A fourth shift in global power

In his book, The Post-American World, published in 2008, Fareed Zakaria identified three important long-term shifts in the distribution of global power. 1) The rise of the West (15th to 19th centuries), a period during which a world order was created and dominated by Europe. 2) The rise of America (late 19th to 20th centuries), a period during which the US, after the two World Wars, became the central power in the international system. 3) The rise of the rest (late 20th and 21st centuries), a period during which countries outside the West experienced unprecedented economic growth, and the rise relatively reduced Western global dominance. This piece argues that after centuries of Atlantic dominance, geography is once again reasserting itself, and this may lead to a fourth shift of global power by 2050.

The fourth shift is defined as the transition from an Atlantic-centric international order to a Eurasian-centred geopolitical system. If Zakaria's analysis explains the redistribution of power from the West to a wider group of rising states, the period leading to 2050 suggests that by 2050, the world may witness a complete transformation of an international system that is currently suspended between two worlds: one marked by the diffusion of power and the other attempting a transition and shift from West to East. The phrase 'rise of the rest against the West' used by Zakaria was never confrontational in nature. He correctly assumed that the political, military and economic capabilities were being widely distributed, and if we keep the year 2050 as a benchmark, then many geopolitical shifts taking place suggest that this shift may eventually culminate and bring the Western and non-Western world into parity with one another.

From an international relations perspective, the current era indicates that the West is no longer dominant, but neither has it been displaced. Consequently, we have an emerging pluralistic international system that is seeking to replace the Atlantic-centric world with a Eurasian-centric world. The Atlantic Age allowed the West to shape the world's political, economic and strategic order from roughly 1500 onward. The world leading to the year 2050 is being pushed forward by Eurasian economic growth, population and geopolitical competition concentrated across Asia and the broader Eurasian landmass. The most significant geopolitical development by 2050 will be the return of Eurasia as the principal arena in which global power will be produced, contested and distributed.

From a geopolitical perspective, this shift to a Eurasian-centric global power is close to the argument made by Halford Mackinder and later modified by Nicholas Spykman in the early 20th century. According to the argument, the decisive arena of global power resided in the interaction between Eurasia's continental core and its surrounding maritime rimlands. Mackinder emphasised the Eurasian heartland, while Spykman emphasised the rimlands surrounding Eurasia. Today, the Indian Ocean links both.

The Indian Ocean acts as the critical connector that sits at the centre of this interaction, connecting the world's major manufacturing centres, energy producers and emerging consumer markets. All are located across the greater Eurasian landmass, linking East Asia, South Asia, the Gulf, Africa and Europe. The economic geography of this landmass clearly suggests that the largest economic interactions today increasingly connect East Asia, South Asia, the Gulf, Central Asia and Europe rather than Europe and North America alone. The landmass includes China as the world's largest manufacturing power. India is standing out as one of the fastest growing major economies. Southeast Asia is clearly a major production and consumption hub, and the Gulf states play a crucial role as important investors and logistics centres. Even the principal strategic flashpoints of the twenty-first century are all located in or around Eurasia. These flashpoints are Russo-Ukrainian War, US-China rivalry in East Asia, Taiwan tensions, Middle Eastern security competition, Arctic competition as the last frontier involving Russia, and Central Asian connectivity and energy politics. Energy flows will be crucial enablers, and these flows increasingly connect Eurasian actors, as a large share of global energy production originates in the Middle East and Russia. This creates dense economic linkages across Eurasia. Another indicator is the growth of transcontinental connectivity, the Chinese BRI, the International North-South Transport Corridor linking India, Iran, Russia and Central Asia, and Middle Eastern logistics corridors.

The most visible manifestation of the growing Eurasian connectivity is the railway connection between China and Europe. Referred to as the China-Europe Railway Express, these are the rail routes linking Chinese industrial centres with markets in Europe through Central Asia, Russia and alternative routes through the Caucasus and Turkey. This is creating a modern Eurasian land bridge that links the world's largest manufacturing region in East Asia with one of its largest consumer markets in Europe, thus confirming the thesis of the major global power shift towards Eurasia, which rests on the core objective of strengthening the economic integration of the Eurasian continent.

Critics may argue that the demographic decline in China and Russia, the political fragmentation and many unsettled conflicts in Eurasia, the technical dominance of the US, the presence of strong financial institutions, and the alliance system may all prevent this Eurasian transition. Yet, the fourth shift of global power is being accelerated primarily by geography and the economics of geography outside the Atlantic framework.

For Pakistan, the opportunity is in the emergence of the Eurasian strategic space connectivity, which seeks to connect China, Russia, Central Asia, Iran, the Gulf and South Asia. If Eurasian connectivity corridors continue to expand, Pakistan's strategic location could become increasingly important. Given Pakistan's time-tested friendship with China and considering that the world in 2050 might be characterised by a competitive coexistence among several major centres of power and not one global hegemon, Pakistan may represent an important geopolitical hinge around which the future Eurasian connectivity may expand. By 2050, the Indian Ocean may rival or surpass the Atlantic in strategic and economic significance. Indian Ocean will most likely become a crucial component of this fourth major shift of global power. Therefore, Pakistan's strategic location at the mouth of the Indian Ocean will be hard to ignore, and so will be its geopolitical relevance.