A possible basis for settling the Kashmir dispute
An agreement between the countries would reduce the support the Jihadis groups receive and thus ensure peace.
The writer has recently retired from the World Bank. He has a PhD from Imperial College in London
The news from the Line of Control (LoC), in Kashmir, is not good. Five Indian soldiers were reportedly kidnapped and murdered by terrorists wearing Pakistan Army uniforms. The Pakistan Army denies any part in this. This action, like similar actions in the past, has most likely been carried out by jihadi groups, who would very much like to derail any process of rapprochement between India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, this has caused tempers to flare across the border — the Indian establishment has sounded off against Pakistan and its support for terrorists. On the Pakistani side, the reaction has been much more muted. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has expressed his concerns at the escalating tensions.
All this comes against the backdrop of positive developments over the last several months where the ground was being prepared for reopening the dialogue between the two countries.
It is really important that both countries keep their eye on the ball and do not get distracted by such incidents, once again. This is exactly what the jihadi groups — who are responsible for the violent incidents on the LoC — want.
Notwithstanding the troubles mentioned above, I think the current circumstances in Pakistan are most favourable to move forward on this matter. The new government has the necessary political space and mandate, and has shown the will to do so. Very soon after Nawaz Sharif took office, he dispatched a special envoy to India to sound out the government there.
The Pakistan Army chief also made a critical statement a few months ago, saying that the major threat to Pakistan is from the Taliban and associated terrorists, rather than India. In his speech at the Pakistan Military Academy, in Kakul, he again dwelt at length on this threat and how Pakistan has no option but to meet it head on, hardly mentioning India in this context.
More importantly, if we look at the matter of Kashmir closely, we see that the interests of both Pakistan and India are surprisingly similar — both India and Pakistan want to keep control over their parts of Kashmir and both have, hopefully, realised after three wars that they cannot get the other part.
Two major opinion surveys conducted on both sides of border in Kashmir, over the period 2007-2010, have shown that less than 10 per cent of the Muslim population of Indian-occupied-Kashmir would like to join Pakistan. Likewise, Pakistani Kashmiris do not want to join India.
Therefore, it seems time has moved on and the situation on the ground has changed, since 1947. A division along the LoC, i.e., a formalisation of the status quo, is in the best interest of both India and Pakistan.
Please note that agreement on these lines only formalises the defacto situation on the ground and does not require any changes which could result in a breaking point. It would, therefore, be the easiest to implement.
In view of the high payback possible from defusing this flashpoint between two nuclear armed countries, it is imperative that political leaders of both countries (with encouragement of the international community) spend the necessary political capital to come to an agreement. It may get them the Nobel Peace Prize if they do!
Published in The Express Tribune, August 17th, 2013.
All this comes against the backdrop of positive developments over the last several months where the ground was being prepared for reopening the dialogue between the two countries.
It is really important that both countries keep their eye on the ball and do not get distracted by such incidents, once again. This is exactly what the jihadi groups — who are responsible for the violent incidents on the LoC — want.
Notwithstanding the troubles mentioned above, I think the current circumstances in Pakistan are most favourable to move forward on this matter. The new government has the necessary political space and mandate, and has shown the will to do so. Very soon after Nawaz Sharif took office, he dispatched a special envoy to India to sound out the government there.
The Pakistan Army chief also made a critical statement a few months ago, saying that the major threat to Pakistan is from the Taliban and associated terrorists, rather than India. In his speech at the Pakistan Military Academy, in Kakul, he again dwelt at length on this threat and how Pakistan has no option but to meet it head on, hardly mentioning India in this context.
More importantly, if we look at the matter of Kashmir closely, we see that the interests of both Pakistan and India are surprisingly similar — both India and Pakistan want to keep control over their parts of Kashmir and both have, hopefully, realised after three wars that they cannot get the other part.
Two major opinion surveys conducted on both sides of border in Kashmir, over the period 2007-2010, have shown that less than 10 per cent of the Muslim population of Indian-occupied-Kashmir would like to join Pakistan. Likewise, Pakistani Kashmiris do not want to join India.
Therefore, it seems time has moved on and the situation on the ground has changed, since 1947. A division along the LoC, i.e., a formalisation of the status quo, is in the best interest of both India and Pakistan.
Please note that agreement on these lines only formalises the defacto situation on the ground and does not require any changes which could result in a breaking point. It would, therefore, be the easiest to implement.
In view of the high payback possible from defusing this flashpoint between two nuclear armed countries, it is imperative that political leaders of both countries (with encouragement of the international community) spend the necessary political capital to come to an agreement. It may get them the Nobel Peace Prize if they do!
Published in The Express Tribune, August 17th, 2013.