Water is a right, not a weapon

In January, United Nations researchers issued a stark warning: the world has moved beyond a water crisis and into a state of "global water bankruptcy". This warning was issued via a new flagship report from the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health, which also pointed out how decades of overuse and environmental degradation have pushed many rivers, aquifers, lakes, wetlands and glaciers into a post-crisis condition from which their historical 'normal' may no longer be recoverable.

Such a warning could hardly be timelier. Water is becoming increasingly entangled with geopolitics and conflict. In the ongoing US-Israeli war with Iran, attacks on critical infrastructure have highlighted the vulnerability of desalination facilities that supply drinking water to millions across the Gulf. When water infrastructure becomes part of a military confrontation, the consequences extend far beyond the battlefield.

But direct military conflict is not the only danger. Even the mismanagement of water can deepen existing political and social tensions. The Nile has become a source of prolonged tension between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Environmental degradation around Lake Chad has intensified competition over scarce resources between pastoral and agricultural communities, and enabled Boko Haram to exploit weak governance and socioeconomic marginalisation to increase its influence.

The UN has thus aptly emphasised that water can be a driver of conflict, a weapon of conflict or a casualty of conflict. Conversely, however, water sharing can also serve as a basis for cooperation. It is in this latter context that the militarisation of the Indus river system needs to be understood. India's decision in 2025 to place the Indus Waters Treaty in "abeyance" disrupted a framework that survived several wars and decades of political hostility. While this treaty has several flaws which need to be addressed, suspending a treaty which enables institutional cooperation at a time of accelerating climate stress is especially dangerous.

Climate change is transforming the Himalayan rivers, and the Indus basin is already under immense pressure from rising temperatures, changing precipitation patterns and shifts in snow and glacial melt. The Indus is not simply a river divided between two hostile states. It is part of a rapidly changing cryosphere. Understanding these changes requires continuous scientific observation, hydrological data and cooperation across borders. Yet the deterioration of Indo-Pak relations threatens precisely the mechanisms that could make such knowledge possible.

Whatever disagreements India and Pakistan have over dams, allocations or security, they share a basic interest in knowing what is happening to the rivers and aquifers on which hundreds of millions depend. That means restoring regular hydrological data exchange and creating mechanisms for joint or independently verified monitoring of shared natural resources to better contend with climate impacts.

Moreover, for lower riparian countries such as Pakistan, the problem is not simply that there is too little water. Much of the water available is used inefficiently and distributed inequitably, while investment in drinking water, sewerage and sanitation remains far too weak. A country can therefore have a water-security crisis even while enormous volumes of water continue to flow through its rivers and irrigation systems.

Achieving water security cannot mean only building more dams or trying to control rivers. It must also mean using water efficiently, allocating it fairly, protecting aquifers and watersheds and ensuring that ordinary citizens have reliable access to safe water. Pakistan need not wait for India to restore the Indus Waters Treaty before undertaking these domestic measures.