Makkah Pact

The deeper significance of the Makkah Agreement lies not simply in its provisions, but in what it represents: the erosion of confidence in the existing Middle Eastern order and its security architecture, and the search for an alternative. The agreement reflects a growing recognition that regional security cannot be left entirely dependent on an externally guaranteed order. It may therefore be viewed as part of an emerging multipolar regional security architecture that is likely to extend beyond bilateral or trilateral defense arrangements. The previous order was increasingly shaped around an Israel-centred regional security architecture, with the Abraham Accords serving as a key component of this strategic vision by promoting Arab-Israeli normalisation and creating greater space for Israel's integration into the broader Middle Eastern security framework. Yet the post-Cold War, US-led regional order failed to deliver lasting stability. At the same time, the Iran War has further reinforced perceptions of the limits of American deterrence, influence and capacity to lead the regional order.

What makes this agreement distinctive is the perception that it has emerged primarily from the strategic autonomy pursued by three regional powers, rather than from a security blueprint designed in Washington or Tel Aviv. The strategic logic of the US-led order in the Middle East broadly followed a sequential process: Arab-Israeli normalisation, Israel's deeper regional integration through the Abraham Accords, and the pursuit of stability within a US-led security architecture. The emerging order reflects a different set of regional dynamics and priorities: strategic autonomy, indigenous deterrence, regional balancing, diversified partnerships, and multipolarity. In this sense, the Makkah Agreement represents a broader shift in the Middle East - from an externally managed security order toward a contested, multipolar and increasingly self-help-based regional order.

The old order sought stability through external balancing, whereas the emerging order increasingly seeks security through regional balancing and strategic autonomy. Under the old arrangement, the US provided the overarching security umbrella, while the Gulf monarchies offered strategic access, energy security and economic partnership. Israel increasingly came to be positioned as a central military pillar of the regional balance, while other Middle Eastern states were expected to operate within an externally structured security architecture. This arrangement has become increasingly unreliable - not because American power has disappeared, but because confidence in the reliability of American security commitments has weakened among regional powers. The problem confronting Washington and Tel Aviv in the Middle East is therefore not a deficit of military capability, but a deficit of strategic credibility.

The 2026 Iran conflict became a catalyst for the search for a new regional order. The war dramatically exposed the vulnerability of Gulf states that were largely positioned as spectators but suddenly found themselves potential targets, while facing risks to energy infrastructure, maritime commerce and vital trade routes. The erosion of confidence in American strategic guarantees pushed some of the region's most important Muslim powers to seek greater strategic autonomy and alternative means of deterrence. The Makkah Agreement can be understood as a consequence of this strategic reassessment. Saudi Arabia, it may be argued, has not necessarily closed the door to normalisation with Israel; however, any future normalisation increasingly appears likely to be linked to meaningful Israeli concessions toward a two-state solution and a political settlement of the Palestinian question.

The Makkah Agreement can also be understood through the concept of hedging. Regional states may increasingly be hedging against strategic uncertainty rather than committing themselves exclusively to any single external power or security arrangement. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is not necessarily abandoning the US; rather, it is diversifying its strategic partnerships to reduce dependence on Washington. In this sense, the Makkah Agreement can be viewed as a hedge against multiple sources of uncertainty: Iran's regional power, the possibility of Israeli strategic dominance, perceived American unreliability, and the broader instability of the Middle East. Hedging may therefore provide an important explanation for the agreement, but the three powers also bring together a distinctive combination of capabilities that creates a new balance of power. Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources, strategic geography, energy leverage and considerable diplomatic weight. Turkey contributes a growing defence industry, advanced drone capabilities, substantial conventional military power and extensive experience within NATO. Pakistan contributes significant military capabilities, decades of experience in conventional and counterinsurgency warfare and, most importantly, nuclear deterrence.

The emerging configuration could increasingly be understood through four broad centres of power: (1) the US and Israel; (2) Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; (3) Iran; and (4) China and Russia as external strategic actors capable of providing additional economic, diplomatic, technological and military balancing options. In other words, the Middle East may be moving from a security system centred on Washington toward a more multipolar and contested balancing system. This may prove to be the agreement's most important structural consequence. The symbolic significance of the Makkah Agreement is equally important. By choosing Makkah as the venue for the agreement, the three states conveyed a political message that the security of the Muslim Middle East should increasingly be shaped and managed by regional Muslim powers themselves.

Finally, the Agreement represents a potentially significant expansion of Pakistan's strategic role. Pakistan has long maintained close security relationships with the Gulf states and has historically been involved in Middle Eastern security affairs, but the agreement potentially connects these relationships to a broader trilateral security framework involving Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Pakistan could therefore emerge as a strategic bridge linking South Asian and Middle Eastern security dynamics. Previously described in geopolitical terms as a gateway to Eurasia, Pakistan may now also be assuming the role of a security bridge between South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the wider Middle East. If this role develops, Pakistan's strategic geography would become not merely a source of vulnerability but an instrument of strategic relevance - allowing it to connect two increasingly interdependent security regions.