Inflexible minds
Imran still has great promise. But inability to change mind in time, cut losses means reactionary groups can play him.
The writer is an Islamabad-based TV journalist and tweets @FarrukhKPitafi
Edward de Bono once asked a legitimate question: “If you never change your mind, why have one?” And if you are a Pakistani voter, this question can often come back to haunt you. In the inertia-ridden politics of Pakistan, parties seldom change their trajectory. That said, there are two exceptions: Benazir Bhutto, after the demise of the Soviet Union and Nawaz Sharif after his return from exile.
Even Imran Khan manifested a change of heart nine years ago when he saw the error of supporting General (retd) Pervez Musharraf in his referendum and decided to wholeheartedly oppose him. Just remember though that the referendum came after Musharraf’s decision to join the Bush Administration in the war on terror and by supporting his election, he was endorsing his foreign policy. Some say he fell out with Musharraf when he saw his dream of being the premier going down the drain. His party’s official stance, however, is that he distanced himself from the dictator when he decided to send the army to the tribal areas. That is untrue for two reasons.
I vividly recall Imran’s early days in parliament after the 2002 elections, much before the purported 2004 decision and he already was weary of Musharraf’s rule. Second, the army entered the Tirah valley in Khyber Agency, shortly after the battle of Tora Bora, followed by the entering of the Shawal Valley in North Waziristan and finally South Waziristan. So, reacting to the army’s deployment in 2004 is a myth.
In any case, Imran’s change of heart was understandable. The Bush Administration was tactless in dealing with perceptions in Pakistan and the fact that there was opaqueness of dictatorial rule in the country didn’t help matters. With speculations on US plans to take out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and the country’s balkanisation finding space in the Western press, it was easy for anyone to go into a reactionary mode. And in all fairness, the PTI was still a one-man party, with all the reactionary retired bureaucrats and servicemen strongly clustered around him.
However, Imran’s massive public gathering in Lahore in 2011 changed that as notable politicians, desperate to explore a third option, started joining his party. That was the best time for him to start distancing himself from reactionary elements. He did not do so and consequently, his party is now a hybrid, where pragmatists often find themselves struggling with the conservatives. Add to this the fact that he thinks that almost all secular politicians are corrupt and only those from the Jamaat-e-Islami are honest people.
If truth be told, Imran still has great promise. But the inability to change his mind in time and cut his losses ensures that other reactionary groups will keep playing him like a fiddle. There has been an elaborate mention of one of his coalition partners. The other strong influence, albeit not his partner, is Tahirul Qadri. Just before the elections, Qadri returned to Pakistan with a desire to disrupt an election that most certainly was to bring Nawaz Sharif back to power. Imran wisely chose not to side with him. But the cheerleading social and news media built such a false sense of euphoria around the PTI’s campaign that even he inhaled his party’s propaganda and as the election results came, he ended up buying Qadri’s lines too. Had he taken an objective look and studied the voting pattern in Punjab, he would have realised that the vote bank there is the last in Pakistan to convert. The PML-N managed to survive in the 2002 elections and in 2008, staged a baffling comeback. Had Imran been cognisant of this fact, he would have been delighted, because in most races even in Punjab, his party was the runner-up, which is a huge feat.
Imran’s focus on governance could make him a force to reckon with. However, the reactionary thought surrounding him ensures he remains divided between blocking Nato supply lines and challenging the May 11 election results, two policies which are doomed to failure.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 14th, 2013.
Even Imran Khan manifested a change of heart nine years ago when he saw the error of supporting General (retd) Pervez Musharraf in his referendum and decided to wholeheartedly oppose him. Just remember though that the referendum came after Musharraf’s decision to join the Bush Administration in the war on terror and by supporting his election, he was endorsing his foreign policy. Some say he fell out with Musharraf when he saw his dream of being the premier going down the drain. His party’s official stance, however, is that he distanced himself from the dictator when he decided to send the army to the tribal areas. That is untrue for two reasons.
I vividly recall Imran’s early days in parliament after the 2002 elections, much before the purported 2004 decision and he already was weary of Musharraf’s rule. Second, the army entered the Tirah valley in Khyber Agency, shortly after the battle of Tora Bora, followed by the entering of the Shawal Valley in North Waziristan and finally South Waziristan. So, reacting to the army’s deployment in 2004 is a myth.
In any case, Imran’s change of heart was understandable. The Bush Administration was tactless in dealing with perceptions in Pakistan and the fact that there was opaqueness of dictatorial rule in the country didn’t help matters. With speculations on US plans to take out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and the country’s balkanisation finding space in the Western press, it was easy for anyone to go into a reactionary mode. And in all fairness, the PTI was still a one-man party, with all the reactionary retired bureaucrats and servicemen strongly clustered around him.
However, Imran’s massive public gathering in Lahore in 2011 changed that as notable politicians, desperate to explore a third option, started joining his party. That was the best time for him to start distancing himself from reactionary elements. He did not do so and consequently, his party is now a hybrid, where pragmatists often find themselves struggling with the conservatives. Add to this the fact that he thinks that almost all secular politicians are corrupt and only those from the Jamaat-e-Islami are honest people.
If truth be told, Imran still has great promise. But the inability to change his mind in time and cut his losses ensures that other reactionary groups will keep playing him like a fiddle. There has been an elaborate mention of one of his coalition partners. The other strong influence, albeit not his partner, is Tahirul Qadri. Just before the elections, Qadri returned to Pakistan with a desire to disrupt an election that most certainly was to bring Nawaz Sharif back to power. Imran wisely chose not to side with him. But the cheerleading social and news media built such a false sense of euphoria around the PTI’s campaign that even he inhaled his party’s propaganda and as the election results came, he ended up buying Qadri’s lines too. Had he taken an objective look and studied the voting pattern in Punjab, he would have realised that the vote bank there is the last in Pakistan to convert. The PML-N managed to survive in the 2002 elections and in 2008, staged a baffling comeback. Had Imran been cognisant of this fact, he would have been delighted, because in most races even in Punjab, his party was the runner-up, which is a huge feat.
Imran’s focus on governance could make him a force to reckon with. However, the reactionary thought surrounding him ensures he remains divided between blocking Nato supply lines and challenging the May 11 election results, two policies which are doomed to failure.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 14th, 2013.