Lessons from Iran war - warfare and warfighting

Every major war, involving newer weapons, strategies and concepts redefines warfighting. However, the laws of warfare remain unchanged, as these are essentially the function of human cognition, resources and systems. A lot has been written on the new dimensions and percepts of 'non-contact' warfare after the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in September 2023, the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Indo- Pak stand-off in May 2025 and the US-Israeli war on Iran in June 2025 and recently since February 2026. These conflicts have lessons for militaries, as every war sends strategists and tacticians back to the drawing board. The coalition's ongoing war on Iran demonstrates some interesting insights which this series would attempt to cover, benefiting from AI-based internet research.

Iran's stand-off with the US historically emanates from Revolution (1979) and the subsequent hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran spanning 444 days. Its recent direct confrontation with the US-Israel Combine has fundamentally reshaped the employment of hard/military power in Middle Eastern context, and response by weaker adversaries, under overwhelming threat scenarios. This conflict has replaced the traditional doctrine of 'overwhelming force', with a 'smart doctrine' defined by 'asymmetric endurance', 'precision psychological dominance', and 'decentralized lethality'. And interestingly, these newer precepts are shaped by the weaker side, Iran in this case.

One of the first shift has been the discernable movement from 'Decisive Victory' to 'Strategic Exhaustion'. Iran's military, particularly the IRGC/Pasdaran, has doctrinally moved from 'winning on the ground' to 'making war continuation too expensive'. Prohibition to continue is not because the Coalition lacks the wherewithal to continue, but because it realises the higher stakes of continuing. Iranian inventory of inexpensive Shahed drones forced the Coalition to respond, using multi-million-dollar interceptors, like THAAD and Patriot missiles. Saturation of adversary's AD responses has significantly depleted the US-Israeli interceptor stocks.

Secondly, the conflict gave rise to 'Multi-Theatre' and 'Grey Zone' warfare. Iran conceptually responded to Coalition's onslaught by spatially extending the battlefield, into a vast, interconnected network, up from a single front. IRGC, through its Quds Force, integrated 3H (Hamas, Houthi and Hezbollah) regional proxies into a resistance arc, spanning greater Middle East and beyond. The 3H 'strategic triangle', and 'horizontal escalation' of warfare by targeting nations not directly party to the conflict (though a questionable strategic move), created pressure – economic, military and political – to de-escalate. The disruption of global energy supplies literally made every nation a party to the conflict, and an unwilling interlocutor on behalf of Tehran.

Thirdly, warfare crept into public imagination like never before, affecting people in 'Mind' through 'Screens', as modern conflict remains a 'war of perception' besides a clash of arms. Iran dexterously employed digital storytelling and mastered the use of high-quality cinematic propaganda and AI-generated simulations. In addition to influencing global public opinion, Iranian media aimed at demoralising civilian populations in the US and Israel. Likewise, by presenting itself as a resilient defender against overwhelming aggression, Tehran controlled the narrative. It did so through decentralised social media platforms, challenging Western media's traditional monopoly on information.

Fourthly, this war reinforced 'Defensive Survivability' as an unshaken principle of war. Like always, this conflict also debunked the myth of overwhelming air superiority delivering quick victory, or airpower alone winning the battles. The conflict under drone/missile environment – also pertinent to Indo-Pak scenario – validated 'asset hardening' and 'deep dispersal'. Iran's strategy, thus, relies on hardened underground 'missile cities', with launchers dispersed and embedded in mountainous terrain, and under natural cover. Mass storage, production and dispersed facilities have made total elimination of resistance capability almost impossible and quickly recouping losses easy. Careful intelligence estimates still account residual capability of Iran's drones and missiles inventory at 50-60%.

Decentralised command, by entrusting local commanders with powers to operate autonomously in case the top leadership is neutralised, prevented chains of command breakdown among civil, military and political leadership. The Israeli 'decapitation' strikes proved less effective than these were in other conflicts, such as the abduction of Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro in January by US Special Forces.

Fifthly, warfighting has transitioned to 'Remote' and 'Autonomous' modes, marking the end of 'Proximity or Contact Warfare'. UAVs and missiles are the ubiquitous primary tools with ground forces, which are postured and employable in secondary or tertiary stages. GPS Spoofing and Cyber Ops including EW (electronic warfare) and cyber disruptions are the new frontiers of warfighting. These new tools, as witnessed, are central to neutralising technologically superior adversaries.

Sixthly, large, conventional assets like tanks and aircraft carriers have been of lesser operational utility, especially the aircraft carriers due to strain from prolonged deployment, constant threats from and vulnerability to low-cost Iranian drone/missile 'swarms', small speedboat, etc. USS Gerald R Ford was rendered into an operational burden and removed from the theatre of operations due to Iranian strikes and fire on board.

Seventhly, as far the geo-strategic and political implications of this conflict go, many geo-strategic truisms stand upended. One, war termination strategy is deadlocked. Militarily superior Coalition and geographically strong Iran, both need an off-ramp. The only superpower badly, and Iran desperately, and both do not agree. With its prestige online against an overconfident Iran, having deployed its punishing leverages, Washington has no strong cards, contributing to peace. It still has decisive superiority in National Power Potential (NPP), but it remains constrained due to global outcry and economic fallout of continuing hostilities. And in this game of thrones, the Sino-Russia Combine apparently seems to have the last laugh. Such are the perils of strategic over-reach.

Two, the conflict again validated that overwhelming NPP superiority is never decisive in asymmetric warfare, given the limits on its employment, as cited. Three, the war validated the concept that 'scale' can compensate for 'qualitative' differential. Four, even superpowers cannot be immune to logistic snarls/hold-ups. Ammunition and supply woes, increasingly led to brakes on Coalition operations. Five, counterintelligence has emerged as an inviolable imperative like never before. Six, the erstwhile US naval power can no longer ensure freedom of navigation through strategic choke points like SoH, Bab-al-Mandab, Strait of Malacca, etc, and is forced to prioritise. Seven, maritime blockade is ineffective against countries with friendly neighbours, as Iran's re-supply through legal/illegal trade via Balochistan substantiates.

Continued…