A report without substance
Of 41 main points, sub-points, 31 are focused directly, indirectly on US. Rest ‘general foreign policy’ in 135 words.
The Parliamentary Committee on National Security has done a shoddy job. Its pompously-titled report on guidelines for revised terms of engagement with the US, Nato and Isaf is a mixture of clichés and knee-jerk reaction to a chain of bad events that have caused a near-complete crash of Pakistan’s relations with the United States. Far from being a document that could inspire healthy, forward-looking debate on important facets of the country’s diplomatic challenges, it is confusing to read and even more difficult to comprehend from the point of view of its eventual implementation. Let us have a look at its fatal flaws.
If the aim of the author and its contributors was to pave the path of a more balanced foreign policy, away from extreme diplomatic dependence on Washington, then the product falls short of sending this message across.
Out of its 41 main points and sub-points, 31 are focused directly or indirectly on the US. The rest of the ‘general foreign policy’ has been covered literally in 135 words. This includes relations with Russia, China, India, the Islamic countries and Kashmir.
This imbalance of focus reinforces the image that for right or wrong reasons, the parliamentarians like the ‘establishment’, cannot get their eyes and minds off Washington. One wonders how the Chinese feel at being reduced to an eight-word line in a document that commands the government “to review the present foreign policy keeping in view the aspirations of the people of Pakistan.”
Even engagement with Washington has not been handled thoughtfully. The document attempts to lock problematic ties with the US in a kind of a paper cage. Instead of proposing fundamental principles of engagement, the draft is a litany of desires and apprehensions. The bullet point wisdom of the parliamentarians does not address the fundamental question as to what sort of strategic centrality should Washington enjoy in Pakistan’s foreign policy. The details of how much the road-use tax on Nato containers should be is of no importance if more black and white issues are left untackled.
One such issue is whether the public representatives see Washington’s aims and goals in the region to be in line with Islamabad’s or not. If the objectives are aligned then the proposed strategies have to complement this assessment. Long-term objectives and shared goals then need to be pursued with a ‘no-matter-what’ attitude. Then seeking a presidential apology for Salala attack cannot be allowed to veto the intended benefits we hope to attain by staying on the right side of Washington.
However, if the goals clash fundamentally, the recommendations would take a different tone altogether. In that case, opening of road supply routes becomes a settled issue: Pakistan would not let the sinews of war pass through its territory if this cooperation ends up fuelling violence inside its own territory. Pakistan will not accept US aid. Cooperation in the war against terror would also end or will be gradually scaled back to point zero. The framework of assessing the quantum of harmony or conflict in Pakistan’s relations with the US should have been the core concern of the committee. Only after this assessment could policy guidelines be suggested. This element is totally missing from the document.
The general thrust of perception about Washington should have been worked out by the committee. We cannot expect the US to give us the kind of civil nuclear deal it has struck with India, if we also believe that Washington is conspiring to dismantle our nuclear arsenal. This thrust of thought should have been the prime focus of the document, which regrettably offers no clarity or guideline in this regard.
This poorly-conceived and lame review document has now furnished the basis of media and parliamentary debate in the country. The argument that this is just a ‘working draft’ and can be changed completely is disingenuous. The words spread on the sheets of the report are echoing everywhere: they are setting the tone and tenor of the discourse all around. It would require brave hearts and robust minds to inject substance and vision in this debate — something the parliamentary report should have done.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 23rd, 2012.
If the aim of the author and its contributors was to pave the path of a more balanced foreign policy, away from extreme diplomatic dependence on Washington, then the product falls short of sending this message across.
Out of its 41 main points and sub-points, 31 are focused directly or indirectly on the US. The rest of the ‘general foreign policy’ has been covered literally in 135 words. This includes relations with Russia, China, India, the Islamic countries and Kashmir.
This imbalance of focus reinforces the image that for right or wrong reasons, the parliamentarians like the ‘establishment’, cannot get their eyes and minds off Washington. One wonders how the Chinese feel at being reduced to an eight-word line in a document that commands the government “to review the present foreign policy keeping in view the aspirations of the people of Pakistan.”
Even engagement with Washington has not been handled thoughtfully. The document attempts to lock problematic ties with the US in a kind of a paper cage. Instead of proposing fundamental principles of engagement, the draft is a litany of desires and apprehensions. The bullet point wisdom of the parliamentarians does not address the fundamental question as to what sort of strategic centrality should Washington enjoy in Pakistan’s foreign policy. The details of how much the road-use tax on Nato containers should be is of no importance if more black and white issues are left untackled.
One such issue is whether the public representatives see Washington’s aims and goals in the region to be in line with Islamabad’s or not. If the objectives are aligned then the proposed strategies have to complement this assessment. Long-term objectives and shared goals then need to be pursued with a ‘no-matter-what’ attitude. Then seeking a presidential apology for Salala attack cannot be allowed to veto the intended benefits we hope to attain by staying on the right side of Washington.
However, if the goals clash fundamentally, the recommendations would take a different tone altogether. In that case, opening of road supply routes becomes a settled issue: Pakistan would not let the sinews of war pass through its territory if this cooperation ends up fuelling violence inside its own territory. Pakistan will not accept US aid. Cooperation in the war against terror would also end or will be gradually scaled back to point zero. The framework of assessing the quantum of harmony or conflict in Pakistan’s relations with the US should have been the core concern of the committee. Only after this assessment could policy guidelines be suggested. This element is totally missing from the document.
The general thrust of perception about Washington should have been worked out by the committee. We cannot expect the US to give us the kind of civil nuclear deal it has struck with India, if we also believe that Washington is conspiring to dismantle our nuclear arsenal. This thrust of thought should have been the prime focus of the document, which regrettably offers no clarity or guideline in this regard.
This poorly-conceived and lame review document has now furnished the basis of media and parliamentary debate in the country. The argument that this is just a ‘working draft’ and can be changed completely is disingenuous. The words spread on the sheets of the report are echoing everywhere: they are setting the tone and tenor of the discourse all around. It would require brave hearts and robust minds to inject substance and vision in this debate — something the parliamentary report should have done.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 23rd, 2012.