US and Iran - after the deal

Ultimately the US and Iran electronically signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)', thanks to Pakistan-led mediation efforts also involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Oman and Qatar, and supported by China and Russia. The MoU will be formally signed on June 19, 2026, in Geneva, Switzerland. Pakistan is hosting the event. Though the draft of MoU is not known, expectations are that it would lead to an overarching 'Agreement', covering issues like Iran's nuclear programme, missile capability, its proxies and a durable peace – from the US standpoint; and unfreezing of Iranian assets, lifting of sanctions, war reparations, ending war in Lebanon, UN guarantees, etc – from the Iranian perspective.

President Trump was cajoled into this war by PM Netanyahu, and the US Jewish lobbies, as a nuclear Iran is perceived as an existential threat to Tel Aviv. Throughout the process, there were repeated attempts by Israel, through overt and covert machinations, to scuttle the deal, including strong opinion/media manipulation internationally and within Pakistan. President Trump – realising Iranian tenacity, America's own military limitations, the catastrophic economic effects of Hormuz closure, the onset of mid-term elections and growing domestic unpopularity, and the futility of military conflict – badly wanted an off-ramp from the Israeli cobweb. American deep state and saner elements within the Jewish caucus realised Israel under BB was taking them down with it. Trump's profanity-laced characterisation of PM Netanyahu is testament to his frustration with Tel Aviv. A prolonged conflict is also likely to create more cracks in the US-Israel alliance.

Despite the growing unpopularity of the clerical regime in Iran, there is a strong sentiment to face off the US-Israeli combine, conflagrate the conflict regionally and punish Israel. Hardliners within the Iranian politics and IRGC/Pasdaran are reportedly rejecting the deal. As, an imposed war, Trump's incendiary rhetoric of obliterating Iranian civilisation and threats of targeting infrastructure are seen directed at the Iranian nation, and not merely the Ayatollahs. Continuation of attacks on the industrial targets, for example, would have painted the US in an extremely bad light.

Typical to his predatory business instincts, President Trump, this week comically offered 'policing the Gulf' for 20% stakes in the regional revenue. Within the US, bipartisan voices are sounding scepticism about the deal curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions and capabilities.

Israel still would want the US to finish the job (regime change, denuclearisation and de-missilefication) as Iran might resurge with a vengeance, after the sanctions are lifted and its economy is back on track. Moreover, continuation of the war shields PM Netanyahu from jail for corruption, and accrues political advantage in elections, later this year. For now, he has, contented himself with Israel's military strategy of 'moving the grass', having removed immediate threats, after significantly degrading Iran's military.

Hezbollah remains one of the thorniest outstanding issues for peace between Israel and Lebanon. Peace in Lebanon will depend on the US reining in Israel, and Iran restraining the Hezbollah. Israel, not a party to negotiations, remains opposed to troop withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Israeli public opinion, by and large, is hostile to the deal, and officials like Israel's national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir, have publicly talked about Israel not being bound by the deal.

For Iran, the transformation is phenomenal. The longer shadow of Khamenei is over, after his killing on the first day of war; the new civil-military leadership is settling down; and Pasdaran have emerged stronger politically, even if militarily degraded, and have consolidated their military and political power like never before. Pasdaran's apparent hardline bluster demonstrates self-discovery and confidence, as Iran under the Pasdaran-led strategy stood up to the US-Israeli onslaught with dignity, and deployed its leverages (SoH blockade, expanding the war to the Gulf, etc) so effectively. It is keeping the world economy hostage, and the final agreed status of the SoH would decide Iran's continuing leverage and financial advantage, if tolls or 'fees' (as Tehran calls them) etc are imposed on international shipping.

As per analysts, Iran's long-term goals include: a) preventing future attacks; b) dividing Arab Gulf over how far to accommodate Tehran; c) pushing out Israel, and; d) diminishing American military presence. Such ambitions entail Tehran overplaying its hand and miscalculating. The reprieve provided by the prevailing geostrategic situation may be transient. The MoU announces 60-day formal truce to be followed by a regional dialogue for SoH status and permanent cessation of hostilities all over, including Lebanon, where Israel continues to flay the 'fragile peace with impunity'.

On the nuclear issue, first, Iran is to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, agree to snap inspections and not to make or purchase a nuclear bomb. Second, it 'may' be allowed 3.67% enrichment for energy production, conceding its demand of 'right to enrichment'. Third, Tehran assisted by the US, is to dig out and surrender/destroy or keep the 12 tons Uranium enriched up to 60%, buried at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, after it is 'downblended'. Four, it is to observe an enrichment moratorium for up to 15 years down from 20 years.

The badly needed financial relief to Iran seems linked to its delivery on commitments. Iran insists technical nuclear negotiations only after the US releases $12 billion of its frozen assets upfront; and another $12 billion later, linked to progress on carrying out the deal, as demanded by the US.

Experts believe the prevailing distrust, the thorny nature of issues, enforcing mechanisms, detailed implementation and Israeli spoiler role threaten a 'no peace, no war situation'. This ensuing limbo may be to Iran's short-term advantage, as the IRGC hardliners reckon, because of the US compulsion to return to pre-war status, especially in the SoH. But it will not be sustainable for much longer, given Iran's dilapidated economy, and the world's inability to withstand petroleum disruption for another four or five months.

There has been huge response to Pakistan's diplomatic coup under very difficult and unpredictable environment, in mediating the MoU. Islamabad's dexterous diplomatic engagement brought the American and Iranian negotiators face to face in Islamabad after 47 years of hostility; helped bridge their misperceptions; indirectly stabilised the world economy; and prevented greater conflict in the ME, despite persistent provocations, domestic challenges and Indo-Israel-Afghan nexus.

For this, Pakistan's political and military leadership deserves acknowledgment, praise and support!