Five years on: any change?

Five years since resuming power, the Afghan Taliban regime operates as a centralised, male-only, Pashtun-dominated administration directed by Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada from Kandahar. Having set aside the 2004 constitution, the regime governs by religious decree, having issued more than 260 to date. Secular courts have been dismantled and replaced by thousands of mullahs enforcing extreme interpretations of Sharia law.

While the regime has improved internal territorial control and tax revenue relative to the republic era, its rule remains defined by a severe humanitarian and economic crisis. Affected by frozen foreign assets ($6–8 billion) and the abrupt loss of international aid, the economy remains fragile. To date, no sovereign nation officially recognises the regime, though Russia remains a rare exception by accepting Taliban credentials.

The 38th report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (UNAMA) acknowledged improved security and several "positive steps", yet cautioned that official recognition remains a distant prospect.

Global assessments remain deeply skeptical of the Taliban's rule, driven by two primary issues: domestic human rights violations and unfulfilled counter-terrorism commitments.

As the August 2026 UNAMA report stated, these factors directly impede post-conflict recovery and prevent Afghanistan's reintegration into the international community: "...particularly the increasingly damaging restrictions on women and girls and ongoing terrorism concerns - continue to impede Afghanistan's path toward post-conflict recovery and progress towards the internationally-affirmed goal of an Afghanistan at peace with itself and its neighbours..."

The UN report is particularly scathing on security matters. While it notes the Taliban's efforts to relocate Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters away from the Pakistani border and issue warnings against cross-border attacks, it highlights a lack of consequential action against groups like the TTP or the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

Both Islamabad and Beijing remain convinced that the top leadership of these organisations operates unhindered under Taliban protection. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have entered an unprecedented freeze, highlighted by Pakistan's border closure on October 11.

This raises a fundamental question: Will the Taliban ever crack down on trans-national allies like Al-Qaeda, ETIM and the TTP? Well, that's highly unlikely – for several key reasons.

First one flows from the precedent dilemma in a conservative tribal society; discarding one group signals to others that they may eventually be abandoned as well. The hosts don't want to be seen as betrayers.

Secondly, these groups fought alongside the Taliban during two decades of insurgency against US-led forces and the regime makes no secret of it. On the contrary, it has coopted ETIM, TTP and IMU militants into their security apparatus, as per reports.

Thirdly, Mullah Omar's historic refusal to surrender Osama bin Laden under intense US pressure illustrates the deep-seated tribal and religious impulse to protect ideological allies. This very propensity seems to have stalled relations with Pakistan over the TTP.

Rather than dismantling the infrastructure that enables the TTP's insurgency against Pakistan, the Taliban administration appears inclined toward containment rather than confrontation - pointing toward a protracted period of regional friction.

The fact that border closure has hit tens of thousands of farm workers and daily wage earners and enforces suspension of cross-border activities has hardly moved the Taliban regime from its stated position on the "ideological partners".

They seem to have diversified their trade with neighbouring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, using them for the transit trade from China, Iran and elsewhere in the region.

If the intent was to punish and force them into giving up on TTP, that has failed.

That said, the more recent question is whether Badakhshan poses an existential threat to the Taliban regime.

While opposition groups claim to have launched an armed resistance in northern Afghanistan, the reality on the ground is less dramatic than these fronts suggest. Though the Badakhshan unrest has embarrassed the Taliban and cast a shadow over the fifth anniversary of their return to power, it does not represent an existential threat. The Taliban dismiss the clashes as localised "criminal activity" tied to mining disputes rather than an organised political challenge.

Even if the unrest spreads, three factors favour the Taliban regime more than the opposition, giving them a decisive competitive advantage.

Firstly, the Taliban command a battle-hardened force equipped with vast stockpiles of former US military hardware. Over the past five years, they have expanded their security apparatus by integrating tens of thousands of loyalists, giving them a depth of manpower unmatched by fragmented opposition groups. This asymmetry explains why foreign powers remain unwilling to sponsor a renewed armed struggle.

Secondly, after four decades of conflict, the Afghan population seems fed up with a perennial state of conflict and is prioritising stability over renewed civil war. The UNAMA report also testifies to this.

Thirdly, the armed opposition lacks the broad-based political constituency required to transform a sporadic insurgency into a national uprising. Most of the leaders live in their comfort zones – Gulf, Europe and Americas – and hence unable to convince the people on ground of their commitment to the country.

Unless the Badakhshan insurgency overcomes this pervasive war fatigue and build genuine social support - which currently appears improbable - the Taliban's monopoly on power will remain secure.