The Taliban and Hamid Karzai
If Taliban aren’t using negotiation as a ruse,then what made them change their minds about a deal with US?
A Taliban confirmation that they’re ready to open a “liaison office” overseas, possibly in the Persian Gulf state of Qatar, has boosted the prospects of a negotiated settlement to end the bloodletting in Afghanistan. But who will the Taliban be talking to, if at all — the Afghans or the Americans? A careful study of the December 3 statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the shadowy Taliban government, revealed that they accept only two “principal parties” to the conflict: the Taliban and the United States and its Western allies. Essentially, this means that the insurgents don’t accept the administration of President Hamid Karzai as being party to the conflict and want to bypass Kabul and pursue direct dialogue with the US because they are, “per se, not America’s enemy”.
This became abundantly clear from another ‘policy-post’ on the Taliban’s Voice of Jihad website, titled “Karzai’s un-national and pro-warlords acts”. In the penultimate part of the long anti-Karzai rant, the author says: “The masquerading Karazai and his coterie of warlords and their nefarious anti-state plans have been unmasked. Now, it’s difficult for him to dupe the Afghans and the international community with his hackneyed tactics. And this renders him disqualified to play any role, whatsoever, in resolving the Afghan conflict.”
Though the contours of a possible peace dialogue haven’t shaped up yet, one thing is clear: The Karzai administration wasn’t privy to the backchannel meetings that led to the Taliban announcement. When Karzai got wind of this parallel secretive plan, it was already too late. Notwithstanding he tried, unsuccessfully though, to assert his authority by insisting that a Taliban ‘political office’ be set up in Saudi Arabia or Turkey, if not Kabul. However, he relented, unwillingly though. The “Qatar address” for the Taliban, he said, is not a bad idea as long as the Afghans drive the consequential peace process. But, it appears as though his call went unheeded. And this is why his reaction to the Taliban’s announcement was ambiguous. He gave his blessings to the initiative but stopped short of disowning it: “We support the proposed talks between the US and the insurgents” to stop the war.
Notwithstanding this scepticism in Kabul, it is a significant step for the American-led coalition, which wants a negotiated settlement to a long-drawn, unpopular and costly war. They’re unlikely to squander this opportunity in favour of their increasingly unpopular protégé in Kabul. Until December 2, the Taliban were trumpeting victory and reviled the idea of pursuing peace talks with “foreign boots still on their soil”. If they aren’t using negotiation as a ruse, which I’m sure they aren’t, then what made the Taliban change their mind will transpire once the talks formally begin. For now, they’re reluctant to say more than what their December 3 statement contains.
Whatever the fate of this initiative or outcome of resulting talks, the Taliban have apparently outsmarted and outmanoeuvred the Hamid Karzai administration by engaging the US in direct dialogue. Clearly, this is a setback for Mr Karzai and his allies who wanted to be in the driving seat of any peace process in Afghanistan. How much of a setback it turns out to be, is something that time will only tell.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 6th, 2012.
This became abundantly clear from another ‘policy-post’ on the Taliban’s Voice of Jihad website, titled “Karzai’s un-national and pro-warlords acts”. In the penultimate part of the long anti-Karzai rant, the author says: “The masquerading Karazai and his coterie of warlords and their nefarious anti-state plans have been unmasked. Now, it’s difficult for him to dupe the Afghans and the international community with his hackneyed tactics. And this renders him disqualified to play any role, whatsoever, in resolving the Afghan conflict.”
Though the contours of a possible peace dialogue haven’t shaped up yet, one thing is clear: The Karzai administration wasn’t privy to the backchannel meetings that led to the Taliban announcement. When Karzai got wind of this parallel secretive plan, it was already too late. Notwithstanding he tried, unsuccessfully though, to assert his authority by insisting that a Taliban ‘political office’ be set up in Saudi Arabia or Turkey, if not Kabul. However, he relented, unwillingly though. The “Qatar address” for the Taliban, he said, is not a bad idea as long as the Afghans drive the consequential peace process. But, it appears as though his call went unheeded. And this is why his reaction to the Taliban’s announcement was ambiguous. He gave his blessings to the initiative but stopped short of disowning it: “We support the proposed talks between the US and the insurgents” to stop the war.
Notwithstanding this scepticism in Kabul, it is a significant step for the American-led coalition, which wants a negotiated settlement to a long-drawn, unpopular and costly war. They’re unlikely to squander this opportunity in favour of their increasingly unpopular protégé in Kabul. Until December 2, the Taliban were trumpeting victory and reviled the idea of pursuing peace talks with “foreign boots still on their soil”. If they aren’t using negotiation as a ruse, which I’m sure they aren’t, then what made the Taliban change their mind will transpire once the talks formally begin. For now, they’re reluctant to say more than what their December 3 statement contains.
Whatever the fate of this initiative or outcome of resulting talks, the Taliban have apparently outsmarted and outmanoeuvred the Hamid Karzai administration by engaging the US in direct dialogue. Clearly, this is a setback for Mr Karzai and his allies who wanted to be in the driving seat of any peace process in Afghanistan. How much of a setback it turns out to be, is something that time will only tell.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 6th, 2012.