Dialogue with the Taliban
A declared policy of negotiating with the Taliban, or any other group should not be construed as ‘surrender’.
The writer is a security and political analyst and works at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad
I am not impressed by the argument that there should be no talks with the Pakistani Taliban or with the idea that the use of force is the only way out for the country. Actually, there is no argument, except an opinion that rests on some strong ideological or philosophical prejudice against militants with a religious agenda and motivation. Why do I say so? The same people who argue against negotiations with the Taliban, open their hearts and minds up for ethnic militants and rather strongly advocate dialogue with them.
There is no guarantee that dialogue, or the use of force, can or will succeed in dousing down the fires of insurgency — low, sporadic and intense as they might be. Insurgencies take a long time to form, develop leadership, an organisation and internal and external linkages. It becomes hard for states like ours to defeat them under one government, one policy or by any either/or option. Many countries have been through insurgencies for decades and have finally defeated them (Sri Lanka) or brought them to a negotiating table (the UK against the Irish Republican Army).
Every conflict, insurgency or militancy, anywhere in the world, that we know of, has produced two-dimensional responses from the state — the use of force and negotiations. Neither a declared policy of negotiating with the Taliban, or any other group, can be or should be construed as ‘surrender’ or end of fighting, nor has the use of force guaranteed any success.
War and politics are two sides of the counter-insurgency strategy. Separating the two, by making a bad faith argument against the adversary or by taking the position that the enemy is not softened enough as yet, doesn’t stand the test of history or reason. There is also another problem with the ‘no-talks’ crowd and argument — of an irrational and unfounded assumption. This assumption is that since the Taliban are driven by religious fanaticism and have an ambitious agenda of capturing the Pakistani state, talking to them is a useless exercise. Never has any state taken a position of no-talks with the militants — religious, communal, ethnic or separatists.
Let me repeat it lest you misunderstand my point — dialogue with the Taliban or any other group doesn’t mean giving up the option of the use of force. It will be, and must remain, in the background and over the horizon. The parliamentary consensus on the dialogue doesn’t and should never lift that threat.
That we know what we are going to talk about is very important to all of us, rather, to both sides — ending the Taliban insurgency and violence. What is more important is what we are not going to talk about. There cannot and will never be a compromise on democracy, the Constitution or the territorial sovereignty of the state — no matter how relative these concepts, in a globalised world, are. Keep in mind, states don’t engage in talks with militants to give up their right to exist or lose their essential significance — the legal right to rule.
Our assessment of whether or not the Taliban are serious about negotiations or ending the war may vary, and it does depend on who is writing or talking about it. Let me share my understanding of the dialogue and its two sides — the Taliban and the government. The Taliban are as pragmatic, rational in self-interest and risk-averse as any person or organisation can be. Let there be no illusions about that. The government, for the right political reasons, would like to exhaust the remedy of talks, while it must prepare itself for delivering a deadly blow at the right time and at the right place, and even prepare for the long haul.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 15th, 2013.
There is no guarantee that dialogue, or the use of force, can or will succeed in dousing down the fires of insurgency — low, sporadic and intense as they might be. Insurgencies take a long time to form, develop leadership, an organisation and internal and external linkages. It becomes hard for states like ours to defeat them under one government, one policy or by any either/or option. Many countries have been through insurgencies for decades and have finally defeated them (Sri Lanka) or brought them to a negotiating table (the UK against the Irish Republican Army).
Every conflict, insurgency or militancy, anywhere in the world, that we know of, has produced two-dimensional responses from the state — the use of force and negotiations. Neither a declared policy of negotiating with the Taliban, or any other group, can be or should be construed as ‘surrender’ or end of fighting, nor has the use of force guaranteed any success.
War and politics are two sides of the counter-insurgency strategy. Separating the two, by making a bad faith argument against the adversary or by taking the position that the enemy is not softened enough as yet, doesn’t stand the test of history or reason. There is also another problem with the ‘no-talks’ crowd and argument — of an irrational and unfounded assumption. This assumption is that since the Taliban are driven by religious fanaticism and have an ambitious agenda of capturing the Pakistani state, talking to them is a useless exercise. Never has any state taken a position of no-talks with the militants — religious, communal, ethnic or separatists.
Let me repeat it lest you misunderstand my point — dialogue with the Taliban or any other group doesn’t mean giving up the option of the use of force. It will be, and must remain, in the background and over the horizon. The parliamentary consensus on the dialogue doesn’t and should never lift that threat.
That we know what we are going to talk about is very important to all of us, rather, to both sides — ending the Taliban insurgency and violence. What is more important is what we are not going to talk about. There cannot and will never be a compromise on democracy, the Constitution or the territorial sovereignty of the state — no matter how relative these concepts, in a globalised world, are. Keep in mind, states don’t engage in talks with militants to give up their right to exist or lose their essential significance — the legal right to rule.
Our assessment of whether or not the Taliban are serious about negotiations or ending the war may vary, and it does depend on who is writing or talking about it. Let me share my understanding of the dialogue and its two sides — the Taliban and the government. The Taliban are as pragmatic, rational in self-interest and risk-averse as any person or organisation can be. Let there be no illusions about that. The government, for the right political reasons, would like to exhaust the remedy of talks, while it must prepare itself for delivering a deadly blow at the right time and at the right place, and even prepare for the long haul.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 15th, 2013.