Speaking out when it matters
Why do Pakistani generals, while in service, seldom question wisdom & authority of their benefactor?
The writer is a defence analyst who retired as a lieutenant colonel in the Pakistan Army
Had it been a revelation, a surprising disclosure or even a confession or admission that we were not aware of, it would have made sense. Yet, knowing everything that we already know about Kargil, the current disclosures by Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz is as much in bad taste now as was the poor military strategy that was executed by the generals then.
Retire and fade away is the best way forward for military officers retiring on senior ranks. Why do Pakistani generals, while in service, seldom question the wisdom and authority of their benefactor — the chief of army staff (COAS) — yet when they retire, have so many stories to tell? Why do generals lose their balance when the shoulder that carries their head no more puts on the badges of ranks they adorned while in the army? Why can’t they understand that whatever they say and do ‘out of uniform’ will hold little importance compared with what they have said and done while in uniform.
The COAS of the Pakistan Army has the sole authority to appoint generals to the various positions they hold. Being appointed a corps commander of Karachi or Lahore is a more lucrative posting compared with the position of the corps commander of Bahawalpur or Gujranwala. These officers not only act as corps commanders but also as presidents of real estate empires known as DHAs. Besides this, on retirement, generals are appointed managing directors and chairmen of the many corporate entities that the army runs. You wouldn’t be eyeing those positions if you were opposing or challenging your boss during service. The truth of the matter is that if the core set of decision-making officers in the Pakistan Army (corps commanders and principal staff officers of the COAS) listen to the calls of their conscience more often during service than after retirement, we would have no Kargils. We are ‘Kargilled’ because some of them fail to take positions and defend them resolutely.
General (retd) Pervez Musharraf may be absolutely and unilaterally blamed for the Kargil fiasco. But why shouldn’t we blame the head of the ISI, the deputy chief of army staff and five of the nine corps commanders for keeping mum. Even if some of them have spoken about it, they have done so only after enjoying all perks and privileges, including a shot at a beneficial posting in the corporate sector after retirement. National interests and not personal benefits and emotions should guide the behaviour of our senior military officers. It is very easy for Lt Gen (retd) Aziz to now indulge in the blame game sitting in his picturesque farmhouse in Pindi Begwal at the foothills of Murree but whether he should have stayed quiet during service is the question he must ask himself.
There are no senior officers who lost their lives during the Kargil operation. The junior officers and men who lost their lives did so honourably serving a cause. “The unsound military plans based on wrong assumptions” as Lt Gen (retd) Aziz points out, are a nightmare that should haunt the senior officers involved with the planning at that time. He knows that this was not the first time that military strategy in Pakistan went wrong. In 1965, we went into Kashmir thinking that India will not open a front against us across the international border; it did. We have yet to find whom to blame for the failure of that military strategy. The tragedy is not that we didn’t hold anyone responsible; it is that our textbooks declare that war as a victory and we celebrate September 6 as our Defence Day.
Lastly, if a nation has the will and intent to hold its generals accountable, it holds them accountable while they are in service. General Stanley A McChrystal and General David Petraeus are two recent examples. One was recalled from Afghanistan and retired and the other retired while holding the position of director CIA. How many generals can we name who were retired or resigned after what the country has been through in the last couple of years?
To Lt Gen (retd) Aziz: Sir, you should have spoken when it mattered. For now, please keep quiet.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 6th, 2013.
Retire and fade away is the best way forward for military officers retiring on senior ranks. Why do Pakistani generals, while in service, seldom question the wisdom and authority of their benefactor — the chief of army staff (COAS) — yet when they retire, have so many stories to tell? Why do generals lose their balance when the shoulder that carries their head no more puts on the badges of ranks they adorned while in the army? Why can’t they understand that whatever they say and do ‘out of uniform’ will hold little importance compared with what they have said and done while in uniform.
The COAS of the Pakistan Army has the sole authority to appoint generals to the various positions they hold. Being appointed a corps commander of Karachi or Lahore is a more lucrative posting compared with the position of the corps commander of Bahawalpur or Gujranwala. These officers not only act as corps commanders but also as presidents of real estate empires known as DHAs. Besides this, on retirement, generals are appointed managing directors and chairmen of the many corporate entities that the army runs. You wouldn’t be eyeing those positions if you were opposing or challenging your boss during service. The truth of the matter is that if the core set of decision-making officers in the Pakistan Army (corps commanders and principal staff officers of the COAS) listen to the calls of their conscience more often during service than after retirement, we would have no Kargils. We are ‘Kargilled’ because some of them fail to take positions and defend them resolutely.
General (retd) Pervez Musharraf may be absolutely and unilaterally blamed for the Kargil fiasco. But why shouldn’t we blame the head of the ISI, the deputy chief of army staff and five of the nine corps commanders for keeping mum. Even if some of them have spoken about it, they have done so only after enjoying all perks and privileges, including a shot at a beneficial posting in the corporate sector after retirement. National interests and not personal benefits and emotions should guide the behaviour of our senior military officers. It is very easy for Lt Gen (retd) Aziz to now indulge in the blame game sitting in his picturesque farmhouse in Pindi Begwal at the foothills of Murree but whether he should have stayed quiet during service is the question he must ask himself.
There are no senior officers who lost their lives during the Kargil operation. The junior officers and men who lost their lives did so honourably serving a cause. “The unsound military plans based on wrong assumptions” as Lt Gen (retd) Aziz points out, are a nightmare that should haunt the senior officers involved with the planning at that time. He knows that this was not the first time that military strategy in Pakistan went wrong. In 1965, we went into Kashmir thinking that India will not open a front against us across the international border; it did. We have yet to find whom to blame for the failure of that military strategy. The tragedy is not that we didn’t hold anyone responsible; it is that our textbooks declare that war as a victory and we celebrate September 6 as our Defence Day.
Lastly, if a nation has the will and intent to hold its generals accountable, it holds them accountable while they are in service. General Stanley A McChrystal and General David Petraeus are two recent examples. One was recalled from Afghanistan and retired and the other retired while holding the position of director CIA. How many generals can we name who were retired or resigned after what the country has been through in the last couple of years?
To Lt Gen (retd) Aziz: Sir, you should have spoken when it mattered. For now, please keep quiet.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 6th, 2013.