Sleeping with the enemy
Establishment must reanalyse its stance before “peace talks” becomes more of a fatuous statement than a policy...
The writer is a graduate student at the University of Southern California and tweets @zahra7891
The charged air of “change” in recent elections caused many political parties to promise an end to terrorism and a return to peace. As a common Pakistani citizen, I would vouch that nobody of sound mind and loyalty to the country would oppose a policy of peace. However, the manner in which the process has been approached has raised eyebrows among the citizenry. The recent negative response from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has drawn even more scepticism for the policy from concerned citizens.
These concerns pertain to the apparent lack of understanding of the issue of terrorism by the political gentry. During the elections, actions of extremism were sometimes termed a result of the “military campaign” that has ensued over the past decade. The newly-elected government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) has cited the absence of a clear federal policy as a reason for delays in the peace process and has even made flagrantly immature statements to the tune of, “we are not at war with the Taliban”. These issues depict a severe lack of communication and analysis at an internal, multi-stakeholder level, which is extremely detrimental to the peace process, as one side of the negotiating table does not stand united and would sooner blame institutions than take collective responsibility for protecting the citizens of the country.
Furthermore, the assumptions upon which the single-tactic “peace talks” policy is based, are worrisome. Political rhetoric urges us to believe that a handful of targeted external variables are causing the problem. Stop drone strikes and the TTP will stop attacking innocent civilians. Stop a military offensive and the TTP will back off. Offer the TTP an olive branch and they will happily reciprocate.
The TTP is an organisation that has repeatedly challenged the sovereignty of Pakistan and infringed upon the rights of its people. While fear and violence are tools often used to promote their twisted ideology, the TTP also engages in community efforts to bolster extremist attitudes and exploit indigence, which, in turn, serves as the bases for recruitment and influence.
Any policy forged without a clear strategy to control both violence and influence is flawed and premature. Precisely what are we willing to negotiate for the prospect of peace if the current policy persists? Will we barter away some of our sovereignty for the illusion of peace and prosperity? Will we allow the TTP to breed in silos before becoming an even larger nuisance in the future?
It would serve the political establishment well to reanalyse its stance on negotiating peace before the offer of “peace talks” becomes more of a fatuous statement than a serious policy option. The concerned policy should be more comprehensive and can include military force, a gradual socioeconomic development of affected regions and targeted community campaigns against extremism, counterterrorism training for security forces and the effective implementation of the recently amended Anti-Terrorism Act. This must be aided with a genuine effort to strengthen policy by keeping all stakeholders on board.
The sheer size and seriousness of the issue demands that we move away from naive presumptuous rhetoric and utopian cause-effect relationships and more towards a long-term policy of eradicating extremism from our midst. Negotiation from a point of disadvantage is not negotiation; it is one-sided compromise; an agreement that rests on quicksand and a settlement that Pakistan simply cannot afford.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 2nd, 2013.
These concerns pertain to the apparent lack of understanding of the issue of terrorism by the political gentry. During the elections, actions of extremism were sometimes termed a result of the “military campaign” that has ensued over the past decade. The newly-elected government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) has cited the absence of a clear federal policy as a reason for delays in the peace process and has even made flagrantly immature statements to the tune of, “we are not at war with the Taliban”. These issues depict a severe lack of communication and analysis at an internal, multi-stakeholder level, which is extremely detrimental to the peace process, as one side of the negotiating table does not stand united and would sooner blame institutions than take collective responsibility for protecting the citizens of the country.
Furthermore, the assumptions upon which the single-tactic “peace talks” policy is based, are worrisome. Political rhetoric urges us to believe that a handful of targeted external variables are causing the problem. Stop drone strikes and the TTP will stop attacking innocent civilians. Stop a military offensive and the TTP will back off. Offer the TTP an olive branch and they will happily reciprocate.
The TTP is an organisation that has repeatedly challenged the sovereignty of Pakistan and infringed upon the rights of its people. While fear and violence are tools often used to promote their twisted ideology, the TTP also engages in community efforts to bolster extremist attitudes and exploit indigence, which, in turn, serves as the bases for recruitment and influence.
Any policy forged without a clear strategy to control both violence and influence is flawed and premature. Precisely what are we willing to negotiate for the prospect of peace if the current policy persists? Will we barter away some of our sovereignty for the illusion of peace and prosperity? Will we allow the TTP to breed in silos before becoming an even larger nuisance in the future?
It would serve the political establishment well to reanalyse its stance on negotiating peace before the offer of “peace talks” becomes more of a fatuous statement than a serious policy option. The concerned policy should be more comprehensive and can include military force, a gradual socioeconomic development of affected regions and targeted community campaigns against extremism, counterterrorism training for security forces and the effective implementation of the recently amended Anti-Terrorism Act. This must be aided with a genuine effort to strengthen policy by keeping all stakeholders on board.
The sheer size and seriousness of the issue demands that we move away from naive presumptuous rhetoric and utopian cause-effect relationships and more towards a long-term policy of eradicating extremism from our midst. Negotiation from a point of disadvantage is not negotiation; it is one-sided compromise; an agreement that rests on quicksand and a settlement that Pakistan simply cannot afford.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 2nd, 2013.