BJP and West Bengal elections

The BJP's victory in last week's West Bengal state election marks one of the most consequential political realignments in contemporary Indian politics. Regional parties and regional coalitions have ruled West Bengal for nearly 49 years, from 1977 to May 2026. This includes 34 consecutive years of the Left Front (1977–2011) and roughly 15 years under the All-India Trinamool Congress (TMC) (2011–2026). This victory for the BJP clearly signals that, as a national party, it is expanding beyond its traditional strongholds. Mamta Banerjee and her party, the TMC, have raised concerns about the fairness of the conduct of these elections. The Indian Election Commission carried out a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise and removed 12% of West Bengal's 76 million electorate from the 2026 electoral rolls. The Indian Election Commission justified its action by saying that the revision was meant to weed out duplicate and outdated entries and to ensure that only genuine voters could vote in the elections. But this exercise has resulted in a controversy that is now subject to legal action. The Election Commission of India has released partial results showing the BJP won at least 124 seats in the 294-member West Bengal assembly and was leading in 83 others. Final results are expected Monday evening. Given the margin of defeat, it is fair to assume that the era of the long resistance offered by regional parties to the national parties in West Bengal is over. This also means that with the arrival of the national party, the BJP, the well-entrenched political model of regional governance in West Bengal has finally been breached. Political analysts are now busy making assumptions and figuring out the geopolitical implications of this resounding BJP victory. In line with this quest, I also wish to write about two things: the political advantages that the BJP has been able to secure through this win and the concerns that this victory raises for those who wish to see India not shackled by the BJP's hard-core Hindutva ideology but regain its lost status as a secular democracy.

To start with, this victory gives the BJP three distinct advantages. The first is a strategic advantage that has now pushed the already weak opposition in the centre further into a corner. With this electoral victory, the BJP has given a clear message to the Indian opposition that it is not only expanding but consolidating its pan-India footprint. This victory strengthens PM Modi's image as a nationwide vote-winner who can now lead the BJP to win states with strong regional identities. West Bengal was a very strong example of regional parties holding off national forces for a long time (over four decades in the case of West Bengal), but with West Bengal's victory, the BJP has set off the alarm bells in Indian politics that regional dominance by regional parties is no longer secure; other regional parties may face similar challenges. Eastern India was the last major political frontier for the BJP. The party now has a replicable model that it can implement in other states dominated by regional parties, such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.

The second advantage is the numerical boost that this victory gives to the BJP. Lok Sabha has a total of 543 seats and to win a clear majority, a political party needs to win 272 seats. West Bengal sends 42 MPs to the Lok Sabha, and in the 2024 elections, the BJP won only 12 seats from West Bengal, while 29 other seats were won by Mamta Banerjee's regional party. This equation may change for the 2029 elections, and the BJP may now aim at winning 20 to 25 seats given the structural advantage it enjoys after winning the state elections.

The third advantage is the advantage of narrative. The regional party, TMC, began as an agent of change when it came to power in 2011 but gradually, the party became the very establishment that it once opposed. TMC had promised land reforms, redistribution of land and protection of farmers' needs. Instead, it limited job growth, and its centralised and insulated leadership working with a tighter bureaucratic hold, along with the rising corruption allegations against it, resulted in a loss of its popularity. When the elections came, people chose change over an entrenched system.

BJP's political narrative may now be built around how it would like to prove how a state can benefit when the long rule of a regional party is replaced by a nationalist party's rule. The BJP will most likely attempt to push West Bengal out of regional exceptionalism by undermining the subnational narrative and driving it into mainstream politics by building national narratives. BJP's politics in the next three years leading to the 2029 Lok Sabha elections is likely to be welfare-driven, aligning West Bengal politics with national trends. The state may now witness two-party democratic competition instead of one-party control and dominance. Job creation, infrastructure growth, health care and addressing farmers' needs may become the political priority that the governing BJP party may set for itself - politics guided by people's aspirations and not by ideological and regional identity loyalties.

The deep concern, however, is that West Bengal may witness a tragedy of communal violence under the ruling BJP regime. The state shares deep cultural, economic and geopolitical links with Bangladesh, with which it shares a large border. Therefore, any change in West Bengal's politics will matter more than in any other state in India. Mamta Banerjee's ruling government in West Bengal was at odds with the Central government on many matters, such as illegal immigrants, border management and citizenship. With the BJP ruling both the Centre and the state, this friction will no longer be there. Since the ouster of Sheikh Hasina Wajid's government in Bangladesh in 2024, India-Bangladesh relations have entered a tense, downward spiral characterised by mutual suspicion and diplomatic friction. BJP considers that TMC has been too soft on the border crossings issue and a hard-handed policy against such immigrants by the BJP may fan communal violence. If, like in the rest of India, the BJP also mobilises religious identity as a political tool and creates Hindu-Muslim polarisation, then it will harm the cultural coexistence and shared Bengali identity in the state. This will not be good for West Bengal nor for the BJP, a party eyeing the 2029 elections.