Frozen border, rising terror and cost of estrangement

The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remain largely frozen. Backchannel diplomacy may be continuing, but cross-border terrorism attributed to the TTP remains the principal obstacle to the resumption of open contacts. Disagreements over girls' education and women's rights continue to divide the Taliban's internal power corridors, while the border has remained closed since October - the longest closure since the 18-month shutdown of the 1960s. TTP and BLA attacks, particularly against civilian and military targets, continue to compound tensions. Meanwhile, border communities on both sides, among the biggest victims of the standoff, are increasingly restless over the loss of livelihoods, trade and businesses.

The Taliban government's fifth anniversary celebrations in Kandahar offered a revealing glimpse into these internal differences. Supreme Leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada rejected calls to reverse decrees restricting women's employment and education beyond primary school, insisting that no one - including himself - had the authority to alter what he described as the Islamic Sharia system.

"Our sacred jihad resulted in the defeat and humiliation of US-led occupiers and brought a pure Islamic system to Afghanistan. We will never obey those who are ignorant and demand of us what is contrary to the Sharia. No one, including myself, has the authority to amend the Islamic Sharia system."

Home Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, however, struck a notably different, sobering tone on August 15: "We must respect our people, not impose our views or moods on them… Afghanistan's future rests on knowledge and education; our faith's first command was Iqra."

Haqqani's emphasis on education is encouraging, although the principle of Iqra - seeking and engaging with knowledge - applies equally to Muslim men and women, without discrimination.

Let's come back to the Pak-Afghan relations. While there are indications of backchannel contacts aimed at eventually restoring formal dialogue, public messaging from Kabul remains unhelpful. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid recently accused Pakistan of instigating conflict in Afghanistan, harbouring Daesh and regrouping Afghan opposition factions on its territory. Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi delivered a similar message on August 19, arguing that regional countries that had developed "positive ties" with the Islamic Emirate had benefited politically, economically and in security terms. The statement appeared to carry an indirect message for Islamabad, particularly given the prolonged border closure, without addressing the circumstances that produced the impasse.

Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoob, meanwhile, stopped short of acknowledging the TTP's presence in Afghanistan, but proposed a potentially useful way forward: a mutual non-sanctuary arrangement. "Neither side will shelter the other's opponents, nor will either allow its territory to be used against the other," he said, adding that Afghanistan was prepared for such an agreement and that mediating countries were aware of its position. This proposal deserves serious consideration because it could provide a basis for addressing the core security dispute without requiring either side to concede its entire position.

The political and economic costs of the stalemate are meanwhile becoming harder to ignore. In Pakistan, opposition leader Mahmood Khan Achakzai recently questioned Islamabad's diplomatic posture after Afghan diplomatic events appeared to attract senior representatives from China, Russia, Britain and India, while Pakistan was represented by a relatively junior Foreign Office official. Whatever the protocol considerations, the episode raised a broader question about whether Pakistan's engagement with Kabul is being driven primarily by security concerns at the expense of wider diplomatic and economic interests. Traders, industries, farmers, transporters, daily-wage workers and businesses linked to Afghanistan and Central Asia have all suffered from the prolonged suspension of border trade, particularly in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. There is little indication yet of an imminent easing.

Meanwhile, Europe appears to be recalibrating its engagement with Kabul. In June 2026, EU officials and representatives of 15 member states held their first face-to-face meeting with Taliban representatives in Brussels, focusing on readmission procedures and consular services. The talks followed earlier contacts in Kabul and came amid low rates of return for Afghans ordered to leave the European bloc. The emerging approach appears less about formal recognition of the Taliban and more about pragmatic engagement on migration, consular matters and other practical interests, while retaining pressure over human rights.

The position expressed by Richard Lindsay, the UK special envoy to Afghanistan, fits this emerging model. Following his recent visit, he said that "dialogue matters" but must be matched by action, particularly on counter-terrorism commitments, regional security and the rights of women and girls. In other words, engagement need not mean recognition or acceptance; it can be used as a mechanism to extract measurable commitments.

For Pakistan, this raises a larger strategic question. Can Islamabad also move towards a calibrated engagement strategy that protects its security interests while reducing the mounting economic and social costs of the border closure? Security concerns cannot simply be wished away, particularly while TTP attacks continue. But neither can the economic damage and growing resentment among border communities be ignored indefinitely. A sustainable policy may require combining firm counter-terrorism demands with structured dialogue, phased border openings, humanitarian and commercial exemptions, and a verifiable non-sanctuary arrangement.

The central question is whether Pakistan can move beyond an approach that is exclusively security-centric and balance immediate security imperatives with its longer-term socio-economic interests, before the current estrangement inflicts even deeper costs on communities on both sides of the border. Equally important is whether the Afghan rulers are amenable to fulfilling their counter-terrorism commitments i.e. demonstrable actions against groups that are a source of serious concern to all neighbouring nations?