Russia: pragmatism not appeasement

With barely a couple of weeks remaining before the US midterm elections, one debate attracting particular attention is President Donald Trump's decision to ease sanctions on Russian diesel exports and its potential implications for the war in Ukraine. The prevailing interpretation is that Trump is motivated by two immediate objectives: lowering fuel prices to improve his electoral prospects and pressuring President Volodymyr Zelensky to accept his proposed terms for ending the war.

To me, however, this is a simplistic reading of Trump's intentions. I see a broader strategic purpose behind the move, one that extends beyond the immediate electoral cycle and the question of how to end the war in Ukraine. My argument rests on the premise that, given his low approval ratings, Trump may already be anticipating a difficult outcome for the Republicans in the midterms. Rather than focusing exclusively on the election itself, he may be positioning himself for the political landscape that follows it. His longer-term strategy, it seems, is driven by two interrelated ambitions: shaping the legacy he leaves behind as president and improving the Republican Party's prospects in the next presidential election.

The greatest challenge confronting the world today is how to sustain global economic stability and endurance in an increasingly fractured international system. For far too long, the West has portrayed President Vladimir Putin as a dictator leading a dangerous adversary and an autocratic ruler waging a brutal war against a democratic republic. This narrative was consistent with the post-WWII international order constructed by the US and its allies - an order founded on liberal values, a rules-based system and respect for international law. Yet, unnecessary American wars, the retreat of liberal democracy, technological disruption, deglobalisation, mass immigration, deepening political polarisation and the proliferation of grey-zone conflicts have all contributed to the erosion of that order. The actions of Russia and China, therefore, must be understood not merely as challenges to the existing system but also in the wider context of the struggle over what kind of international order will replace it.

President Trump appears determined to secure the distinction of being the American president who brings the war in Ukraine to an end. This ambition, however, may reflect a broader recognition that the international system is changing and that the old order cannot be restored. As illiberal and autocratic tendencies gain ground across the world, the challenge is to develop a new framework of global governance that acknowledges and accommodates the ideological, cultural and civilisational diversity of the international community. Such an arrangement would require the US to make room for both Russia and China within the emerging order, allowing the great powers to compete for influence without being drawn into direct military confrontation. The objective must extend beyond ending the wars in Ukraine and Iran to preventing future conflicts in emerging geopolitical flashpoints, including the Caucasus, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans.

Trump's apparent strategy is to compel Zelensky to the negotiating table by signaling that Washington's willingness to underwrite Ukraine's defence is no longer unconditional. The reported energy ceasefire arrangements, delays in the delivery of American interceptor missiles, restrictions on intelligence-sharing and disruptions affecting Ukrainian drone operations attributed to blocking access to Starlink – all point towards a possible recalibration of American policy. Taken together, these measures could be interpreted as instruments of pressure designed to alter Kyiv's calculations and make a negotiated settlement more likely.

Two historical analogies offer useful insights into what might happen if President Trump succeeds in placing economic pragmatism above the continuation of what I regard as reckless wars in Ukraine and Iran. The first takes us back to the Yalta Conference of February 1945, when Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin discussed the post-war reorganisation of Europe, the future of Germany and the establishment of the UN. Their meeting reflected a recognition that the post-war world could not be organised without an understanding among the great powers. Today, a similar question confronts the international community. Considering that all three are likely to meet first at the sidelines of the Pacific Rim Countries Conference in Hawaii and a month later at the G20 Summit Meeting at President Trump's Doral Resort in Florida, can they find common ground on the principles that should govern an emerging world order? If their anticipated meetings provide an opportunity for meaningful dialogue, the three leaders should use it to develop a workable framework for global governance - one that acknowledges their respective spheres of influence, limits external interference in areas of vital strategic interest and replaces the pursuit of absolute global leadership with an acceptance of great-power coexistence.

The second analogy lies in President Richard Nixon's historic opening to China in the early 1970s. At the time, Washington's rapprochement with Beijing unsettled many American allies, much as Trump's apparent willingness to engage Moscow has generated unease among Western capitals today. Nixon's initiative demonstrated that strategic engagement with an adversary need not amount to surrender; it can instead transform the geopolitical environment and create opportunities that confrontation alone cannot deliver. The US and China had spent years on opposing sides of ideological and geopolitical struggles, yet both eventually recognised the strategic advantages of opening diplomatic channels. The subsequent normalisation of relations culminated in the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1979, alongside the US commitment to maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. If President Trump can persuade Kyiv to participate in a credible peace settlement, the question of guaranteeing Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity must be central to the negotiations.

The US, Russia and China need to recognise that the pursuit of unconstrained global leadership by any one power can deepen insecurity for all. Their task is to move beyond an endless struggle for primacy. The objective should be a global economy that is vibrant and sustainable and which is capable of enduring geopolitical shocks. If Trump's willingness to engage Moscow can contribute to such an outcome, his legacy may ultimately be measured not by the concessions he made to an adversary, but by whether he helped establish a world in which great powers could compete without continually resorting to war.