How should Pakistan respond to Indian terrorism? There's a way

It's time to wake up and smell the new normal.

Pakistan and India have remained locked in a mutually hostile relationship which has now turned a new corner. But many here at home remain wedded to archaic doctrines steeped in a conservative approach and a defensive mindset. We need to shed the old ways and adopt a fresh, proactive and clear-headed attitude towards India grounded firmly in the post-Maarka-e-Haq victory realities.

This week Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stated unequivocally in Quetta that our "eastern neighbour" was sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan. A day earlier, Director General ISPR Lt Gen Ahmad Sharif Chaudhry echoed similar sentiments. Good. Clarity starts with identifying the culprit. A plan of action must now follow. Such a plan must outline what Pakistan will do if India does not desist from using proxies to wage a campaign of terror on our homeland.

This is where we tend to falter.

We falter for two reasons: first, we have lacked consistency in our approach towards India; second, our commentators and analysts are so welded into the traditional India policy that they are unwilling to critique it on merit. One major factor for our success over India in Maarka-e-Haq was this: our response to blatant Indian aggression defied our default approach which prioritised avoidance of escalation. The new 'Quid Pro Quo Plus' retaliation set new standards of conventional deterrence.

But now this approach needs to be distilled into a coherent doctrine which standardises our approach to India on all issues – including the Indus Water Treaty. Fortunately, we do not have to reinvent the wheel. One of our most respected and acclaimed strategists has already described a broad outline.

A few weeks after our resounding victory over Narendar Modi's India last year, Lt Gen (retd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai delivered a keynote address at a seminar at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI). Gen Kidwai is an Advisor to the National Command Authority (the highest decision-making body for our nuclear weapons) and is the former DG of the Strategic Plans Division SPD (responsible for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal). In fact, he is rightly credited as having organised, built and operationalised our strategic assets command infrastructure under the umbrella of the SPD.

In his May 2025 speech, he explained our post-Maarka-e-Haq doctrine in very clear terms. Since paraphrasing can often lead to misinterpretation, I am going to quote him directly from the press release issued by the ISSI dated May 28, 2025.

"Lt Gen (retd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai underscored the emergence of a 'new normal' in South Asia's strategic environment…He emphasized that the defining feature of the new strategic reality is the reversal of air superiority in the region…The Pakistan Air Force's (PAF) decisive performance…has established Pakistan as the dominant air power in South Asia. This shift validates Pakistan's conventional deterrence as an effective complement to its robust nuclear arsenal."

Let's stop here for a moment and focus on two elements he has mentioned in relation to each other: "Air superiority" as a "shift" and "conventional deterrence" now "complementing" nuclear deterrence. Taken together, this combination means that Pakistan now has enhanced confidence in its conventional deterrent ability, even though nuclear weapons provide us the ultimate defence. We also know the newly established Rocket Force Command is aimed at further strengthening our conventional arsenal and the ability to strike Indian targets across a wide range without resorting to the use of nuclear-capable missiles.

In the May 2025 conflict our conventional capability inflicted serious pain on the Indians. First the PAF humiliated the Indian Air Force (as President Donald Trump keeps reminding the world), and then a ferocious barrage of Fatah missiles pummelled Indian military bases and other non-civilian targets. Yet, we too learnt lessons. Some weaknesses were identified. They must have been addressed by now. If India blunders into another misadventure, our response across all domains will be two notches up.

But is all this sufficient to cure our Indian headache?

Here's where our lack of clarity becomes problematic. Too many of our strategic thinkers are still hesitant to consider stepping outside the comfort zone of a defensive posture towards India. Too many of them are still willing to hand over the initiative to India and are fine with being responders. India attacked in 2019 and we responded; India attacked again in 2025 and we responded – will we now again wait for their next attack and only focus on our response?

The world has changed, times have changed, and our strategic environment has changed – the only thing that, unfortunately, has not changed is this defensive mindset.

The test is upon us in the shape of a fresh wave of terrorism, and of India building projects to steal our water from the Chenab. What will we do other than issuing condemnatory statements and threatening pacifist "lawfare"?

Thankfully, Gen Kidwai has clarity. Here's what he said in his May 2025 speech:

"Pakistan reserves the right to reciprocate any terror attack with conventional responses against pre-determined adversaries, reflecting a reciprocal logic to India's declared doctrines."

Read this twice. Then a third time. That is how important this statement is. I am surprised most of our strategists have not comprehended the change in our approach that this statement reflects. For the first time – thank God – we are shedding our defensive attitude towards India and saying clearly that we reserve the right to hit them if we determine they have sponsored terror attacks inside Pakistan. Note the use of the words "reciprocate" and "reciprocal" twice in the same sentence. This is the "offensive defence" that I referred to in my last Sunday's column and it spells out an expansion of our doctrine towards India. We should snatch the initiative from India and reserve the right to take action on our terms at the time and place of our choosing. It is as simple as that.

And yet, there is an added factor.

We need a narrative that communicates our new approach to India and beyond. Last week at a seminar in Islamabad, Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar reminded India that any attempt to divert our waters will be considered an act of war. This week the Prime Minister warned India against sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan. The new narrative should weave together policy, strategy and doctrine in a manner that makes India understand the cost it will have to pay for continuing down this path.

As an added benefit, the narrative may finally force our traditional-minded strategists to step outside their comfort zones and smell the new normal.