Trump, Pakistan and the Abraham Accords

Pakistan has a chequered history of engaging with US pressure. But there is also a misconception that outside powers can simply dictate outcomes to smaller states. Reality is more complex, shaped by domestic politics, strategic interests and regional compulsions. The renewed debate has emerged after US President Donald Trump recently suggested that the Abraham Accords framework should be expanded beyond its original signatories and could potentially include countries like Pakistan. His remarks came in the context of efforts seeking an end to the Iran-US war. The Abraham Accords were first signed in 2020 during Trump's earlier presidency. They normalised relations between Israel and several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and later Sudan. The agreements were hailed in Washington as a major diplomatic breakthrough. But they also bypassed the core Palestinian issue which remains unresolved and highly sensitive across the Muslim world. Since then, attempts to expand the framework have repeatedly run into political resistance and regional volatility.

In response to recent speculation, Pakistan's Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar has firmly rejected any suggestion of a policy shift. Speaking in the context of his engagements with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Dar made it clear that Pakistan's position on recognising Israel remains unchanged. He reiterated that Islamabad will only consider it after the establishment of a viable, independent Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital. Dar described Pakistan's policy as "clear, consistent and not subject to external pressure or changing geopolitical winds." He also dismissed media speculation suggesting that Pakistan was under consideration for inclusion in any expanded Abraham Accords arrangement.

This clarification is important because it comes at a time when Pakistan and the US are engaged in broader diplomatic contact over regional stability, including the Iran situation and shifting security dynamics in the Middle East. However, Islamabad has drawn a clear distinction between dialogue and policy compromise. Historically, Pakistan and the US have experienced both alignment and divergence. During the Cold War and especially the first Afghan war, the two countries were close strategic partners, yet key differences persisted. The most defining example was Pakistan's nuclear programme. Washington consistently pressured Islamabad to halt its development. While sanctions and diplomatic pressure followed, especially in the 1990s, Pakistan ultimately proceeded with its nuclear tests in May 1998 after India's nuclear explosions. That decision marked a turning point in South Asia's strategic balance. After 9/11, Pakistan again became a frontline US partner in the war on terror. But even during that phase, tensions remained. Washington frequently accused Islamabad of dual policies, while Pakistan argued it was balancing internal security realities with external expectations.

Another long-standing point of divergence has been Pakistan's strategic partnership with China despite repeated US concerns. This too reflects a broader pattern of resisting external pressure when core national interests are perceived to be at stake.

On the question of Israel, Pakistan's position has remained consistent since 1948. No government, civilian or military, has formally recognised Israel. The stance has been anchored in the unresolved Palestinian question and domestic political consensus. Against this backdrop, expectations of a sudden policy shift under external pressure appear unrealistic. Even during periods of heavy dependence on US assistance, Pakistan has shown that it is willing to absorb diplomatic and economic costs rather than reverse core foreign policy positions. Engagement with Washington continues. But on Israel and the Abraham Accords, Pakistan's policy line remains firmly anchored in its traditional stance.