The debate has already begun!
US, Nato forces haven't left Afghanistan, but debate has already begun as to who's responsible for the dismal failure.
The writer was Pakistan’s ambassador to the EU from 2001-2004 and to the US in 1999 tariq.fatemi@tribune.com.pk
The US and Nato forces have another year and a half to go before they leave Afghanistan and yet, the debate has already begun as to who and what is responsible for the dismal failure looming large in that country. This was inevitable but the fact that this has begun so early is primarily because of the growing conviction amongst scholars and diplomats that for all the hundreds of billions spent in Afghanistan and many valuable lives lost, the US and its allies may have little to point to in terms of justifying any of the much-vaunted reasons advanced for the invasion of Afghanistan.
This debate has been triggered primarily because of an explosive book by Vali Nasr, a well-regarded scholar, closely associated with the administration’s Af-Pak policy. As a confidant and adviser of President Barack Obama’s Special Representative, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, he had a unique opportunity of witnessing and participating in the formulation and execution of US policy, or lack thereof.
Though Nasr’s The Dispensable Nation makes his sympathy for Holbrooke clear, there is no doubt that the book has valuable comments on the Arab Spring and US policy in the Middle East. Since we are, however, primarily concerned with this region, Vali’s well-reasoned analysis need to be considered by policymakers in the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
His most interesting comments relate to the power and influence of the US military intelligence lobby and its increasing success in dominating the foreign policy debate. This has always been true though it has certainly gained strength since President Dwight Eisenhower’s farewell speech warning of the growing threat from the military-industrial complex. Since 9/11, this coalition has been reinforced thanks to the close collaboration of the intelligence agencies, a phenomenon which cannot but arouse a quiet chuckle among Pakistanis — so accustomed are they to the clout of this powerful coalition.
The second and more disappointing revelation relates to the confirmation of constant interference by the White House political appointees in any serious initiative by the State Department to set relations with Pakistan on a durable basis. Holbrooke was right to highlight the importance of Pakistan, not only in the context of Afghanistan but also in its own right. This was to be done by not simply enhancing economic assistance but by transforming relations with Pakistan to make them truly “strategic”. His recommendations were not only turned down by the White House but failed to win the support of former secretary of state Hillary Clinton, who chose to side with the military intelligence, perceiving this as more advantageous in burnishing her hawkish credentials and assisting in her future political ambitions. But it was not Clinton alone who was influenced by domestic considerations. Obama, too, ignored Holbrooke’s sensible policies, convinced of the need to shield himself from Republican criticism by giving primacy to the military surge, while protecting himself from disappointment in his own ranks, by signalling a time frame to “quit” this theatre of operations. Consequently, the focus of foreign policy shifted from diplomacy to crude pressure on Pakistan, which in Nasr’s view, was responsible for inconsistent policies that resulted in intense anti-American sentiments in Pakistan and weakened American influence in the Middle East.
This reinforced Pakistan’s fear of history being repeated — being “used” and then being “abandoned”. On the other hand, the Americans were outraged at what they saw as Pakistan’s duplicity. Resultantly, mutual doubts and misgivings fed on each other, bringing relations to an unprecedented low, from which climbing out has not been easy. The results are right before us, with a “reconciliation” process, which neither side is serious about, adding to uncertainty and concern with each passing day, described by the outgoing French Ambassador last weekend as the fear that post-2014, Afghanistan could be engulfed in a “perfect storm of political and military upheaval”.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 1st, 2013.
This debate has been triggered primarily because of an explosive book by Vali Nasr, a well-regarded scholar, closely associated with the administration’s Af-Pak policy. As a confidant and adviser of President Barack Obama’s Special Representative, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, he had a unique opportunity of witnessing and participating in the formulation and execution of US policy, or lack thereof.
Though Nasr’s The Dispensable Nation makes his sympathy for Holbrooke clear, there is no doubt that the book has valuable comments on the Arab Spring and US policy in the Middle East. Since we are, however, primarily concerned with this region, Vali’s well-reasoned analysis need to be considered by policymakers in the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
His most interesting comments relate to the power and influence of the US military intelligence lobby and its increasing success in dominating the foreign policy debate. This has always been true though it has certainly gained strength since President Dwight Eisenhower’s farewell speech warning of the growing threat from the military-industrial complex. Since 9/11, this coalition has been reinforced thanks to the close collaboration of the intelligence agencies, a phenomenon which cannot but arouse a quiet chuckle among Pakistanis — so accustomed are they to the clout of this powerful coalition.
The second and more disappointing revelation relates to the confirmation of constant interference by the White House political appointees in any serious initiative by the State Department to set relations with Pakistan on a durable basis. Holbrooke was right to highlight the importance of Pakistan, not only in the context of Afghanistan but also in its own right. This was to be done by not simply enhancing economic assistance but by transforming relations with Pakistan to make them truly “strategic”. His recommendations were not only turned down by the White House but failed to win the support of former secretary of state Hillary Clinton, who chose to side with the military intelligence, perceiving this as more advantageous in burnishing her hawkish credentials and assisting in her future political ambitions. But it was not Clinton alone who was influenced by domestic considerations. Obama, too, ignored Holbrooke’s sensible policies, convinced of the need to shield himself from Republican criticism by giving primacy to the military surge, while protecting himself from disappointment in his own ranks, by signalling a time frame to “quit” this theatre of operations. Consequently, the focus of foreign policy shifted from diplomacy to crude pressure on Pakistan, which in Nasr’s view, was responsible for inconsistent policies that resulted in intense anti-American sentiments in Pakistan and weakened American influence in the Middle East.
This reinforced Pakistan’s fear of history being repeated — being “used” and then being “abandoned”. On the other hand, the Americans were outraged at what they saw as Pakistan’s duplicity. Resultantly, mutual doubts and misgivings fed on each other, bringing relations to an unprecedented low, from which climbing out has not been easy. The results are right before us, with a “reconciliation” process, which neither side is serious about, adding to uncertainty and concern with each passing day, described by the outgoing French Ambassador last weekend as the fear that post-2014, Afghanistan could be engulfed in a “perfect storm of political and military upheaval”.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 1st, 2013.