Fighting terrorism
The journey of cleaning violence from society is steeply uphill. The only option is to free the state of any religion.
The writer is an independent social scientist and author of Military Inc.
The National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta) draft policy on counterterrorism bravely talks about introducing a new religious narrative to bring down levels of violence. The idea is to highlight the peaceful aspects of religion rather than those that create violence and conflict. Although an interesting idea, it is both questionable and highly challenging.
But how does one know which flavour of religion is better? Does Nacta want to follow the US RAND Corporation’s formula in its 2007 report on “building moderate Muslim networks” that identified Sufi and Barelvi Islam as a counter to the Deobandi and Salafi religious narratives that encourage jihad? Western and local elite get thrilled by images of people dancing to traditional or pop versions of devotional music, in some cases, even high on intoxicants. However, such understanding depicts corporatisation of images that in turn doesn’t explain that even Sufi movements, especially in Africa, were linked with violent uprising. The emerging violence of the Barelvis in the name of protesting blasphemy in Pakistan, which is actually a bid to compete against the slowly growing popularity of the Deobandis, is another case in point. In fact, there are Barelvi militants as well linked with the shrine of Sultan Bahu that have fought in Kashmir alongside Deobandi groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad and others. What continues to keep Sufism and Barelvism relatively peaceful is that state actors have not actively exploited it.
In any case, we are assuming that the common man is still bound to Sufi shrines in a traditional way. In a world driven primarily by quantitative analysis, we forget that hundreds and thousands of people visiting Sufi shrines doesn’t mean anything, especially when there is no narrative being produced by keepers of the shrines that can face challenges of modern times. Pakistan’s renowned sociologist Hamza Alavi called ‘Barelvism’ as religion of the peasants that would undergo tension and pressure once society modernises, even though superficially. Economic and social advancement raises expectations. So, while people will keep going to shrines in droves asking for amulets and blessings of pirs, the level of expectation has changed. The mureed no longer just wants blessings and prayers but also access to the pir’s patronage in the form of intervention with the state. Incidentally, there are now other forces that are becoming more powerful than the pir. In fact, the pirs have begun to partner with the militants for enhancing material gains and power. This is certainly the case in Punjab and Sindh where pirs and puritans coexist (interestingly, some of the prominent pirs of Punjab were falling over each other to participate in Ghazi Abdul Rasheed of Lal Masjid’s funeral).
Meanwhile, the trader-merchant representing the middle class bourgeoisie is attracted towards the religious model offered by the Deobandi and Salafi religious groups due to its relative modernity and inherent egalitarianism. This is most obvious from the package deal offered by the militants to potential martyrs: a crown of jewels on your head and power to get 70 people pardoned in the life hereafter. From the perspective of power politics of a fast urbanising society, the Deobandi and Salafi religious/militant networks are attractive for the emerging middle class and elite due to the former’s capacity to do violence. Donations to militant groups provide protection, enhance muscle power and give spiritual satisfaction as well. This will continue to happen in a state which seems to be melting away, giving way to alternative sources of power.
The other fundamental question pertains to who will determine the correct flavour of religion for society? If the plan is for the State to undertake this shift, then it is a deadly recipe since any form of state intervention of or manipulation of religion for tactical or strategic purposes has brought more, not less, conflict. Learning from conflict in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, even Buddhism will get violent when used for power maximisation. All religions will be good if used for fulfilling spiritual needs but bad when used for power and political gains.
Those, who argue for a utopian idea of politics not being separate from religion in Islam, do so at the risk of ignoring Islamic history that is indicative of how religion was often manipulated for political gains. A Muslim scholar from the 1920s at Al Azhar, Ali Abdel Razek argued in his seminal work on “Islam and the Foundation of Political Power” that the concept of a caliphate is, in fact, a political manipulation as there is no reference to such an entity in the Holy Quran or Hadith. Had a particular system been so fundamental to the lives of Muslims, God would have ordained it. Other scholars like Abdullah’a Naeem talk about the need for separation of religion from politics of the state as fundamental for the growth and development of religion. These approaches need to be discussed and debated but are lost between two extremes — the belief that the state cannot run without religion versus the idea that people should abstain from religion altogether. But a more critical issue with marrying religion with politics of the state is that the group, which will have power, will force its will through marketing its peculiar interpretation of religion as being the word of God.
Post-modernist Islamists who argue that people conforming to specific religious norms and ideology denote free choice and, hence, secularisation of society, forget that people are rarely offered free choice. This idea of free choice is inherently neo-imperialistic as those offering a certain interpretation of religious text do not allow any other perspective and expect the believer to take their word as the word of God.
The journey of cleaning violence from society is steeply uphill. The only option is to free the state of any religion (not to be confused with society that can follow any faith). Else, the alternative religious narrative will prove disastrous. But we are most likely to fail as the leadership doesn’t have the will to bring the critical change.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 15th, 2013.
But how does one know which flavour of religion is better? Does Nacta want to follow the US RAND Corporation’s formula in its 2007 report on “building moderate Muslim networks” that identified Sufi and Barelvi Islam as a counter to the Deobandi and Salafi religious narratives that encourage jihad? Western and local elite get thrilled by images of people dancing to traditional or pop versions of devotional music, in some cases, even high on intoxicants. However, such understanding depicts corporatisation of images that in turn doesn’t explain that even Sufi movements, especially in Africa, were linked with violent uprising. The emerging violence of the Barelvis in the name of protesting blasphemy in Pakistan, which is actually a bid to compete against the slowly growing popularity of the Deobandis, is another case in point. In fact, there are Barelvi militants as well linked with the shrine of Sultan Bahu that have fought in Kashmir alongside Deobandi groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad and others. What continues to keep Sufism and Barelvism relatively peaceful is that state actors have not actively exploited it.
In any case, we are assuming that the common man is still bound to Sufi shrines in a traditional way. In a world driven primarily by quantitative analysis, we forget that hundreds and thousands of people visiting Sufi shrines doesn’t mean anything, especially when there is no narrative being produced by keepers of the shrines that can face challenges of modern times. Pakistan’s renowned sociologist Hamza Alavi called ‘Barelvism’ as religion of the peasants that would undergo tension and pressure once society modernises, even though superficially. Economic and social advancement raises expectations. So, while people will keep going to shrines in droves asking for amulets and blessings of pirs, the level of expectation has changed. The mureed no longer just wants blessings and prayers but also access to the pir’s patronage in the form of intervention with the state. Incidentally, there are now other forces that are becoming more powerful than the pir. In fact, the pirs have begun to partner with the militants for enhancing material gains and power. This is certainly the case in Punjab and Sindh where pirs and puritans coexist (interestingly, some of the prominent pirs of Punjab were falling over each other to participate in Ghazi Abdul Rasheed of Lal Masjid’s funeral).
Meanwhile, the trader-merchant representing the middle class bourgeoisie is attracted towards the religious model offered by the Deobandi and Salafi religious groups due to its relative modernity and inherent egalitarianism. This is most obvious from the package deal offered by the militants to potential martyrs: a crown of jewels on your head and power to get 70 people pardoned in the life hereafter. From the perspective of power politics of a fast urbanising society, the Deobandi and Salafi religious/militant networks are attractive for the emerging middle class and elite due to the former’s capacity to do violence. Donations to militant groups provide protection, enhance muscle power and give spiritual satisfaction as well. This will continue to happen in a state which seems to be melting away, giving way to alternative sources of power.
The other fundamental question pertains to who will determine the correct flavour of religion for society? If the plan is for the State to undertake this shift, then it is a deadly recipe since any form of state intervention of or manipulation of religion for tactical or strategic purposes has brought more, not less, conflict. Learning from conflict in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, even Buddhism will get violent when used for power maximisation. All religions will be good if used for fulfilling spiritual needs but bad when used for power and political gains.
Those, who argue for a utopian idea of politics not being separate from religion in Islam, do so at the risk of ignoring Islamic history that is indicative of how religion was often manipulated for political gains. A Muslim scholar from the 1920s at Al Azhar, Ali Abdel Razek argued in his seminal work on “Islam and the Foundation of Political Power” that the concept of a caliphate is, in fact, a political manipulation as there is no reference to such an entity in the Holy Quran or Hadith. Had a particular system been so fundamental to the lives of Muslims, God would have ordained it. Other scholars like Abdullah’a Naeem talk about the need for separation of religion from politics of the state as fundamental for the growth and development of religion. These approaches need to be discussed and debated but are lost between two extremes — the belief that the state cannot run without religion versus the idea that people should abstain from religion altogether. But a more critical issue with marrying religion with politics of the state is that the group, which will have power, will force its will through marketing its peculiar interpretation of religion as being the word of God.
Post-modernist Islamists who argue that people conforming to specific religious norms and ideology denote free choice and, hence, secularisation of society, forget that people are rarely offered free choice. This idea of free choice is inherently neo-imperialistic as those offering a certain interpretation of religious text do not allow any other perspective and expect the believer to take their word as the word of God.
The journey of cleaning violence from society is steeply uphill. The only option is to free the state of any religion (not to be confused with society that can follow any faith). Else, the alternative religious narrative will prove disastrous. But we are most likely to fail as the leadership doesn’t have the will to bring the critical change.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 15th, 2013.