Iran: strategic choices

Sadly, for many who were enthused by Iran's spectacular resilience before the combined US-Israeli assault, Iran's future options do not include or rest on how it arrogates control of the Strait of Hormuz, or gets Israel to stop attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon. Both matter, but neither is existential. Hezbollah serves Iran's convenience to deflect Israeli attention away from itself. A strategic argument can be made of Iran's support of Hezbollah, but can the survival of a 'Lebanese' militia truly constitute Iran's vital national interest? Should it not be for Lebanon to deal with a residual non-state force from the civil war of the 1980s? It beats all principles of sovereign existence that Iran itself is fighting for. Israel can be mutilated on the altar of non-adherence to international laws and disrespect for sovereignty from its genocidal excesses, but one wrong does not make another right. Hezbollah may be a useful foil against Israel, and thus the criticality. But would Iran save Hezbollah from Israeli wrath at the cost of Iran? I doubt.

Hormuz, and its control that Iran vies for, is a different strategic proposition. Iran leveraged geography to irk and pique the world as a tool of coercive diplomacy. That it bottled up Iran with attendant consequences is something Iran considered worth the pain the others will feel. The world, however, did not come to Iran's aid, as Tehran had hoped, except for Pakistan, itself grappling with significant internal and regional challenges. That it stepped up to the plate when all others chose to watch on says a lot about the national character and leadership of the country. Globally, there was enough oil in reserve and floating stock to mitigate the pain, and oil prices were well contained. Also, it was presumed that the war would not go as far as to cause a permanent dent in energy supplies. The poorest of the poor have indeed suffered, but the economies have largely borne the brunt resolutely.

The Law of the Seas and related conventions have underpinned global commerce for decades. Any deviation will thus be a new challenge that mankind and international institutions must negotiate. Hormuz is both territorial and international waters because of its unique geography, as indeed all straits ought to be. To arrogate control by competing forces to blackmail the international system into submission is not only distasteful, it is unacceptable. The strategic value of that leverage is likely to diminish over time as alternatives, such as transport routes, pipelines, refining capacities and energy sources, reduce dependence on a single maritime chokepoint. Iran must aim to maximise gains from this geographical benevolence by using it in collaboration with others, keeping Iran relevant and selling its oil before the world moves to solar and batteries as its primary source.

Iran's presumed leverage over Hormuz can be its worst enemy since it is only a narrow and potentially diminishing advantage. Iran may be tempted to overestimate the political gains deriving from it and underestimate the economic and strategic cost of prolonged pain that it may impose on itself and others. It has a lot more to gain from a more positive flip of the same endowment. That is the key challenge Iran, as a nation, must now answer. Iran's future will not be secured by its enhanced profile alone, but by understanding its limits, recognising its needs, and applying its considerable national talent to meeting them.

Going by the immediate sense of excitement that Iranians and their cohorts have felt over the assumed ascendancy in the war against the US-Israel, it seems Iran may falter again under the weight of another presumption about civilisational heritage, misplaced and untimely pride, and euphoric misjudgement in this crucial phase of their national journey. That it has found eminence after decades of having been lost to most of the world, there would be a resident sentiment of both exultation and resentment. Emerging from war with heavy losses of life, capital and resources can be a painful adjustment, but for it to overwhelm rationality and prudence will write Iran's next chapter. I say this in the civilisational recourse. What is a strength can also become a limiting weakness when sagacity takes a backseat.

Iran has two paths ahead of it as it stands at the crossroads, following a war that failed to deliver a clear victor. Not being the loser is not being a victor necessarily. Modern wars only deliver qualified gainers. Iran must break out of this binary and chart a favourable path to its future. Between choosing to go nuclear with its enrichment infrastructure, which is only a few steps ahead, Iran can graduate to being a nuclear-weapons state like Israel and North Korea and then stand up to the world with its newly gained deterrence but with little else to go along. Already heavily sanctioned, clubbed in the axis of resistance/evil, and excoriated from the global chain for the last five decades, Iran will continue to lie outside the global community where opportunity abounds and prosperity multiplies. It may choose to be a pariah as safe as North Korea, or be an international economic force as South Korea. The choice and the consequences are stark.

The other option is to bring its strength to the common benefit of the world at large. By shedding the route to nuclear aspirations, it can multiply its riches as the rest of the world has done and bring benefit to its people. Iranians are well-educated, skilful and entrepreneurial, characteristics honed over time in an old civilisation which has survived many a challenge and prospered to modern times. It must bring to fruition the potential that the nation and its people carry. Gas and oil, modern economies' engines, are in greatest demand currently, as economies transition and some need to rebuild or build faster. Iran must benefit from its reserves in the next two decades while markets for its products exist. Modern economies are undergoing major transformations in technological advances; Iran would not like to miss this bus, as the future ordains differently.

The dilemma for Iran is that the policies which maximise economic growth may not always coincide with those that the leadership believes maximise the regime's hold over power. A fragmented top tier, which is as desperate to find its respective place among the constituents, makes the process even more complicated and cautious. Looking over the shoulder is not how great nations can find their place in the comity of nations. Reconciling these competing imperatives will be the defining challenge as Iran negotiates the next phase in its search for abiding peace and prosperity.