The conquering generals — I
In the govt of the East India Company, the military exercised the dominant role in tandem with the governor-general.
“In the Mughal times maintenance of law and order was the responsibility of the village community through its headman and the effective district police were the local governor’s military forces” says the well-known historian of the British Raj, VA Smith in the Oxford History of India, (1998).
Following the demise of Mughal rule the military became solely responsible for the internal and external security of the realm of the East India Company Bahadur. The British rulers usurped the traditional role of the local community. As the dominion expanded, the state apparatus was bifurcated between the military and civil executive and later the military was bifurcated into the military and the police.
In the government of the East India Company, the governor-general had his army to protect (and enlarge) the possessions, his police to maintain order, and his civil executive officers to collect revenue and administer day-to-day affairs. The people of India had no role in governance. The military exercised the dominant role, often in tandem with the governor-general.
The stock of the English generals rocketed sky high after they defeated Napoleon’s armies at Waterloo in 1814. The commander-in-chief, Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) was revered as a demigod. The victorious general served the Crown as foreign minister and also as prime minister and remained a close adviser of Queen Victoria till his death.
The English generals in India, protecting and enlarging the government of the East India Company, established notorious precedents of acting independently, indeed, in defiance of the policy laid down by the civil political authority in London.
The governor general who was in fact “Governor General of India in Council” and his commander-in-chief invaded Afghanistan in 1838 without taking the members of the Council into confidence. A few years later Sir Hugh Gough, commander-in-chief of the army in India, decided to invade the Punjab. The governor-general told him that the attack would contravene the policy laid down by London. Moreover, he had no funds to finance the war. The military man told the governor-general that victory in the battle was certain as the betrayal of elements from the enemy’ army has been arranged. Large amount of loot and plunder would come in their hands and there would be no shortage of funds. The two hatched a conspiracy. The commander-in-chief ordered the governor-general to report for battle duty since the latter was a retired lieutenant-general of the army and as such was subsequently in the reserves. The crafty governor-general put himself under the command of the military and also wrote a secret letter to a friend in London which was to be delivered to the government if the battle was lost in which he wrote that he was coerced by the military c-in-c. The two chiefs led the charge on horseback. They won and no one questioned their defiance of the political authority. The governor-general’s letter came to light a century later from the house of his friend.
In 1843 a major-general, called Charles Napier, acting against the policy laid down by the crown and against the advice of James Outram, the resident representative of the governor-general at Hyderabad, started military action against the Mirs of Sind. V A Smith writing in the Oxford History of India, has the following to say about the military leader: “The eccentric swashbuckler possessed as few scruples as Auckland (the governor-general at the time of the Afghan War) but had at least the honesty to admit it. 'We have no right to seize Sind', he wrote in his diary, 'yet we shall do so and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it will be’.”
The entire Sindh incident was the unblushing violation of the 1832 treaty — a naked show of force by a military general against the policy laid down by the Crown. What if a rogue general or a governor general or a conspiracy of the two were to rebel against the Crown. A possible coup d’etat in a vast colony like India, six thousand miles and months away from possible reinforcements posed nightmarish problems for the government of Queen Victoria in London. Something drastic was needed to maintain the British hold on India.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 29th, 2010.
Following the demise of Mughal rule the military became solely responsible for the internal and external security of the realm of the East India Company Bahadur. The British rulers usurped the traditional role of the local community. As the dominion expanded, the state apparatus was bifurcated between the military and civil executive and later the military was bifurcated into the military and the police.
In the government of the East India Company, the governor-general had his army to protect (and enlarge) the possessions, his police to maintain order, and his civil executive officers to collect revenue and administer day-to-day affairs. The people of India had no role in governance. The military exercised the dominant role, often in tandem with the governor-general.
The stock of the English generals rocketed sky high after they defeated Napoleon’s armies at Waterloo in 1814. The commander-in-chief, Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) was revered as a demigod. The victorious general served the Crown as foreign minister and also as prime minister and remained a close adviser of Queen Victoria till his death.
The English generals in India, protecting and enlarging the government of the East India Company, established notorious precedents of acting independently, indeed, in defiance of the policy laid down by the civil political authority in London.
The governor general who was in fact “Governor General of India in Council” and his commander-in-chief invaded Afghanistan in 1838 without taking the members of the Council into confidence. A few years later Sir Hugh Gough, commander-in-chief of the army in India, decided to invade the Punjab. The governor-general told him that the attack would contravene the policy laid down by London. Moreover, he had no funds to finance the war. The military man told the governor-general that victory in the battle was certain as the betrayal of elements from the enemy’ army has been arranged. Large amount of loot and plunder would come in their hands and there would be no shortage of funds. The two hatched a conspiracy. The commander-in-chief ordered the governor-general to report for battle duty since the latter was a retired lieutenant-general of the army and as such was subsequently in the reserves. The crafty governor-general put himself under the command of the military and also wrote a secret letter to a friend in London which was to be delivered to the government if the battle was lost in which he wrote that he was coerced by the military c-in-c. The two chiefs led the charge on horseback. They won and no one questioned their defiance of the political authority. The governor-general’s letter came to light a century later from the house of his friend.
In 1843 a major-general, called Charles Napier, acting against the policy laid down by the crown and against the advice of James Outram, the resident representative of the governor-general at Hyderabad, started military action against the Mirs of Sind. V A Smith writing in the Oxford History of India, has the following to say about the military leader: “The eccentric swashbuckler possessed as few scruples as Auckland (the governor-general at the time of the Afghan War) but had at least the honesty to admit it. 'We have no right to seize Sind', he wrote in his diary, 'yet we shall do so and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it will be’.”
The entire Sindh incident was the unblushing violation of the 1832 treaty — a naked show of force by a military general against the policy laid down by the Crown. What if a rogue general or a governor general or a conspiracy of the two were to rebel against the Crown. A possible coup d’etat in a vast colony like India, six thousand miles and months away from possible reinforcements posed nightmarish problems for the government of Queen Victoria in London. Something drastic was needed to maintain the British hold on India.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 29th, 2010.