Militancy and the conceptual lag
Battle for Swat was fought on hills of the valley but war against militancy can only be won in minds of the people.
The issue of militancy and extremism has generated an unending debate on the policy responses, methods and approaches as there are no simple solutions to this fairly complex issue. The rising tide of militancy of different hues and stripes has brought the state of Pakistan and society under severe pressures. Varying motivational drives, ideological proclivities and a dim worldview have turned the militants into killing machines. They are highly autonomous in their operational capability, with strong mutually supportive linkages. Their training, level of commitment and indoctrination has lifted them to a make-believe world where life and death lose their significance. Militancy, as a persistent social bane, continues to grow and is now embedded into the minds of the people. The larger picture, however, is subject to a widely divergent discourse; militants and others of their ilk have a distinct political voice and have even assumed a rationalist form through those who see more into the causes responsible for their acts than just the actual acts perpetrated by them. To such people, addressing the causes precedes everything else in order for peace to be established. Then, there are those who see this phenomenon as an imminent threat to the existence of state and society. Pakistan, therefore, is faced with a dilemma: how to come to terms with this anarchic drift in view of the conceptual lag that accompanies it. This is not only impacting our clarity of thought but is also tampering with the response that is needed to tackle this deadly issue.
The raging national discourse on the issue has broadly classified the divide into ‘liberal left’ and ‘conservative right’. This may not be an entirely correct perspective in the given context as it raises more questions than it answers. A fairly sizeable section of the conservative right — which includes an important section of the clerics — does not subscribe to the Taliban’s version of religion and jihad and the method they are employing to gain their ends. A more apt classification may be in terms of a thinking that perceives the problem and also the solution through a causal approach — cause is the essence of the problem. Those holding this view can be termed ‘causalists’. The other school of opinion-holders is more concerned with the imminence of threat to our existence. This category can be termed ‘existentialists’, to whom first things matter first — and in this case, it is the survival of the state and society, which they believe should be uppermost in the minds of every Pakistani.
The causalists’ strand coincides with the Taliban’s avowed proclamations and gives the latter a supportive push because of a certain convergence in views. Because of this convergence, militancy and the rising tide of terrorism is perceived as a direct consequence of Western policies. A causalist linkage is irrefutably established between the drone attacks in our tribal areas and the spate of suicide bombings inside Pakistan. According to this reasoning, on a relative scale, the American factor outweighs the Taliban threat to the state.
The existentialist view, on the other hand, is swayed by the survival instinct. Executing innocents with impunity, seeking submission through coercion, gunning for dissenters and the feeble sections of society in the name of religion is a recipe for disaster. Episodically, the causalists do condemn the acts of violence perpetrated by the militants but the gravity of the gruesome acts is overshadowed by empathetic waves in the same breath, which try to explain the militants’ diminished responsibility.
This conceptual lag needs to be addressed in earnest if we wish to move with clarity and speed. The narrower the gap in this debate, the better this nation and its institutions will be equipped to fight this scourge.
The on-ground situational lags are equally disconcerting. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) and the tribal belt represent the core problem area with a very strong spillover into Punjab and Sindh. The core problem area has a Pakhtun overlap with strong feelings against the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, which has provided bonding amongst the tribes across the Durand line. The hardcore Taliban were the product of seminaries and tribal ethos, whereas, with the passage of time, many other militant groups of different ethnic lines have joined them because of motivational reasons. Palpably, their main aim has been to challenge the writ of the state in a bid to break its will and mop up the spoils in the ensuing disarray with the ultimate goal of gaining political control.
The ascent of the Taliban and other militant forces has coincided with the correspondingly alarming descent of the administrative machinery of K-P and Fata. Multiple factors are responsible for this slide. The line of least resistance has been the key to expediency. General (retd) Pervez Musharraf’s reforms worsened the centrality of the district administrative machinery, giving rise to serious issues of enforcement with no focal point in the district that could act as an extended arm of the civil administration and engage with such elements. The five-year rule of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal in K-P was a boon for the incubation and flowering of these elements. During this time, FM radio stations were beaming hate campaigns in the idyllic Swat valley.
There has been a fear of Taliban advances into the country’s settled areas. These fears may not have completely proven to be true, since as astute players of the game, these elements know their inherent limitations. So far, they have gained space within their given cultural milieu — close lingual, familial ties and familiarity with the topography. Their capacity to strike in Punjab and Sindh through resident agents and supportive linkages, however, cannot be ruled out. Therefore, all provincial governments will have to be extremely careful of the soft bellies in their midst and act against them through timely, actionable intelligence. In Punjab, it is the sectarian soft belly, while in Sindh, it is the ethnic factor which can violently upset social dynamics. In Balochistan, it is the burning issue of political rights that just cannot be wished away. The battle of Swat was fought on the rolling hills of the valley but the war against militancy can only be won in the minds of the people of Pakistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 8th, 2012.
The raging national discourse on the issue has broadly classified the divide into ‘liberal left’ and ‘conservative right’. This may not be an entirely correct perspective in the given context as it raises more questions than it answers. A fairly sizeable section of the conservative right — which includes an important section of the clerics — does not subscribe to the Taliban’s version of religion and jihad and the method they are employing to gain their ends. A more apt classification may be in terms of a thinking that perceives the problem and also the solution through a causal approach — cause is the essence of the problem. Those holding this view can be termed ‘causalists’. The other school of opinion-holders is more concerned with the imminence of threat to our existence. This category can be termed ‘existentialists’, to whom first things matter first — and in this case, it is the survival of the state and society, which they believe should be uppermost in the minds of every Pakistani.
The causalists’ strand coincides with the Taliban’s avowed proclamations and gives the latter a supportive push because of a certain convergence in views. Because of this convergence, militancy and the rising tide of terrorism is perceived as a direct consequence of Western policies. A causalist linkage is irrefutably established between the drone attacks in our tribal areas and the spate of suicide bombings inside Pakistan. According to this reasoning, on a relative scale, the American factor outweighs the Taliban threat to the state.
The existentialist view, on the other hand, is swayed by the survival instinct. Executing innocents with impunity, seeking submission through coercion, gunning for dissenters and the feeble sections of society in the name of religion is a recipe for disaster. Episodically, the causalists do condemn the acts of violence perpetrated by the militants but the gravity of the gruesome acts is overshadowed by empathetic waves in the same breath, which try to explain the militants’ diminished responsibility.
This conceptual lag needs to be addressed in earnest if we wish to move with clarity and speed. The narrower the gap in this debate, the better this nation and its institutions will be equipped to fight this scourge.
The on-ground situational lags are equally disconcerting. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) and the tribal belt represent the core problem area with a very strong spillover into Punjab and Sindh. The core problem area has a Pakhtun overlap with strong feelings against the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, which has provided bonding amongst the tribes across the Durand line. The hardcore Taliban were the product of seminaries and tribal ethos, whereas, with the passage of time, many other militant groups of different ethnic lines have joined them because of motivational reasons. Palpably, their main aim has been to challenge the writ of the state in a bid to break its will and mop up the spoils in the ensuing disarray with the ultimate goal of gaining political control.
The ascent of the Taliban and other militant forces has coincided with the correspondingly alarming descent of the administrative machinery of K-P and Fata. Multiple factors are responsible for this slide. The line of least resistance has been the key to expediency. General (retd) Pervez Musharraf’s reforms worsened the centrality of the district administrative machinery, giving rise to serious issues of enforcement with no focal point in the district that could act as an extended arm of the civil administration and engage with such elements. The five-year rule of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal in K-P was a boon for the incubation and flowering of these elements. During this time, FM radio stations were beaming hate campaigns in the idyllic Swat valley.
There has been a fear of Taliban advances into the country’s settled areas. These fears may not have completely proven to be true, since as astute players of the game, these elements know their inherent limitations. So far, they have gained space within their given cultural milieu — close lingual, familial ties and familiarity with the topography. Their capacity to strike in Punjab and Sindh through resident agents and supportive linkages, however, cannot be ruled out. Therefore, all provincial governments will have to be extremely careful of the soft bellies in their midst and act against them through timely, actionable intelligence. In Punjab, it is the sectarian soft belly, while in Sindh, it is the ethnic factor which can violently upset social dynamics. In Balochistan, it is the burning issue of political rights that just cannot be wished away. The battle of Swat was fought on the rolling hills of the valley but the war against militancy can only be won in the minds of the people of Pakistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 8th, 2012.