World’s highest battlefield — what next?
With hullabaloo about saving world’s environment, there is nary a squeak from international community about Siachen.
The writer is a former ambassador and former assistant secretary general of OIC
Adviser to the Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs is reported in the media as having averred that the presence of Indian forces on the Siachen glacier “is a serious threat to the environment of Pakistan”. He went on to ask for the “withdrawal” of the Indian forces. Even though it has come rather late in the day, this ‘realisation’ should be welcomed. It would be of some interest to see what the government intends to do as a follow-up.
What had lent a sense of urgency to the 2012 India-Pakistan negotiations on the issue was the fact that apprehensions of natural disasters waiting to happen — if military activity in the region was not stopped — as expressed by international ecologists for quite some time had, regrettably, started to come true. The loss of so many lives in the Gayari landslide should have served to bring home to both sides the fact that nature has little respect for the best laid plans of men.
The joint statement issued at the end of the 2012 talks was lame to the extreme. Some media opinion sunk so low as to interpret the mere issuing of the joint statement as an indication of ‘some progress’. There was even talk of the two sides ‘inching towards a solution’. Why speak of ‘inches’ at a time when there are virtually miles to cover? India has, over the years, exhibited a marked reluctance to budge an inch from its traditional — and, one might add, somewhat irrational — stand: that of not taking a step forward unless the ‘ground realities’ are not only recognised but also formally authenticated.
The issue came close to a solution at least twice over the years. In 1989, prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi reached a tacit agreement on withdrawal of troops to pre-1972 positions. The Indian establishment apparently torpedoed the agreement. Then during the November 1992 talks in New Delhi, the two sides had reached agreement on a compromise settlement that would have resulted in demilitarisation of the area. This, too, was vetoed by the Indian establishment.
This said, a few home truths. Pre-1984, the Siachen glacier area was a vast, peaceful expanse, with nary a soldier in sight. There was universal defacto recognition that the area was under the ‘administrative control’ of the Pakistan authorities. In the 1960s, Pakistan and China had negotiated a border agreement covering the frontier between China and the area under the administrative control of Pakistan. This agreement covered, inter alia, the expanse of the Siachen glacier and extended up to the Karakoram Pass in the east. The Indian government went through the formality of putting on record its reservations, but made no attempt to challenge Pakistan’s notional defacto control over the area. It is to be noted that India did not challenge Pakistan’s defacto administrative control over the Siachen glacier area either during or after the Simla summit meeting.
Circa 1984, apparently taking advantage of the technological superiority afforded by the supply of high-altitude helicopters, India surreptitiously established advance posts on some of the heights, thus manifesting the first serious violation of the Simla accord (the Kargil fiasco being the second).
There is a gigantic ecological disaster just waiting to happen. What with the hullabaloo about saving the world’s environment, there is nary a squeak from the international community about the sinister goings-on in Siachen. Pakistan’s feeble response at this juncture can only be put in the category of too little too late.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 10th, 2013.
What had lent a sense of urgency to the 2012 India-Pakistan negotiations on the issue was the fact that apprehensions of natural disasters waiting to happen — if military activity in the region was not stopped — as expressed by international ecologists for quite some time had, regrettably, started to come true. The loss of so many lives in the Gayari landslide should have served to bring home to both sides the fact that nature has little respect for the best laid plans of men.
The joint statement issued at the end of the 2012 talks was lame to the extreme. Some media opinion sunk so low as to interpret the mere issuing of the joint statement as an indication of ‘some progress’. There was even talk of the two sides ‘inching towards a solution’. Why speak of ‘inches’ at a time when there are virtually miles to cover? India has, over the years, exhibited a marked reluctance to budge an inch from its traditional — and, one might add, somewhat irrational — stand: that of not taking a step forward unless the ‘ground realities’ are not only recognised but also formally authenticated.
The issue came close to a solution at least twice over the years. In 1989, prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi reached a tacit agreement on withdrawal of troops to pre-1972 positions. The Indian establishment apparently torpedoed the agreement. Then during the November 1992 talks in New Delhi, the two sides had reached agreement on a compromise settlement that would have resulted in demilitarisation of the area. This, too, was vetoed by the Indian establishment.
This said, a few home truths. Pre-1984, the Siachen glacier area was a vast, peaceful expanse, with nary a soldier in sight. There was universal defacto recognition that the area was under the ‘administrative control’ of the Pakistan authorities. In the 1960s, Pakistan and China had negotiated a border agreement covering the frontier between China and the area under the administrative control of Pakistan. This agreement covered, inter alia, the expanse of the Siachen glacier and extended up to the Karakoram Pass in the east. The Indian government went through the formality of putting on record its reservations, but made no attempt to challenge Pakistan’s notional defacto control over the area. It is to be noted that India did not challenge Pakistan’s defacto administrative control over the Siachen glacier area either during or after the Simla summit meeting.
Circa 1984, apparently taking advantage of the technological superiority afforded by the supply of high-altitude helicopters, India surreptitiously established advance posts on some of the heights, thus manifesting the first serious violation of the Simla accord (the Kargil fiasco being the second).
There is a gigantic ecological disaster just waiting to happen. What with the hullabaloo about saving the world’s environment, there is nary a squeak from the international community about the sinister goings-on in Siachen. Pakistan’s feeble response at this juncture can only be put in the category of too little too late.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 10th, 2013.