North Waziristan and Kamra
Opening a front with Taliban Inc. when Pakistan is at its weakest is perhaps, not a good way forward.
Between war and dialogue the choice should be clear. Why then the news from home is not what one expects. Pakistan seems to have decided to go after some of the groups that have inhabited North Waziristan since the war started. It may even find reason and strategic justification to pursue the intended operation in North Waziristan as a facet of a longer term strategic direction that it must pursue even after America decides to shelve combat in Afghanistan. I have no quarrel with that, but is the timing right? Or, shall Pakistan have to contend with a more cumulative reaction from the combined strength of Taliban Inc. even when she declares only the Pakistani groups its intended quarry if operations are indeed initiated as touted? Will the Haqqanis inevitably be sucked into the vortex of such an operation even though they are not on the target list? Is Pakistan mixing its own war with that of America’s and fomenting a bigger front against itself? The contradictions are many and disconcerting. And here is, why.
Just when peace dominates the agenda in Afghanistan and more than two-thirds of America chooses peace and an end to armed action there, should Pakistan widen its own ambit of war? There are stages in a war against insurgency that must alternate: armed action meant to garner space that must give a chance to politicians to engage in dialogue. It remains a politico-military imperative to seek space; always through inducement — economic benefit, share of power — both consequences of a dialogue, and when these fail or need a resurgence in commitment, some helpful coercion through armed action. Has Pakistan exhausted all other options that it must graduate to war?
America has fought its 10-year war and wishes to give peace a chance. President Barack Obama promised to his people to bring a closure to the unnecessary wars that America was engaged in — and Afghanistan has relegated to one such. He is ready to follow up on his promise and show to his people in an election year that war indeed is now over and the boys are on their way back home. When re-elected, he will then have the space to focus more on the economic front. He, therefore, has a plan that suits America and his own political strategy. However, does this suit Pakistan and is this its desired strategy as well?
Opening a front with Taliban Inc. when Pakistan is at its weakest is perhaps, not a good way forward. If indeed the most reasonable route to bringing peace through dialogue is pursued — and with some reasonable inducements the process can urge the foreign groups to find shelter back within their own mainstream — Pakistan’s own load may simply become more manageable without creating perpetual hostility among those who simply get sucked into an operation because of co-location. Such resident sentiment among people that inhabit Pakistan’s border regions can only be self-defeating in the long run. When Pakistan begins its own internal push against homegrown elements, inimical groups from across the border are more likely to jump in support of their targeted cousins setting the tribal regions aflame, once again. The Haqqanis then should be won over by dialogue, rather than be pushed to choose sides. A sensible strategy suggests leaving doors open before the final act.
The attack on the Kamra base is more likely the harbinger of the things to come in response to Pakistan’s intention of initiating operations in North Waziristan. More of these will happen including something that may be intended to embarrass Pakistan even further in the eyes of the world; it might even include something as dastardly as another Mumbai with consequences that can push a war between Pakistan and India. With most of the region on a short fuse, especially India, is that a risk that Pakistan can afford?
There is tactical resort and there is strategic sense; it is the latter that must govern our destiny — and timing is a part of it. Or else, the cost is borne by generations without recourse or remedy. The current state of the nation is in itself instructive to that end.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 27th, 2012.
Just when peace dominates the agenda in Afghanistan and more than two-thirds of America chooses peace and an end to armed action there, should Pakistan widen its own ambit of war? There are stages in a war against insurgency that must alternate: armed action meant to garner space that must give a chance to politicians to engage in dialogue. It remains a politico-military imperative to seek space; always through inducement — economic benefit, share of power — both consequences of a dialogue, and when these fail or need a resurgence in commitment, some helpful coercion through armed action. Has Pakistan exhausted all other options that it must graduate to war?
America has fought its 10-year war and wishes to give peace a chance. President Barack Obama promised to his people to bring a closure to the unnecessary wars that America was engaged in — and Afghanistan has relegated to one such. He is ready to follow up on his promise and show to his people in an election year that war indeed is now over and the boys are on their way back home. When re-elected, he will then have the space to focus more on the economic front. He, therefore, has a plan that suits America and his own political strategy. However, does this suit Pakistan and is this its desired strategy as well?
Opening a front with Taliban Inc. when Pakistan is at its weakest is perhaps, not a good way forward. If indeed the most reasonable route to bringing peace through dialogue is pursued — and with some reasonable inducements the process can urge the foreign groups to find shelter back within their own mainstream — Pakistan’s own load may simply become more manageable without creating perpetual hostility among those who simply get sucked into an operation because of co-location. Such resident sentiment among people that inhabit Pakistan’s border regions can only be self-defeating in the long run. When Pakistan begins its own internal push against homegrown elements, inimical groups from across the border are more likely to jump in support of their targeted cousins setting the tribal regions aflame, once again. The Haqqanis then should be won over by dialogue, rather than be pushed to choose sides. A sensible strategy suggests leaving doors open before the final act.
The attack on the Kamra base is more likely the harbinger of the things to come in response to Pakistan’s intention of initiating operations in North Waziristan. More of these will happen including something that may be intended to embarrass Pakistan even further in the eyes of the world; it might even include something as dastardly as another Mumbai with consequences that can push a war between Pakistan and India. With most of the region on a short fuse, especially India, is that a risk that Pakistan can afford?
There is tactical resort and there is strategic sense; it is the latter that must govern our destiny — and timing is a part of it. Or else, the cost is borne by generations without recourse or remedy. The current state of the nation is in itself instructive to that end.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 27th, 2012.