Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa - irony and antidote

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa once again is in the eye of the storm. The province has a peculiar sociology, shaped primarily by tribal heritage, Islamism, Pashtun cultural structures and a predominantly rural population, mainly living under the tenants of social codes like the pervasive Pakhtunwali, or the lesser prevalent Islamzoona and Turizoona in the erstwhile tribal districts. K-P's rural population is roughly 81.20%, with only about 18.80% living in urban centres. Islam plays an all-encompassing role, and both Pakhtunwali (or Pashtunwali) and Islam complement each other; but when in conflict, Pakhtunwali wins. Islam as practised, remains defined mainly by its rural undertones, where besides melmastia (hospitality), shegara (doing good to other), wafa (fidelity to the word and cause), toora (bravery) and nang (honour); tarboorwali (agnatic rivalry), sway (jealousy), badal (revenge) also define the Pakhtun universe. Peghore (taunt), siali (getting even at all costs), and lop-sided concepts of ghairat (honour as pride) and namoos (honour as dignity) reinforce a constant state of conflict, and eternal jockeying for power. Hujra (the communal townhall so to speak), Jumaat (mosque) and Nanawate (asylum) play an outsized role under conflict resolution mechanism (CRM). CRM, however, has taken a good battering in upper Pakhtunkhwa (Afghanistan) and lower Pakhtunkhwa (K-P and Balochistan) during years of conflict. These values – as briefly and incompletely defined – collectively make the Pakhtun social organisation weak, amenable to machinations and susceptible to break down. Literature defines this intensely democratic tribal society as more or less 'acephalous' (leaderless), as Pakhtun resent central authority.

Most academics divide K-P into: a) nang society that mainly constitute the tribal highlands; b) the qalang society comprising the urban districts and plains including the Yousafzai plain of Mardan and Swabi, the Yousafzai fief of Dir, Swat, the Charsadda Doaba formed by twin waters of Kabul and Swat Rivers, etc; c) the Hindko speaking Hazarajat and Galiyat; and d) the cosmopolitan urban centres of Peshawar, Mardan, Abbottabad, etc that are inhabited by societal elite, entrepreneurs and mercantile classes and settlers from other provinces.

Politically, K-P's politics remained traditionally dominated by Northern Districts of Peshawar, Nowshera, Charsadda, Mardan and Swabi, extending up to Dir and Swat. Other areas (the periphery) like tribal districts, Hazarajat, etc had a stint or two, like when Pir Sabir Shah and the George Sikander Zaman family had political visibility at provincial level. It is only recently that peripheral K-P has been at the provincial helm. The JUI-F has its stronghold with Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the eternal deal maker, in the Southern Districts of Tank, Lakki Marwat, DI Khan, Bannu, Kohat, etc – the proverbial Pashto belt. The Gandapurs, the Kundis, the Saifullahs mainly represent the political landscape of K-P South. Traditionally, Peshawar-based political power has remained divided laterally between the K-P North and South, with chief ministers and governors alternating. The settled districts and the newly merged districts (NMDs) of erstwhile FATA represent another vertical division in comparative developmental terms.

It was rare that the erstwhile FATA had any significant political visibility, with the deposed CM, Sohail Afridi, being an exception. Female politics is generally concentrated in Wali and Bilour families of ANP and Saifullahs of Lakki Marwat, who have had varying political affiliations.

Democratic tradition, in political terms, remains weak in the NMDs, which have lived under the Sandeman System for decades. That system was orchestrated by Sir Robert Groves Sandeman (1835-1892) during the late 1870s starting from Balochistan. It was formed around collective tribal responsibility under the infamous FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations), and defined by the Maliks, Muaajib (official endowment to clans and subtribes) and Lungi (individual endowment).

Contemporary terrorism in K-P politically remains diametrically opposed to insurgency in Balochistan, where cessation from Pakistan remains the operative mantra. TTP demands in K-P are mainly rollback of FATA merger, prisoner release, return to their homes with arms, imposition of Sharia, etc, the last being nebulous. So, although TTP and Baloch groups operationally cooperate, their long-term collaboration is seemingly not well thought-out, as their aims and objectives are different and divergent. Terrorism in K-P is an administrative issue, well within the provincial government's purview, albeit with federal assistance. In addition to the internal dynamics of terrorism, its linkages with Afghanistan are well established, necessitating a synchronised strategy and response between the province and Islamabad.

Historically, Islam remains a great mobilisation force, as people in K-P, irrespective of ethnicity, are easily systematised by religious causes because: a) clerics are voluntarily given lead role by the feuding tribes during crises like the Afghan Jihad etc; b) clergy has consolidated its political position and role, and has greater ability to stir up and manipulate public sentiment through pervasive network of mosque and mimber (pulpit); c) the Afghan Jihad and ascension of IEA to power next door in Afghanistan gave the religious cadre a shot in the arm, on either side. However, Islamism remains episodic, busting spontaneously but subsiding with time, as evidenced in Malakand and Dir during the last decade of 19th Century, the Faqir of Epi episode during the 1950s, the overthrow of Taliban 1.0 in Afghanistan at the turn of this century, and the Sharia Movement under Sufi Mohammad of TNSM in Swat during the 2000s.

In K-P's predominantly Pakhtun universe, the force of argument or overwhelming force are respected in an effective CRM. Contemporary modern state twice tried to rule lar au bar (lower and upper) Pakhtunkhwa, as witnessed through the British model and the recent US/NATO model. The British successfully tried its model of governance in the former NWFP and Balochistan through minimal governance, self-rule and inducements. Whereas the US/NATO model of central authority, pervasive governance and outlandish ideas failed.

Traditionally, there is intense competition among the elected and non-elected elite of the province, and their intercession with Islamabad for appointments, especially for Governorship. Those appearing very principled and politically stoic also run this race behind the scenes through not-so-hidden manipulations. The JUI-F appears proficient in such backroom pleadings and manipulations. Fazlur Rehman continues as a constant beneficiary of the State's largesse, despite his incendiary anti-government and anti-establishment rhetoric. Miltablishment effectively deals with his art of politics, on Government's terms.

(Continued)