Australia, China and Pakistan
The writer heads the independent Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad
A recent visit to Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney entailed interesting perspectives on how the middle power Australia, like Pakistan, is caught between two big powers i.e. China and the United States for maintaining a balance in relations with the two global rivals. Whatever way you look at it, an intrinsic tilt to the US is unmistakable. Secondly, the Pakistan-Australia ties also stand at an interesting juncture in the context of the former's role in the mediation between the US and Iran.
With a population of nearly 27 million, a whopping US$2.12 trillion GDP and US$75,648 per capita income, Australia ranks among the world's 15 largest economies. For its strong voice in the Indo-Pacific region, strategic partnerships in alliances like ANZUS and AUKUS, Quad, WTO and the UN, and a reputation as a stable rule-of-law based society, Australia today wants to be reckoned as an influential "middle power" with enviable democratic credentials.
The mutually conflicting relationships with the US and China probably have never been as stressful as today. China is one of Australia's biggest trading partners while the US is the security guarantor, particularly for the maritime security in the Indo-Pacific Ocean. For Canberra, the Australian capital, maritime security is central to its sovereignty and supply chains. The National Defense Strategy 2026 also spells it out loud and clear. An across-the-board consensus exists on the US as the essential lynchpin of Australia's security.
Under a September 2021 AUKUS security agreement with the US and the UK, Australia is set to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), making Australia only the seventh nation to operate such technology historic. Despite the commotion that President Donald Trump has caused across the globe, the project is very much on track and justified as "the absolutely essential way to defend Australia" – the third largest maritime zone in the world.
Most officials concede that the Trump-induced fracture in the global order is near permanent and has forced a definite recalibration of foreign relations across the globe. Yet, the Australian political elite is disinclined to break the strategic bond with the US. An unmistakable "chronic anxiety about China" within the policy circles and the political community seems to define Australia's quest for American security umbrella.
Perceived threats from China ring aloud in conference rooms, accompanied some times by characterisations such as "malign influence of China". Over two-thirds of Australians view China as a threat and that is why the "edifice of Australia's China policy is built around the US and hence don't desire a break despite reservations about President Trump," said an official at ASPI, a Canberra think tank.
"Indo-Pacific Ocean nations are currently facing hard choices and don't want to do what others tell them to do," said an official while speaking of "coercion" by China.
A glance back reveals that tensions with Beijing soared when Canberra called for an independent investigation into Covid-19, blocked Huawei from Australia's 5G network, introduced foreign interference laws, and continued criticism of China's policies in Xinjiang – essentially replicating the American punitive actions against China.
Beijing rejected the accusations and responded with new tariffs, import restrictions and unofficial bans on Australian goods such as wine, barley, coal, beef and lobster, calling them "justified trade actions" as legitimate commercial or regulatory measures.
Yet despite the tensions, China ironically remained Australia's largest trading partner throughout much of the dispute. This partnership also features Australia's jet fuel imports from China. On the other hand, China depended heavily on Australian iron ore, energy and raw materials to sustain its industrial economy.
This demonstrated both the depth of economic interdependence and the limits of coercive pressures which can disrupt parts of the relationship that cannot afford a complete economic rupture.
Unfortunately, considerable negativity is discernible in the Australian conversations on China – largely shaped by the American views.
What goes amiss in these discussions is that China has never invaded or bombed or threatened another nation like the US did to Venezuela and Iran, or enforced a perpetual siege like the one around Cuba. Nor has Beijing militarily blockaded any international waterway as the US has done in the case of Hormuz Strait.
Political analysts such as Prof James Curran, an ex-diplomat, nevertheless, do concede that the current government has managed the relations with China very well. Face-away from the China reality is not possible and hence both nations have to look for a mutually beneficial win-win relationship independent of geopolitical strains, says Curran.
On the democracy front, Australia has done admirably well. Citizens' welfare and the rule of law sit at the heart of the policies. One of the manifestations of this lies in the openness of the Parliament House to all citizens – the real sovereign behind the parliament. The visitors' galleries also reflect the supremacy of the people; they are seated above everybody else and can look down at the Ministers and MPs from the top.
But the sense one gets from politically active Pakistani-Australians is one of disappointment over the country's relative silence or muted reactions thus far to the democratic backpedalling in Pakistan. This belittles – if not belies – the claim to democratic rights and the rule of law. Most Aussies, for example, know Imran Khan as one of the most distinct cricketers of all times. Our guide at Melbourne Cricket Ground led us past a showcase where Khan's name and portrait figure along Sir Garfield Sobers and Sir Jack Hobbs and recalled his memories of Khan's numerous performances.
Officially, the Australian government seems to have stayed as expedient as the US and UK administrations ever since the regime change in Pakistan three years ago. Bilateral relations have remained unaffected, underlining a bitter reality that geopolitical compulsions prevent breakdown in ties even if democratic norms demand otherwise.