Taliban's unfinished victory

The Taliban won Afghanistan's war for power. They have yet to secure a peace that includes their opponents, protects former soldiers and reassures their neighbours. The persistence of armed resistance exposes that unfinished task. For Pakistan, whose security is threatened by militants operating from Afghan territory, the distinction between controlling a country and governing it responsibly carries deadly consequences.

Afghanistan's opposition landscape is becoming more varied. A compilation published by South Asia Times attributes 119 claimed attacks across 26 provinces to resistance organisations during August and September 2026. These claims require independent verification. The UN Secretary-General's September assessment, as summarised by Security Council Report, found that fragmented opposition had not significantly challenged Taliban control during its reporting period.

These accounts describe different dimensions of the conflict. Dispersed attacks can coexist with government military superiority. The question is whether the Taliban are eliminating the causes of resistance or merely containing their armed expression.

The National Resistance Front under Ahmad Massoud and the Afghanistan Freedom Front remain established resistance organisations. The Afghan United Front, led by former army commander Sami Sadat, announced armed operations in August, claiming attacks in Kandahar and Helmand. Southern activity complicates the portrayal of opposition as an exclusively northern phenomenon.

That geographical diversification matters politically. It challenges the equation of Taliban authority with Pashtun consent. Pashtuns are a diverse community whose interests cannot be reduced to those of one armed movement. Opposition involving southern networks also demands analysis beyond the contrast between a Pashtun government and disaffected northern minorities.

At the centre of the problem lies exclusion. A narrow governing circle cannot build lasting national consent while denying meaningful participation to communities beyond its own networks. Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and other Afghans need credible avenues to influence decisions. Pashtuns outside the ruling establishment have an equal stake in that principle.

Exclusion alone does not explain every attack, and resistance leaders must answer for their own conduct. Nevertheless, a political order that offers opponents no peaceful route to influence leaves fewer incentives for accommodation. Inclusivity is therefore a security requirement, especially where experienced commanders and surviving military networks remain available.

The Taliban's broken amnesty illustrates the danger. UN reporting documented 218 extrajudicial killings, 424 arbitrary arrests and detentions, more than 144 instances of torture and ill-treatment, and 14 enforced disappearances involving former officials and security personnel between August 2021 and June 2023. These historical findings establish a grave failure of promised protection.

An amnesty asks defeated personnel to place their survival in the hands of yesterday's enemies. When that bargain fails, trained men may turn towards clandestine networks for protection. Their experience, local knowledge and relationships can strengthen resistance organisations. The scale of recruitment remains uncertain, but the incentive created by fear is clear.

Militarily, scattered operations do not establish an insurgency's ability to hold territory, sustain supplies or coordinate a national campaign. If persistent, however, attacks across multiple provinces can increase the burden of protecting officials, installations and transport routes.

The strategic risk is a cycle in which attacks provoke wider repression, repression deepens grievances, and grievances preserve recruitment opportunities. Breaking that cycle requires protection, accountability and political access. Another series of arrests cannot supply the trust that an honoured amnesty and meaningful participation might have built.

For Pakistan, Kabul's domestic failures intersect with a separate, documented security threat. The UN Monitoring Team's August 2026 report states that Taliban support for the TTP continued as it escalated attacks against Pakistan. The report also records Kabul's denial of harbouring terrorist groups.

The same report describes attempts to restrain the TTP, including relocating approximately 2,000 fighters and family members farther from the border and a reported warning against continued attacks. These measures deserve scrutiny. Their significance depends on whether they disrupt recruitment, financing and attack planning.

Here lies Kabul's central contradiction: it claims authority sufficient to demand respect for Afghan sovereignty, yet its conduct falls short of the responsibilities accompanying that authority. Governing Afghanistan entails preventing its territory from enabling attacks against neighbouring countries.

Pakistan should seek a negotiated verification framework: designated liaison officers, documented responses to specific threat notifications, verified action against identified facilities and facilitators, and coordinated investigation of financing channels. Regular reviews should track unresolved cases. Regional participation could support verification where agreed, with safeguards for sensitive information and clear responsibilities.

Pakistan must continue strengthening its own intelligence, policing and prosecution. Those obligations do not absolve Kabul. Nor should Islamabad confuse Afghan resistance organisations with ISKP. The UN report records serious setbacks to ISKP alongside its continuing threat. Different actors require distinct assessments; opposition to the Taliban alone establishes no common political project.

Another Afghan civil war would threaten Pakistan through displacement, disrupted commerce and opportunities for terrorist networks. Islamabad's interest lies in a functioning neighbour.

The Taliban's unfinished victory is ultimately a test of government. Can they protect former adversaries, accommodate excluded communities and act against networks threatening their neighbours? The resistance landscape makes those questions harder to evade. Pakistan cannot be asked to absorb the consequences while Kabul offers assurances unsupported by action.

Afghanistan needs a peace its people can trust. Pakistan needs a neighbour whose commitments it can verify. Kabul must deliver both.