US-Iran talks - conclusions and implications

Last week, we covered the obtaining situation leading up to the Islamabad MoU between the US and Iran. Finally, after much speculative disruptions, the MoU was electronically signed as a framework agreement for further negotiations and technical discussions. The first high-level follow-up round of talks ended in Bürgenstock, Switzerland on June 22, 2026, to take the agreed 60-day roadmap towards a final peace deal, to officially end hostilities between the US-Israel combine and Iran. US Vice President JD Vance represented Washington and Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf represented Tehran. The talks reportedly made 'encouraging progress' despite initial friction and disagreements.

As per Iran's demand, the US Treasury Department, as immediate relief, issued a 60-day sanctions-waiver that permits Tehran to sell and deliver oil globally in US dollars until August 21. America also agreed to release $12 billion in frozen Iranian funds to purchase agricultural products, like soybeans, from farmers in the US. On the contentious 'nuclear issue', VP Vance claimed Iran has permitted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear sites. Iran's FM and state media disputed the US claim, reiterating 'no new commitments' linking further cooperation to be strictly under the UN auspices. Iran's missile programme, reportedly, was not discussed.

On the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), both sides agreed instituting 'direct communication line' to prevent any mishaps and mis-coordination, and ensure shipping safety. On Lebanon, negotiators agreed to create a joint 'de-confliction cell' to maintain the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. Tehran emphasised that full implementation of the peace deal would be contingent upon complete cessation of Israeli operations in Lebanon. Lower functionaries from both sides, in some four working groups, would remain in Switzerland to dilate details and establish specific verification mechanisms and fiscal structures.

President Masoud Pezeshkian travelled to Islamabad on June 23, to thank Islamabad, discuss the whole gamut of Pak-Iran relations, and to have a formal follow-up of the Islamabad MoU. While US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is on a trip to Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE for regional consultations and augment some confidence in the US leadership, Iranian officials are holding parallel security talks with Gulf states.

If we look at the developments in the aftermath of the Feb-March war, Iran emerges stronger from the conflict with a robust geostrategic standing, at least for now. Tehran used horizontal escalation, targeting US military bases, embassies and critical energy/civilian infrastructure across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Israel. International and domestic pressure, mayhem in global energy markets and economy, military limitations and Iranian resilience compelled the US to postpone further attacks and agree to a negotiated settlement. The US could not attain any of its war objectives – regime change, surrender, de-nuclearisation and de-missilefication, SoH opening, removal of threat to Israel, etc. And militarily when a weaker side denies a stronger side the attainment of its war objectives, the weaker side technically wins. So as a verdict, the US lost 'Operation Epic Fury' to Iran's 'True Promise IV'.

The subsequent negotiations are dubbed as 'surrender to Iran' in the mainstream US media and in bipartisan debates. Having imposed an unnecessary war on Iran under the manipulated urgings and counsel of Israeli PM Netanyahu, America was in the end left with no good options, either to pursue military operations or end the war on a favourable, let alone victorious, note. The strategy followed by the US CENTCOM could not open more options for the indomitable US military, leaving it with a weak hand on the negotiation table. Whereas Iran still had more aggressive options to close SoH, conflagrate the war to the entire Gulf/Middle East and target Israel.

The war's outcome would injure President Trump and his Republican Party politically, harm the US global prestige and weaken the Trans-Atlantic US-Europe alliance. The conflict has strengthened the clerical regime in Iran, enhanced the IRGC's military standing and improved Iran's geostrategic clout in the Gulf in particular, and the Middle East in general. Any toll imposed on international shipping in the future would allow Tehran economic benefits and enable it to hold the global jugular vein; while sanctions relief and ability to sell oil would allow it to rebuild faster. The $300 billion reconstruction fund – as a sort of war reparation – would ensure greater fiscal space for Iran.

As far as Pak-Iran bilateralism goes, the effects of the war would result in closer security and diplomatic cooperation, dilution of Indian influence and shadow over Tehran, besides economic cooperation and greater integration between the two nations. The positivity of the sentiment needs to be harnessed into robust economic, political and diplomatic framework, without undue interference.

Regionally, despite Israel's frequent efforts at 'mowing the grass', Iran remains a formidable challenger to Tel Aviv's dominance; its 3H regional proxies – Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis – remain alive and well even if militarily battered; and Tehran emerges as a formidable counterweight to the Sunni Crescent under the Saudi stewardship. So, in a nutshell, Netanyahu conned President Trump by misleading him into this unnecessary war which was not winnable from the day one, unless boots could be put on the ground, a far-fetched scenario.

Militarily, once again, the US and Israeli general staffs have left observers surprised, echoing the historical missteps of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. Militaries think through the whole scenario up to the 'possible' conflict outcomes, and develop what is called a favourable 'war termination strategy'. It is no surprise to see the USMIL, post-conflict, in a much-subdued light, having achieved no discernible war aims, and leaving their enemy in much stronger position – perceptually, diplomatically, politically and geo-strategically, after spending close to $1 trillion (yes that is right). The USMIL/IDF's gung-ho euphemism had left their political leaders in much weaker position, and that is not very professional. Military leaders at the apex provide solid, candid and professional advice to their political masters about possible outcomes, without fear or favour. However, the jury would be out for some time to see whether the generals misled the politicians, or the politicians overruled military advice, which also includes political appreciation of the situation.

In one's professional judgement, CENTCOM/IDF brought all options to President Trump/PM Netanyahu and then followed orders without a 'questionable' whimper.