Determinants of militancy
Research on determinants of militancy in Pakistan is changing how we view those who join the ranks of militancy.
The writer is a student at the University of California, Santa Barbara, specialising in International Relations
There is always something inherently satisfying about finding a rational order to our questions but that’s not always the case. An interesting body of research coming from the academia on the determinants of militancy in Pakistan is beginning to change how we view those who are joining the ranks of militancy. This is one of those areas of study where we have taken answers for granted and assumed them to be axioms of international politics. That is as far from the truth as one can get.
Professors at Princeton, Stanford, Georgetown and Indiana University — four of America’s elite, and certainly most active institutions — recently published papers on questions surrounding the role of poverty, religion and education on support for militancy. Their observations should upend conventional wisdom that is often at the pulse of debates in the Pakistani media.
We generally assume that poverty is correlated with support for militancy. It’s an intuitive idea and one that has appeal. For instance, we generalise that the poor are more likely to support fringe militant voices for a score of reasons, some of which are related to their not having employment, their desire for discretionary income, anger at the existing social mobility framework and so forth. We hear those stories where poor labourers constrained by their choice of employment are inspired by an appeal to a virulent strain of religious thought, whereby the conclusion results in some form of terrorism. This only implants the idea of a supposed link between income and terrorism. Well, that’s not quite true.
Researchers found that Pakistan’s poor, especially in urban areas such as Karachi and Quetta, are less likely to support claims to militancy than are middle class Pakistanis.
The reasoning is that there are a host of negative externalities correlated with militancy that hit the poor harder that they hit middle class Pakistanis. In other words, because direct effects resulting from militant action hurt the poor more than they affect the middle class Pakistanis, support for militancy is lower among the low-income demographic.
In a broader scope, what this should mean for policymakers is that a focus on aid development targeted towards the poor in order to lessen appeals of terrorist networks is misguided. The $7.5 billion in non-military aid that the Kerry-Lugar Bill provided followed in the footsteps of those who saw a perceived link. As a testament to this finding, conclusions from various reports have assessed the Kerry-Lugar Bill as having fallen short of meeting its goals. The poor, as the researchers observe, may be the more natural allies in the war against terrorism.
We can conclude the same on aspects of religion as well. In light of the recent Boston bombing, debates on the supposed link between religiosity and terrorism resurfaced. Several news networks jumped the gun and connected the two brothers’ Islamic faith to their impetus behind the grisly bombing. Because the younger brother’s Facebook profile indicated that he practised Islam, he was immediately taken to be a radical.
In Pakistan, researchers concluded through a nationally representative survey that no such link exists between one’s religious practice or beliefs and support for militancy. Sure, there are established political parties that espouse and spread hate, but that is not always internalised by their followers.
Lastly, Pakistan currently is home to the second largest number of children out of school. While we worry about Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution, Article 37 which states that education is the fundamental right of every citizen has been reduced to a footnote. This brings me to the final and predictable observation by researchers at Indiana University: education discourages suicide bombings against civilians.
The hope for these professors doing research is one and the same: to see their proposals and ideas implemented on the ground where real action is taking place. The secondary intent is to inform and inspire debate in the corridors of Islamabad. It would be foolhardy for politicians to ignore the calls coming from the academia.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 2nd, 2013.
Professors at Princeton, Stanford, Georgetown and Indiana University — four of America’s elite, and certainly most active institutions — recently published papers on questions surrounding the role of poverty, religion and education on support for militancy. Their observations should upend conventional wisdom that is often at the pulse of debates in the Pakistani media.
We generally assume that poverty is correlated with support for militancy. It’s an intuitive idea and one that has appeal. For instance, we generalise that the poor are more likely to support fringe militant voices for a score of reasons, some of which are related to their not having employment, their desire for discretionary income, anger at the existing social mobility framework and so forth. We hear those stories where poor labourers constrained by their choice of employment are inspired by an appeal to a virulent strain of religious thought, whereby the conclusion results in some form of terrorism. This only implants the idea of a supposed link between income and terrorism. Well, that’s not quite true.
Researchers found that Pakistan’s poor, especially in urban areas such as Karachi and Quetta, are less likely to support claims to militancy than are middle class Pakistanis.
The reasoning is that there are a host of negative externalities correlated with militancy that hit the poor harder that they hit middle class Pakistanis. In other words, because direct effects resulting from militant action hurt the poor more than they affect the middle class Pakistanis, support for militancy is lower among the low-income demographic.
In a broader scope, what this should mean for policymakers is that a focus on aid development targeted towards the poor in order to lessen appeals of terrorist networks is misguided. The $7.5 billion in non-military aid that the Kerry-Lugar Bill provided followed in the footsteps of those who saw a perceived link. As a testament to this finding, conclusions from various reports have assessed the Kerry-Lugar Bill as having fallen short of meeting its goals. The poor, as the researchers observe, may be the more natural allies in the war against terrorism.
We can conclude the same on aspects of religion as well. In light of the recent Boston bombing, debates on the supposed link between religiosity and terrorism resurfaced. Several news networks jumped the gun and connected the two brothers’ Islamic faith to their impetus behind the grisly bombing. Because the younger brother’s Facebook profile indicated that he practised Islam, he was immediately taken to be a radical.
In Pakistan, researchers concluded through a nationally representative survey that no such link exists between one’s religious practice or beliefs and support for militancy. Sure, there are established political parties that espouse and spread hate, but that is not always internalised by their followers.
Lastly, Pakistan currently is home to the second largest number of children out of school. While we worry about Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution, Article 37 which states that education is the fundamental right of every citizen has been reduced to a footnote. This brings me to the final and predictable observation by researchers at Indiana University: education discourages suicide bombings against civilians.
The hope for these professors doing research is one and the same: to see their proposals and ideas implemented on the ground where real action is taking place. The secondary intent is to inform and inspire debate in the corridors of Islamabad. It would be foolhardy for politicians to ignore the calls coming from the academia.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 2nd, 2013.