. Such cooperation can contribute towards ensuring internal security and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Pakistan has one year left to retrieve the initiative from the militants. The civil and military authorities need to work together to assert the state’s primacy before it is too late.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 16th, 2013.
Pakistan is not the only country in the world where some groups challenge the writ of the state or want to overwhelm the state structure. The experience of other countries shows that once such groups come into existence, they continue to function even if the original reason is partially or totally removed. These groups develop a sense of power and find it difficult to give up the habit of violence and new justifications are evolved for their continued existence. Insurgencies and challenges to state authorities come to an end either when one party loses to the other or the competing entities come to a political understanding.
Dialogue is an option for coming out of an internal conflict situation. However, dialogue is only possible when both sides come to the conclusion that none can get a clear victory and that the situation is stalemated. The other chance for a dialogue exists when one competing entity perceives its defeat or total elimination.
The possibilities of a political settlement between the government of Pakistan and the militants in our tribal belt are minimal because they do not feel stalemated in their efforts to project their power in the tribal areas and mainland Pakistan. They appear quite confident that they can pursue their agenda of implementing their perception of the Sharia rule and world view because they are not only entrenched in the tribal areas but have also developed strong linkages with militant groups in mainland Pakistan. These linkages have strengthened the Punjab-based militant and sectarian groups and also helped the militants based in the tribal belt to spread their network in mainland Pakistan. This networking and spread of their activists in mainland Pakistan enables them to count on sympathy, if not support, for their political agenda in mainland Pakistan. This is coupled with the ascendancy of those political parties in Pakistan that have rightist orientations (the PML-N, the PTI and their allies). All this makes it difficult for the civilian government to adopt a tough policy towards the militancy.
Pakistan’s federal government is leaning towards bringing the militants to the dialogue table. The militants, on the other hand, have set out preconditions for the talks rather than starting the dialogue and then raising these demands. This shows that they are not in any hurry to start a dialogue with the Pakistani government.
The militants in the tribal belt do not think that they are losing against Pakistan’s state apparatus. Their leadership also thinks that given their linkages with the mainland groups and the right-wing orientations of the federal government, there is an inbuilt pressure on the civilian government for not going for a tough action against them. As long as the ground political realities do not turn against the militants, they will not avail of the federal government’s offer for talks.
The army top brass is looking towards the civilian government for seeking a political solution to the problem of militancy. The army cannot sit back for an indefinite period for the civilian leaders to continue toying with the notion of dialogue. Perhaps, it can wait for three to four months. If nothing comes out of the dialogue, what would be its disposition? The army may be inclined to go for a security operation in the tribal areas to secure the region before the end of 2014. It would seek the cooperation of the civilian government for backing up the security operation. Without the availability of full political support, the army may be reluctant to go for a security operation. This kind of divergence can cause a strain in civil-military relations.
The federal government faces another serious challenge. The militant groups based in the tribal belt can encourage the mainland groups to resort to sectarian violence in Punjab to cause internal instability. In fact, the tribal belt-based militant groups can also directly launch attacks in Punjab. All this will be done to divert the attention of the federal government from the tribal areas towards security issues in Punjab.
If Pakistan cannot contain all these militant groups either by talks or through security action before the end of 2014, it will face greater problems after most of the US/Nato troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. If the Afghan Taliban gain strength in southern Afghanistan, militants on the Pakistani side will be more confident of challenging the state and if the military takes action against them, they can easily cross over to Afghanistan.
It is important that Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities adopt a joint strategy to cope with the challenge posed by these militant-sectarian groups. The criterion should be that any group using violence against the Pakistani state or its citizens must be dealt with firmly.
Pakistan should also help the Kabul government to hold a dialogue with the Afghan Taliban. These two countries should cooperate with each other for the adoption of a shared security arrangement to curb the two-way movement of such elements across the Pakistan-Afghan border. Such cooperation can contribute towards ensuring internal security and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Pakistan has one year left to retrieve the initiative from the militants. The civil and military authorities need to work together to assert the state’s primacy before it is too late.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 16th, 2013.