Losing hearts and minds
Afghan security forces are not prepared for the Taliban and will not be able to prevent violence across the country.
The writer, a native of South Waziristan, has a master’s degree in conflict-resolution from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California and blogs at http://coffeeshopdiplomat.wordpress.com/
Nato countries have agreed to get together next year and discuss troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Washington DC is already moving on from the South Asia region, particularly from the conflict along the Durand Line. Funding for programmes covering the conflict has dried up and interests have shifted to the Middle East and Africa. This is rather disappointing, especially as we near the 2014 deadline when Afghanistan is going to be left at the mercy of the Taliban. The Afghan security forces are not prepared for the challenge and the few US bases that will remain in Afghanistan will not be able to prevent a surge of violence across the country.
A recent report titled “A successful outcome in Afghanistan” co-authored by General John Allen, has blamed corruption in Afghanistan, the resilience of the Taliban and Pakistan’s fickleness, for US failures in Afghanistan. The report warns that the US risks “snatching defeat from the jaws of something that could still resemble victory … if they accelerate their disengagement between now and 2014 and under-source their commitment to Afghanistan after 2014”. A case is made for President Barack Obama to declare how many US troops shall remain in Afghanistan post-withdrawal. The report claims that several thousand will be necessary for up to three years after the withdrawal in order to assist Afghanistan security forces develop their capability and technology. If a coalition of 140,000 Nato/Isaf troops, with their superior weapons and drones, were unable to manage the conflict in Afghanistan; and the surge even failed to achieve necessary results, then keeping a small number of troops behind is futile.
General Allen’s report argues that the US has a plan B for preventing Afghanistan from turning into a safe haven for al Qaeda, once again, with the following caveat: “this plan is not guaranteed to work, of course.” Plan B entails building a capable Afghan military, air force and special forces units, holding free and fair elections in 2014 and staying committed to creating stability in Afghanistan. US efforts to train and empower the Afghan National Army have not been promising thus far. Afghan forces continue to suffer from deserters and infiltrators and will probably be incapable of protecting their side of the border. Keep in mind that the US will have to spend $5 billion per year on the Afghan security forces alone, in order to sustain their current numbers. Meanwhile, green on blue attacks are on the rise and the Taliban continue to thrive in the remote and rural areas of Afghanistan. Billions of dollars have also been pledged to ensure free and fair elections next year in Afghanistan, failing which, the country will lose aid from the US.
One solution was always obvious and simple: talk to the majority Pashtuns. Instead, the US decided to change the dynamics of Afghanistan and empower the minority groups — the Northern Alliance, which includes Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. This resulted in a dramatic decline in the representation of Pashtuns, who represent a cohesive majority in Afghanistan and their intentional marginalisation cannot be sustained in any natural manner. Perhaps, the powers that be in Afghanistan bought into the erroneous generalisation that all Pashtuns are Taliban.
In the end, the report concludes that “Afghanistan will remain one of the poorest, least developed and more corrupt countries in the world for years to come”. The authors plead that the US and its allies must remain committed to pursuing stability and economic development in Afghanistan. They argue that compared with what has already been invested, in terms of human lives and wealth, it would be unwise to lose interest now. These statements are a flash from the past and remind us of the aftermath of the US role in Afghanistan during the 1980s’ Soviet invasion. After the failure of the US Congress to continue aid to Afghanistan for development, Congressman Charlie Wilson stated that “these things did happen. They were glorious and they changed the world … and then we (messed) up the endgame”
Published in The Express Tribune, June 7th, 2013.
A recent report titled “A successful outcome in Afghanistan” co-authored by General John Allen, has blamed corruption in Afghanistan, the resilience of the Taliban and Pakistan’s fickleness, for US failures in Afghanistan. The report warns that the US risks “snatching defeat from the jaws of something that could still resemble victory … if they accelerate their disengagement between now and 2014 and under-source their commitment to Afghanistan after 2014”. A case is made for President Barack Obama to declare how many US troops shall remain in Afghanistan post-withdrawal. The report claims that several thousand will be necessary for up to three years after the withdrawal in order to assist Afghanistan security forces develop their capability and technology. If a coalition of 140,000 Nato/Isaf troops, with their superior weapons and drones, were unable to manage the conflict in Afghanistan; and the surge even failed to achieve necessary results, then keeping a small number of troops behind is futile.
General Allen’s report argues that the US has a plan B for preventing Afghanistan from turning into a safe haven for al Qaeda, once again, with the following caveat: “this plan is not guaranteed to work, of course.” Plan B entails building a capable Afghan military, air force and special forces units, holding free and fair elections in 2014 and staying committed to creating stability in Afghanistan. US efforts to train and empower the Afghan National Army have not been promising thus far. Afghan forces continue to suffer from deserters and infiltrators and will probably be incapable of protecting their side of the border. Keep in mind that the US will have to spend $5 billion per year on the Afghan security forces alone, in order to sustain their current numbers. Meanwhile, green on blue attacks are on the rise and the Taliban continue to thrive in the remote and rural areas of Afghanistan. Billions of dollars have also been pledged to ensure free and fair elections next year in Afghanistan, failing which, the country will lose aid from the US.
One solution was always obvious and simple: talk to the majority Pashtuns. Instead, the US decided to change the dynamics of Afghanistan and empower the minority groups — the Northern Alliance, which includes Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. This resulted in a dramatic decline in the representation of Pashtuns, who represent a cohesive majority in Afghanistan and their intentional marginalisation cannot be sustained in any natural manner. Perhaps, the powers that be in Afghanistan bought into the erroneous generalisation that all Pashtuns are Taliban.
In the end, the report concludes that “Afghanistan will remain one of the poorest, least developed and more corrupt countries in the world for years to come”. The authors plead that the US and its allies must remain committed to pursuing stability and economic development in Afghanistan. They argue that compared with what has already been invested, in terms of human lives and wealth, it would be unwise to lose interest now. These statements are a flash from the past and remind us of the aftermath of the US role in Afghanistan during the 1980s’ Soviet invasion. After the failure of the US Congress to continue aid to Afghanistan for development, Congressman Charlie Wilson stated that “these things did happen. They were glorious and they changed the world … and then we (messed) up the endgame”
Published in The Express Tribune, June 7th, 2013.