In the ‘name’ of God: Violence erupts in sectarian hotbed
Jhang district in Punjab has endured three decades of sectarian militancy.
LAHORE/FAISALABAD:
Defying the relative calm across the country during the month of Muharram was a place known for its intransigence on such matters.
Eight people were injured in Shia-Sunni clashes in Jhang on Monday. The violence could escalate, as the leadership of a Sunni group warned police that it would not allow Shias to hold their main Ashura procession until those involved in a “sacrilegious incident” were taken into custody.
The incident in question is what instigated the sectarian violence, which started in Jhang city on Sunday night.
Ubaidullah Usmani, media coordinator for the Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat (formerly known as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan), told The Express Tribune that the leadership of his hardline party had tried to tone down the situation – but put full responsibility on the police for not arresting the accused. The leadership has called for activists to gather over Muharram if the culprits are not arrested – this after 500 people initially gathered following the news of the supposed ‘blasphemy’.
Later, the police registered a case against the unknown accused – only for them to escape from the area, according to Ubaidullah Usmani.
This caused tension to rise on Monday. ASWJ members gathered to protest against the police’s ineffectiveness, only for a number of Shias to gather in the same place. To avoid clashes, the police intervened. However, they could not stop provocative slogans being chanted by each group, which ultimately led to aerial firing. The resultant baton charges from the police left eight people injured.
The district police officer, Rao Abdul Karim, told The Express Tribune that the authorities are doing all they can to find the people responsible for placing the name on the dog. They are also, he said, in contact with the leadership of both sects to calm the situation and ensure a peaceful Ashura in the city.
Why has Jhang become a hotbed of Shia–Sunni conflict?
Jhang is no stranger to sectarian conflict.
The area has suffered severe waves of sectarian militancy over the past three decades. The rise of a particular type of Deobandi influence is certainly a factor: clerics like Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and his successors, who have claimed authority to denounce Shias as non-Muslims, have operated relatively freely in the area, preaching hatred and instigating violence.
The rivalry between the two leading kinships in Jhang – the Syeds and Sials – is also a factor. These competing kinships have deliberately exploited and aggravated the sectarian fault lines in Jhang for local political advantage.
Equally important is the role of the migrants, who settled in Jhang after partition. These local traders and bazaar merchants from East Punjab had wealth but no political clout, which they aimed to gain through unequivocal support and funding for outfits such as Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. This rising urban commercial class, locked out of political power by landowners who traditionally dominated district politics, have therefore somewhat unwittingly contributed to bloodshed.
Like all militant struggles, the anti-Shia campaign of the SSP has thrived on such bloodshed. Sectarian killings began with the murders of Ehsan Ellahi Zaheer in 1987 and Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafariya Pakistan leader Allama Arif-ul-Husseini in 1988.
On February 22, 1990, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the SSP’s founder, was killed in a retaliatory bomb attack. Following Haq Nawaz’s death, his successors used the cult of the martyr — around which, ironically, the Shia theological discourse is structured — to enhance the SSP’s electoral standing. From the outset, the SSP leadership sought influence in the National Assembly in order to amend the Constitution and cause a ‘Sunnification’ of the Pakistani state.
In 1996, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi emerged as an armed offshoot of the SSP, as violence escalated. Members of the Jhang District administration, the SSP leadership, and other notables were included in negotiations that led to a peace treaty. Only a few days after the accord was reached, a bomb exploded in Jhang, killing three Sunnis and injuring 28. This effectively sabotaged the peace efforts.
The SSP expanded beyond its roots in sectarian rivalries and Biraderi politics in Jhang. It organized itself remarkably well at the district and tehsil level. Acccording to one estimate, by the time that the SSP was outlawed in January 2002, it controlled 74 district and 225 tehsil level units. In addition, the SSP ran 17 foreign branches, in countries that included Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Canada, and the UK.
The SSP’s growing influence was accompanied by an association with violence. While Jhang was the scene of many sectarian killings, they spread to other areas of Punjab and beyond. Although the SSP attempted to distance itself from the activities of its armed offshoot, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, this was never done convincingly.
The SSP extremists had two major modes of operation: targeted killings and indiscriminate shootings in places of worship. A number of leading Shias were assassinated.
By 1992, SSP activists had gained access to sophisticated weapons systems. Saudi Arabia was the major source of funding, while Iran provided financial support to Shia outfits.
Sectarian polarization enabled the SSP to increase its vote bank. In the central Jhang constituency, in the 1990 election, Maulana Esar-ul-Qasimi, Haq Nawaz’s successor and vice patron, secured victory with a considerable majority.
The military takeover on October 12, 1999 may be one of the reasons that militant groups assumed a low profile for a few years. However, the 2002 elections, which were held under military rule, reversed the process.
Azam Tariq won the election despite being in jail. Although both the LJ and the SSP, along with their Shia rivals, the SMP and the TNFJ, had been banned, Tariq was allowed to contest the elections as an independent candidate. This decision evoked a sharp reaction from
many quarters. In October 2003, Azam Tariq was killed in Islamabad. There had been 20 previous attempts on his life.
The causes of sectarianism are hydra-headed – and though Jhang is a specific case, the problem applies throughout the country. Dr Tahir Kamran, who heads the study of sectarianism at Government College University Lahore, attributes the increased conflict to Zia ulHaq’s Islamisation programmes, the Afghan war, the proliferation of Deobandi madrasahs, and the Iranian Revolution.
Whatever the cause, Pakistanis will hope for a reversal in Jhang this Ashura – and beyond.
Late night update:
DPO Jhang Rao Abdul Kaleem said that they had managed to convince Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat to allow the Shia sect to take out their processions on Muharram 10.
"We have peacefully negotiated with the Sunni community to allow Shia's to take out their scheduled Muharram 10 processions," he said.
DPO and DCO took part in the negotiation.
Sunni's extended their earlier set deadline for the arrest of those who had committed a sacrilegious incident by 24 hours.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 6th, 2011.
Defying the relative calm across the country during the month of Muharram was a place known for its intransigence on such matters.
Eight people were injured in Shia-Sunni clashes in Jhang on Monday. The violence could escalate, as the leadership of a Sunni group warned police that it would not allow Shias to hold their main Ashura procession until those involved in a “sacrilegious incident” were taken into custody.
The incident in question is what instigated the sectarian violence, which started in Jhang city on Sunday night.
Ubaidullah Usmani, media coordinator for the Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat (formerly known as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan), told The Express Tribune that the leadership of his hardline party had tried to tone down the situation – but put full responsibility on the police for not arresting the accused. The leadership has called for activists to gather over Muharram if the culprits are not arrested – this after 500 people initially gathered following the news of the supposed ‘blasphemy’.
Later, the police registered a case against the unknown accused – only for them to escape from the area, according to Ubaidullah Usmani.
This caused tension to rise on Monday. ASWJ members gathered to protest against the police’s ineffectiveness, only for a number of Shias to gather in the same place. To avoid clashes, the police intervened. However, they could not stop provocative slogans being chanted by each group, which ultimately led to aerial firing. The resultant baton charges from the police left eight people injured.
The district police officer, Rao Abdul Karim, told The Express Tribune that the authorities are doing all they can to find the people responsible for placing the name on the dog. They are also, he said, in contact with the leadership of both sects to calm the situation and ensure a peaceful Ashura in the city.
Why has Jhang become a hotbed of Shia–Sunni conflict?
Jhang is no stranger to sectarian conflict.
The area has suffered severe waves of sectarian militancy over the past three decades. The rise of a particular type of Deobandi influence is certainly a factor: clerics like Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and his successors, who have claimed authority to denounce Shias as non-Muslims, have operated relatively freely in the area, preaching hatred and instigating violence.
The rivalry between the two leading kinships in Jhang – the Syeds and Sials – is also a factor. These competing kinships have deliberately exploited and aggravated the sectarian fault lines in Jhang for local political advantage.
Equally important is the role of the migrants, who settled in Jhang after partition. These local traders and bazaar merchants from East Punjab had wealth but no political clout, which they aimed to gain through unequivocal support and funding for outfits such as Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. This rising urban commercial class, locked out of political power by landowners who traditionally dominated district politics, have therefore somewhat unwittingly contributed to bloodshed.
Like all militant struggles, the anti-Shia campaign of the SSP has thrived on such bloodshed. Sectarian killings began with the murders of Ehsan Ellahi Zaheer in 1987 and Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafariya Pakistan leader Allama Arif-ul-Husseini in 1988.
On February 22, 1990, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the SSP’s founder, was killed in a retaliatory bomb attack. Following Haq Nawaz’s death, his successors used the cult of the martyr — around which, ironically, the Shia theological discourse is structured — to enhance the SSP’s electoral standing. From the outset, the SSP leadership sought influence in the National Assembly in order to amend the Constitution and cause a ‘Sunnification’ of the Pakistani state.
In 1996, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi emerged as an armed offshoot of the SSP, as violence escalated. Members of the Jhang District administration, the SSP leadership, and other notables were included in negotiations that led to a peace treaty. Only a few days after the accord was reached, a bomb exploded in Jhang, killing three Sunnis and injuring 28. This effectively sabotaged the peace efforts.
The SSP expanded beyond its roots in sectarian rivalries and Biraderi politics in Jhang. It organized itself remarkably well at the district and tehsil level. Acccording to one estimate, by the time that the SSP was outlawed in January 2002, it controlled 74 district and 225 tehsil level units. In addition, the SSP ran 17 foreign branches, in countries that included Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Canada, and the UK.
The SSP’s growing influence was accompanied by an association with violence. While Jhang was the scene of many sectarian killings, they spread to other areas of Punjab and beyond. Although the SSP attempted to distance itself from the activities of its armed offshoot, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, this was never done convincingly.
The SSP extremists had two major modes of operation: targeted killings and indiscriminate shootings in places of worship. A number of leading Shias were assassinated.
By 1992, SSP activists had gained access to sophisticated weapons systems. Saudi Arabia was the major source of funding, while Iran provided financial support to Shia outfits.
Sectarian polarization enabled the SSP to increase its vote bank. In the central Jhang constituency, in the 1990 election, Maulana Esar-ul-Qasimi, Haq Nawaz’s successor and vice patron, secured victory with a considerable majority.
The military takeover on October 12, 1999 may be one of the reasons that militant groups assumed a low profile for a few years. However, the 2002 elections, which were held under military rule, reversed the process.
Azam Tariq won the election despite being in jail. Although both the LJ and the SSP, along with their Shia rivals, the SMP and the TNFJ, had been banned, Tariq was allowed to contest the elections as an independent candidate. This decision evoked a sharp reaction from
many quarters. In October 2003, Azam Tariq was killed in Islamabad. There had been 20 previous attempts on his life.
The causes of sectarianism are hydra-headed – and though Jhang is a specific case, the problem applies throughout the country. Dr Tahir Kamran, who heads the study of sectarianism at Government College University Lahore, attributes the increased conflict to Zia ulHaq’s Islamisation programmes, the Afghan war, the proliferation of Deobandi madrasahs, and the Iranian Revolution.
Whatever the cause, Pakistanis will hope for a reversal in Jhang this Ashura – and beyond.
Late night update:
DPO Jhang Rao Abdul Kaleem said that they had managed to convince Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat to allow the Shia sect to take out their processions on Muharram 10.
"We have peacefully negotiated with the Sunni community to allow Shia's to take out their scheduled Muharram 10 processions," he said.
DPO and DCO took part in the negotiation.
Sunni's extended their earlier set deadline for the arrest of those who had committed a sacrilegious incident by 24 hours.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 6th, 2011.