Nuclear cooperation in South Asia
If countries can offer nuclear tech to India, US cannot suggest Pakistan and China refrain from similar cooperation.
The writer is a public policy analyst and former interior secretary
Recently, American think tanks have claimed that Pakistan and China entered into a new understanding in mid-February for the construction of another nuclear reactor in Pakistan, which in their view, would violate Beijing’s commitment to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
While China has strongly denied this, a few facts about proliferation in South Asia need to be recalled. India’s nuclear test in May of 1974 generated huge concern, prompting Pakistan and regional countries to galvanise world opinion in favour of South Asia being declared a nuclear weapons free zone. Over subsequent years, Pakistan made other proposals aimed at keeping the region — which had already seen more than its share of conflicts — safe from this scourge. India, however, chose to ignore these initiatives. Consequently, Pakistan initiated its own programme and succeeded in emulating India when the latter carried out fresh tests in May 1998. And yet, Pakistan did not abandon hopes of managing this “scourge”, offering to India the Strategic Restraint Regime, containing three interlocking elements of nuclear restraint, conventional balance and dispute settlement. To Pakistan’s regret, this comprehensive proposal has failed to evoke any response from its neighbour. While the merits of Indian policy could be debated, the attitude of many major powers continues to puzzle Pakistanis and others interested in restraining proliferation in South Asia.
India’s huge market for nuclear technology beckons many a reactor manufacturer, but surely, governments should take a more measured and responsible view, which is why the Bush Administration’s decision in 2005 to offer a civilian nuclear deal to India was so shocking. It ridiculed not only US domestic laws, but called for exemption from provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the NSG that virtually destroyed the very rationale of these global understandings. This has been followed by bilateral agreements by others for supply of nuclear technology to India that calls into question their commitment to the concept of non-proliferation, as the US-India deal excluded from safeguards eight Indian reactors suitable for weapons-grade plutonium production. Similarly, the 13 breeder reactors have been left out of safeguards and to leave no ambiguity, the Indian prime minister has affirmed that no part of India’s nuclear programme would be placed under safeguards if it was of a strategic nature. The US, however, claims that these concessions to India serve the cause of global non-proliferation.
Notwithstanding, Pakistan’s modest nuclear cooperation with China continues to draw criticism from the US, with Pakistan being accused of engaging in nuclear proliferation and China of violating its commitments to the NSG. Yet, it is well known that Pakistan and China signed a 30-year civil nuclear cooperation agreement in September 1986. Subsequently, additional agreements were entered into prior to China joining the NSG in 2004, under whose provisions it has been engaged in building nuclear reactors in Pakistan. Consequently, China is under no legal bar to assist Pakistan meet its massive energy needs. Nor is Pakistan under any obligation to end its cooperation with China, especially as all of Pakistan’s nuclear reactors for power generation, including those planned for the future, would be under safeguards. As Mark Hibbs of the Carnegie Endowment pointed out in a recent piece, there is nothing in the NSG guidelines that prevents continuing Sino-Pakistan cooperation as “the NSG guidelines are voluntary understandings of governments”. And Mark Krepon, a well-known expert in this field, has emphasised: “The NSG has become less consensual and the NPT weaker”, as a result of the US-India deal.
Pakistan is convinced that if NPT signatory states, such as France, Russia, the UK, Japan and the US, can offer nuclear technology to India, a non-NPT signatory state, the US and its allies have little moral standing to suggest that Pakistan and China refrain from similar cooperation.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 3rd, 2013.
While China has strongly denied this, a few facts about proliferation in South Asia need to be recalled. India’s nuclear test in May of 1974 generated huge concern, prompting Pakistan and regional countries to galvanise world opinion in favour of South Asia being declared a nuclear weapons free zone. Over subsequent years, Pakistan made other proposals aimed at keeping the region — which had already seen more than its share of conflicts — safe from this scourge. India, however, chose to ignore these initiatives. Consequently, Pakistan initiated its own programme and succeeded in emulating India when the latter carried out fresh tests in May 1998. And yet, Pakistan did not abandon hopes of managing this “scourge”, offering to India the Strategic Restraint Regime, containing three interlocking elements of nuclear restraint, conventional balance and dispute settlement. To Pakistan’s regret, this comprehensive proposal has failed to evoke any response from its neighbour. While the merits of Indian policy could be debated, the attitude of many major powers continues to puzzle Pakistanis and others interested in restraining proliferation in South Asia.
India’s huge market for nuclear technology beckons many a reactor manufacturer, but surely, governments should take a more measured and responsible view, which is why the Bush Administration’s decision in 2005 to offer a civilian nuclear deal to India was so shocking. It ridiculed not only US domestic laws, but called for exemption from provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the NSG that virtually destroyed the very rationale of these global understandings. This has been followed by bilateral agreements by others for supply of nuclear technology to India that calls into question their commitment to the concept of non-proliferation, as the US-India deal excluded from safeguards eight Indian reactors suitable for weapons-grade plutonium production. Similarly, the 13 breeder reactors have been left out of safeguards and to leave no ambiguity, the Indian prime minister has affirmed that no part of India’s nuclear programme would be placed under safeguards if it was of a strategic nature. The US, however, claims that these concessions to India serve the cause of global non-proliferation.
Notwithstanding, Pakistan’s modest nuclear cooperation with China continues to draw criticism from the US, with Pakistan being accused of engaging in nuclear proliferation and China of violating its commitments to the NSG. Yet, it is well known that Pakistan and China signed a 30-year civil nuclear cooperation agreement in September 1986. Subsequently, additional agreements were entered into prior to China joining the NSG in 2004, under whose provisions it has been engaged in building nuclear reactors in Pakistan. Consequently, China is under no legal bar to assist Pakistan meet its massive energy needs. Nor is Pakistan under any obligation to end its cooperation with China, especially as all of Pakistan’s nuclear reactors for power generation, including those planned for the future, would be under safeguards. As Mark Hibbs of the Carnegie Endowment pointed out in a recent piece, there is nothing in the NSG guidelines that prevents continuing Sino-Pakistan cooperation as “the NSG guidelines are voluntary understandings of governments”. And Mark Krepon, a well-known expert in this field, has emphasised: “The NSG has become less consensual and the NPT weaker”, as a result of the US-India deal.
Pakistan is convinced that if NPT signatory states, such as France, Russia, the UK, Japan and the US, can offer nuclear technology to India, a non-NPT signatory state, the US and its allies have little moral standing to suggest that Pakistan and China refrain from similar cooperation.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 3rd, 2013.