A provocation, but with little cure!
Failure of nuclear states to honour their NPT commitments affected their moral standing, weakened non-proliferation.
North Korea’s latest nuclear test has deeply upset not only its neighbours, but countries far beyond, especially as US intelligence officials suggested that the test — the first under the new leader Kim Jong-Un— indicated ability to produce devices with higher levels of explosive power.
Inevitably, the test invited a crescendo of condemnations, with the UN Security Council passing another resolution threatening the secretive, authoritarian state with tough measures, while US President Barack Obama called the test “a highly provocative act” that demands “swift and credible action by the international community”.
These are strong words but the reality, however, is that the international community has few, if any, effective options available to it against a country already in possession of nuclear weapons, however egregious its behaviour may be. With minimal trade and little meaningful contact with the outside world, North Korea has become a virtual pariah state and yet, remains near-secure, thanks to its burgeoning nuclear programme.
In such a situation, the focus has shifted to China, which remains North Korea’s lone source of trade and economic assistance. US officials have stated that the administration will judge Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s foreign policy by how he reacts to demands that China join the other powers in cooperating against North Korea. There does appear to be some truth to the impression that the Chinese are not too enamoured of Kim and are upset at his needless provocation, especially as Xi had expressed an interest in developing a “new type of relationship between the two great powers”. But what are China’s real options? While the West has been urging China to use its economic clout against North Korea, such a policy is fraught with serious risks. For one, China is opposed, in principle, to pressurising friends, especially one as unpredictable as North Korea, which has, on more than one occasion, given evidence of its irrational behaviour. Moreover, any policy that risks destabilising a key neighbour could result in chaos and uncertainty that could even lead to a unified Korea, closely aligned to the US. After all, North Korea is the only buffer between China and US ally South Korea, which may explain why China did join the Security Council’s resolution condemning the Korean nuclear test, but its official reaction was relatively mild and did not suggest any policy change towards North Korea.
Moreover, Sino-US relations are currently passing through a difficult phase, with both states deeply suspicious of each other’s long-term intentions. The Obama Administration’s ‘reset’ to Asia is seen in Beijing as directed against it, while in US perception, China’s economic clout has made it more assertive, even belligerent, in advancing its claims in the region, more specifically in the South China Sea.
It may be ironic but is nevertheless true that US policies have contributed to enhanced nuclear ambitions in some states, especially those that fear attempts to engineer a regime change or are confronted by stronger and inimical neighbours. The stark difference in US policies towards Iraq and Libya on one hand and North Korea on the other hand, has added to the belief in some states that possession of nuclear weapons does give a degree of comfort that is otherwise not available to them.
In this context, it deserves to be recalled that the very foundation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, was based on a ‘grand bargain’: the non-nuclear weapon states agreed never to acquire nuclear weapons, while the nuclear weapon states, in exchange, agreed to share the benefits of nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
While the NPT has been a useful tool that has resulted in fewer states than predicted joining the nuclear club, the failure of nuclear weapon states to honour their commitments has affected their moral standing and weakened their efforts at promoting non-proliferation.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 20th, 2013.
Inevitably, the test invited a crescendo of condemnations, with the UN Security Council passing another resolution threatening the secretive, authoritarian state with tough measures, while US President Barack Obama called the test “a highly provocative act” that demands “swift and credible action by the international community”.
These are strong words but the reality, however, is that the international community has few, if any, effective options available to it against a country already in possession of nuclear weapons, however egregious its behaviour may be. With minimal trade and little meaningful contact with the outside world, North Korea has become a virtual pariah state and yet, remains near-secure, thanks to its burgeoning nuclear programme.
In such a situation, the focus has shifted to China, which remains North Korea’s lone source of trade and economic assistance. US officials have stated that the administration will judge Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s foreign policy by how he reacts to demands that China join the other powers in cooperating against North Korea. There does appear to be some truth to the impression that the Chinese are not too enamoured of Kim and are upset at his needless provocation, especially as Xi had expressed an interest in developing a “new type of relationship between the two great powers”. But what are China’s real options? While the West has been urging China to use its economic clout against North Korea, such a policy is fraught with serious risks. For one, China is opposed, in principle, to pressurising friends, especially one as unpredictable as North Korea, which has, on more than one occasion, given evidence of its irrational behaviour. Moreover, any policy that risks destabilising a key neighbour could result in chaos and uncertainty that could even lead to a unified Korea, closely aligned to the US. After all, North Korea is the only buffer between China and US ally South Korea, which may explain why China did join the Security Council’s resolution condemning the Korean nuclear test, but its official reaction was relatively mild and did not suggest any policy change towards North Korea.
Moreover, Sino-US relations are currently passing through a difficult phase, with both states deeply suspicious of each other’s long-term intentions. The Obama Administration’s ‘reset’ to Asia is seen in Beijing as directed against it, while in US perception, China’s economic clout has made it more assertive, even belligerent, in advancing its claims in the region, more specifically in the South China Sea.
It may be ironic but is nevertheless true that US policies have contributed to enhanced nuclear ambitions in some states, especially those that fear attempts to engineer a regime change or are confronted by stronger and inimical neighbours. The stark difference in US policies towards Iraq and Libya on one hand and North Korea on the other hand, has added to the belief in some states that possession of nuclear weapons does give a degree of comfort that is otherwise not available to them.
In this context, it deserves to be recalled that the very foundation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, was based on a ‘grand bargain’: the non-nuclear weapon states agreed never to acquire nuclear weapons, while the nuclear weapon states, in exchange, agreed to share the benefits of nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
While the NPT has been a useful tool that has resulted in fewer states than predicted joining the nuclear club, the failure of nuclear weapon states to honour their commitments has affected their moral standing and weakened their efforts at promoting non-proliferation.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 20th, 2013.