Finally, the review!
The policy, so far, has been driven by security concerns which have pushed peace negotiations in to the background.
So, Pakistan is finally going to review its agreements with the United States and also push for a reconciliation process in and with Afghanistan regardless of Washington’s approach?
I am impressed. What 40,000 civilian and military lives could not achieve in over a decade, the sacrifice of 24 soldiers of the 7th Battalion of the Azad Kashmir Regiment — a terrific paltan I remember from its days in Sialkot, when my late father served in it — has managed.
Reports suggest the two-day-long envoys’ conference has agreed on a broad policy review and, as part of that, would “renegotiate two key agreements signed with the United States and its western allies nine years ago”. The agreements relate to allowing transit of supplies and extending logistics support to US-led Nato forces.
This newspaper has reported that the “recommendations include fresh agreements for Nato supplies and logistics support to the US, minimising the ‘CIA footprint’ in the country, seeking an honourable return of Afghan refugees and pursuing efforts to stabilise Afghanistan irrespective of Washington’s approach”.
As reported, all of this sounds good. These recommendations will now go before the parliamentary committee on national security, which has the remit to redraft the terms of any agreement with the US. So far so good, but the question is: will this reaction result in a sustainable proactive policy?
It is well to establish with the US what I have described elsewhere as a baseline. However, the policy review should be realistic rather than an expression of anger. Also, one of the most important aspects of this review must deal with Afghanistan and how Pakistan wants to deal with the situation in that country.
In that, the decision to effect reconciliation in and with Afghanistan, independent of what the US might or might not do, is good and indicates a proactive approach that relies more on political negotiations than firefighting. Pakistan needed such an approach. The policy, so far, has been driven by security concerns which, though understandable, have pushed the complex process of negotiations in the background.
One can have an easy benchmark to determine this point. How many official international conferences have been hosted by Pakistan that dealt with constitutional development and/or socio-economic issues in Afghanistan? Not one, thank you, even as Islamabad has constantly pushed for a central role in determining the future of Afghanistan.
Similarly, so far Pakistan has taken the position that it cannot do much until the Americans are clear about what they want and how. I was always sceptical of this position and events have proved that this approach did not make a good, proactive policy. The effort by Pakistan to pull in President Hamid Karzai and make him understand the importance of talking to the leaders of the insurgency was a smart move. But there was no real follow through on it. The arrest of Mullah Baradar and the refusal to release him even after Karzai publicly asked for his release, did nothing to improve trust. Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani’s murder by elements inimical to any negotiations has all but derailed the bilateral process.
That process must be revived. It is important, if Pakistan wants to play the role that it seeks, to become proactive and focus on Afghanistan’s concerns. As a facilitator of peace, Pakistan would need to level with Afghanistan. If Pakistan can help the Kabul government to start negotiating with the leaders of the insurgency and those talks enter an advanced stage, the United States will have to fall in line because this will also offer the US the best way out of the current impasse. To wait for the Americans to present a road map before Pakistan will do something, is to lose the initiative.
This will not be an easy process. The distrust between Islamabad and Kabul has increased. Kabul’s reaching out to New Delhi is no great help either. But one needs to weigh the pros and cons: is it more important to focus on Afghanistan and deal with that country directly or have a skewed approach towards it on the basis of its ‘strategic partnership’ with India? The former course seems to be a better option because it allows Pakistan to be proactive and innovative rather than getting bogged down in a zero-sum game, which sees it increasingly pitted against the Afghanistan-India combine.
In that scenario, the distrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan would continue to increase, with a proportional decrease in Pakistan’s ability to shape outcomes on the western side. The beneficiary of any such development will be India, which will not even have to incur any direct costs of making Pakistan less relevant to events in West Asia. Also, in such a scenario, Pakistan will run the risk of losing traction. That seems like an outcome opposed to the entire focus of Pakistan’s policy of playing the leading role.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 15th, 2011.
I am impressed. What 40,000 civilian and military lives could not achieve in over a decade, the sacrifice of 24 soldiers of the 7th Battalion of the Azad Kashmir Regiment — a terrific paltan I remember from its days in Sialkot, when my late father served in it — has managed.
Reports suggest the two-day-long envoys’ conference has agreed on a broad policy review and, as part of that, would “renegotiate two key agreements signed with the United States and its western allies nine years ago”. The agreements relate to allowing transit of supplies and extending logistics support to US-led Nato forces.
This newspaper has reported that the “recommendations include fresh agreements for Nato supplies and logistics support to the US, minimising the ‘CIA footprint’ in the country, seeking an honourable return of Afghan refugees and pursuing efforts to stabilise Afghanistan irrespective of Washington’s approach”.
As reported, all of this sounds good. These recommendations will now go before the parliamentary committee on national security, which has the remit to redraft the terms of any agreement with the US. So far so good, but the question is: will this reaction result in a sustainable proactive policy?
It is well to establish with the US what I have described elsewhere as a baseline. However, the policy review should be realistic rather than an expression of anger. Also, one of the most important aspects of this review must deal with Afghanistan and how Pakistan wants to deal with the situation in that country.
In that, the decision to effect reconciliation in and with Afghanistan, independent of what the US might or might not do, is good and indicates a proactive approach that relies more on political negotiations than firefighting. Pakistan needed such an approach. The policy, so far, has been driven by security concerns which, though understandable, have pushed the complex process of negotiations in the background.
One can have an easy benchmark to determine this point. How many official international conferences have been hosted by Pakistan that dealt with constitutional development and/or socio-economic issues in Afghanistan? Not one, thank you, even as Islamabad has constantly pushed for a central role in determining the future of Afghanistan.
Similarly, so far Pakistan has taken the position that it cannot do much until the Americans are clear about what they want and how. I was always sceptical of this position and events have proved that this approach did not make a good, proactive policy. The effort by Pakistan to pull in President Hamid Karzai and make him understand the importance of talking to the leaders of the insurgency was a smart move. But there was no real follow through on it. The arrest of Mullah Baradar and the refusal to release him even after Karzai publicly asked for his release, did nothing to improve trust. Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani’s murder by elements inimical to any negotiations has all but derailed the bilateral process.
That process must be revived. It is important, if Pakistan wants to play the role that it seeks, to become proactive and focus on Afghanistan’s concerns. As a facilitator of peace, Pakistan would need to level with Afghanistan. If Pakistan can help the Kabul government to start negotiating with the leaders of the insurgency and those talks enter an advanced stage, the United States will have to fall in line because this will also offer the US the best way out of the current impasse. To wait for the Americans to present a road map before Pakistan will do something, is to lose the initiative.
This will not be an easy process. The distrust between Islamabad and Kabul has increased. Kabul’s reaching out to New Delhi is no great help either. But one needs to weigh the pros and cons: is it more important to focus on Afghanistan and deal with that country directly or have a skewed approach towards it on the basis of its ‘strategic partnership’ with India? The former course seems to be a better option because it allows Pakistan to be proactive and innovative rather than getting bogged down in a zero-sum game, which sees it increasingly pitted against the Afghanistan-India combine.
In that scenario, the distrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan would continue to increase, with a proportional decrease in Pakistan’s ability to shape outcomes on the western side. The beneficiary of any such development will be India, which will not even have to incur any direct costs of making Pakistan less relevant to events in West Asia. Also, in such a scenario, Pakistan will run the risk of losing traction. That seems like an outcome opposed to the entire focus of Pakistan’s policy of playing the leading role.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 15th, 2011.