India's dangerous military mindset

On May 16, 2026, Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi lashed out, yet again, at Pakistan, while speaking at Gen Manek Shaw's Senak Samavad function at new Delhi. His diatribe was for Islamabad to decide "whether they [sic] want[s] to be part of geography or history" due to Pakistan ostensibly harbouring anti-India militants. He earlier described Operation Sindoor 1.0 (May 2025) as an '88 hours trailer' of what India could do to Pakistan. General Dwivedi's views against Pakistan are motivated by his 'uncompromising anti-terror doctrine, existential signalling, and a policy of absolute, zero-restraint military retaliation'.

The general believes in eliminating 'tactical restraint' against Pakistan. He considers Pakistan a 'Two-Front Threat' alongside China; is an ardent believer of atmanirbharta (self-reliance); normalises cross border retaliation as the 'New Normal'; advocates 'shaping the environment' (preparing) for Operation Sindoor 2.0; focuses on multi-domain readiness for war including AI, cyber capabilities and drone warfare. And most importantly, the general disavows the 'regional escalation' narrative i.e. he reckons that conventional war with Pakistan could be controlled from spiraling into a nuclear exchange.

General Dwivedi is from Indian Infantry's 18 Battalion, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Rifles; a veteran of Kashmir and Rajasthan area of operations; a graduate of the US Army Staff College; and former defence attache in Seychelles. He has commanded Assam Rifles, most importantly the 9 Corps, deployed mainly along Punjab in India's Western Command (WC). He also remained GOC Northern Command (NC), commanding 14, 15 and 16 Corps along India's borders with China and Pakistan including J&K. His forte is COIN (counterinsurgency) and tactical battles in the mountains except for a stint in the WC.

The 3rd Indian Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General NS Raja Subramani, who was called from retirement to assume CDS tenure on 31 May 2026, is also an expert on Pakistan/China front. He is the third consecutive CDS from the elite Indian infantry regiment, the 8th Battalion of Garhwal Rifles, after General Bipin Rawat and General Anil Chauhan.

Gen Subramani commanded critical combat units and high-altitude formations along India's borders with China and Pakistan in the North and West; participated in COIN operations in Assam (Operation Rhino); and remained General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of the India's Central Command, after commanding the premier 2 (Strike) Corps. He shares the Army Chief's views, ardently believing in the 'New Normal', and rejecting 'Pakistan's nuclear blackmail'.

If you look at the profile of these General Officers, their service exposure and experience is tactical (mountain warfare) and at best operational (COIN), and they are not in the category of 'strategic thinkers'; otherwise, they would not espouse such careless operational views of Pakistan, and its robust military capability, including a nuclear triad.

Nuclear powers never fight in conventional warfare, given the chances of miscalculation, uncalled-for escalation and unintended consequences, especially when they are neighbours, with very short warning time (180 to around 300 seconds) for (non-hypersonic) missiles to hit targets across. They also avoid using nuclear capable missiles, like India firing BrahMos cruise missile at Nur Khan base in Rawalpindi in Sindoor 1.0; never use armed UAVs/ drones; and avoid escalation and border conflagration along the entire border, hitting civilian infrastructure.

All these are dangerously escalatory steps and Indian Military, under the present leadership, wilfully escalated in May 2025 during Operation Sindoor. And if the statements by India's civil and military leadership are any guide, New Delhi would try and replicate these escalatory steps in Sindoor 2.0, if and when. Military truism establishes that 'Capability + Intention = Threat'. India's defence acquisition spree, its military capability and declared intentions make it a potent and existential threat for Pakistan, which needs a matching response. And that needs to sink in.

Pakistan Army spokesperson at various fora has responded to India's cited provocatory posturing, by reiterating Pakistan's multidomain, timely/ immediate, muscular and painful response. Pakistan has highlighted the chances of miscalculation because of the short warning time, compelling decision-making in compressed timeframe. BrahMos strike on Nur Khan base seems to have changed the entire gamut of Pakistan's security calculus.

Conventional missile launches can create 'strategic ambiguity', with consequences. So, survivability, quicker response, synergy and 'possible escalation control' would guide Islamabad's retaliation, in case of India's 'New Normal'. Pakistan's response parameters would constitute technology, compressed decision-making and credibility of deterrence. In one's opinion, conventional deterrence vis-à-vis India is now of limited credibility, because future conflict will entail much faster 'psychological escalation', reaching 'psychological threshold' much earlier, due to media frenzy and public pressure, as argued in previous columns. The future conflicts will have lesser scope for political parleys, given the very rapid deterioration of situation.

At the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (May 29-31), Commander Corps of the newly raised 'Rocket Force', Lt Gen Nauman Zakaria, dilated in detail about the shifting strategic calculus in South Asia, after the May 2025 Indo-Pak war. Primary takeaways include no space for conventional war, as dictated by the post-conflict regional dynamics. He highlighted shrunken space for decision-making (seconds not minutes), as modern, tech-driven warfare dramatically compresses operational timelines. General Zakaria highlighted AI threat in modern combat, as technology-integration shortens the classic OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop. Paradoxically, excessive technology reliance also removes the buffer required to evaluate adversary's moves and intentions. Likewise, AI-generated disinformation would target and degrade military command networks. And all this leaves minimal or no room for error and significantly increases escalation risk.

The cited challenges, the general argued, would need institutionalised regional stability mechanisms, due to the 'hyper-compressed reaction windows'. This would warrant 'direct, institutionalised strategic communication channels' between states, requiring technical dialogues and transparency. Discussing Pakistan's strategic posture, he highlighted Islamabad's pivot towards 'maximum operational readiness and rapid-response deterrence'.

In sum, the desire to avenge the embarrassment of Operation Bunyanum Marsoos, the ambition of Indian generals to leave legacy and earn medallions and post-retirement jobs, and the dangerous civil-military collusion championed by RSS under their Hindutva-laced hatred of Pakistan make a toxic mix which Pakistan cannot ignore. So, to deal with an arrogant India, Pakistan should declare its nuclear policy, in intent and manifestations – that any violation of our territorial integrity will invite a nuclear response. Period.