Australia and Pakistan in an age of rupture

In a blunt address to the 2026 World Economic Forum in January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney declared a fundamental "rupture" in the post-Cold War global order - an end, in his words, to the so-called rules-based system. In its place, he described a harsher reality shaped by great power rivalry, economic coercion and weaponised interdependence. Carney urged middle powers to cooperate and pursue strategic autonomy while upholding core values such as sovereignty and human rights.

Is Australia undergoing a similar transition, particularly under the unpredictability associated with Donald Trump? Or is Canberra treating Trump-era disruptions as temporary turbulence, choosing instead to cling to a Cold War-era security framework anchored in the United States? And how does Australia interpret Washington's renewed engagement with Pakistan?

Recent interactions with government officials and policy experts suggest that Australians are acutely aware of the "rupture" Carney described. There is growing recognition that Trump-style unilateralism has shaken longstanding assumptions. Officials concede that middle powers like Australia must work harder to reduce dependence on the United States, diversify partnerships and strengthen both multilateral and mini-lateral frameworks to preempt vulnerabilities. The emphasis increasingly rests on three priorities: preserving a rules-based order; enhancing domestic resilience; and building new strategic relationships. Implicit in this shift is an acknowledgment that Washington's capacity to underwrite global order is no longer assured.

This recalibration, however, is not entirely new. As early as 2008, then prime minister Kevin Rudd articulated a vision of "middle power diplomacy", positioning Australia as an active shaper of global economic, security and environmental agendas. Yet the country's strategic behaviour has remained deeply anchored in history.

As historian James Curran observes, Australia's approach to the United States and China is shaped less by strategic calculation than by historical habit, cultural affinity and a persistent anxiety about navigating global power without a protector. Successive governments have aligned closely with US-led interventions - from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan - reflecting the enduring mindset.

For decades, the alliance with Washington has served as Australia's strategic anchor. Institutionalised through ANZUS, it has provided security, intelligence and diplomatic reassurance. Yet, as Curran argues, the alliance has evolved into something more reflexive than deliberative. In times of uncertainty, Australia tends to look up to the United States for relief and guidance.

That instinct predates the United States. Before Washington, it was London – a cultural inheritance that has produced a strategic culture that remains Western-oriented, even as the country's economic future is firmly tied to Asia, particularly China, with bilateral trade exceeding $300 billion.

Nowhere is this contradiction more evident than in Australia's relationship with China. Beijing is central to Australia's economic prosperity, yet increasingly viewed through a security lens – something that allows threat perceptions to harden into doctrine.

The real danger, therefore, lies not in choosing between Washington and Beijing, but in losing the capacity for independent judgment. Australia risks over-securitising China while under-examining the costs of automatic alignment with the United States. Strategic loyalty, in this context, can become a substitute for strategic thinking.

Is this driven by fear of China? Partly. Is it a lack of confidence? Also. But it is equally a product of history - a nation long accustomed to operating under the protection of distant powers.

Despite this, there remains an overwhelming consensus within Australia's political class on the indispensability of the US alliance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Initiatives such as AUKUS underscore this commitment, with Australia pursuing nuclear-powered submarines in partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom.

Australia is a prosperous, stable middle power with significant diplomatic capital and deep regional linkages, yet its political elites behave as though strategic autonomy were beyond their reach. As one former envoy put it, Australia remains "reactively non-reactive"— uncertain about the durability of US commitments, yet instinctively drawn to traditional alliances.

A more mature strategy would not abandon the United States. Rather, it would recalibrate the alliance - treating it as an instrument of policy rather than a default setting. It would engage China with realism rather than caricature, and, above all, cultivate the confidence to act independently when required.

For many officials, the question is no longer whether Australia must choose between the United States and China. Instead, it is how to maintain a workable balance - preserving security ties with Washington while safeguarding economic interests linked to Beijing.

Against this backdrop, Pakistan has re-emerged, unexpectedly, in strategic conversations. Observers in Australia have been struck by the apparent shift in US tone toward Islamabad. Developments surrounding tensions with Iran and subsequent diplomatic engagements in April have brought Pakistan back into focus.

There is a degree of appreciation within Australian policy circles for how Islamabad navigated a volatile regional environment during the recent US-Israeli confrontation with Iran. Yet this recognition is tempered by a more fundamental question: what comes next?

Will this renewed attention and goodwill in Washington as well as elsewhere translate into tangible gains for Pakistan's people? More importantly, is Pakistan prepared to leverage this moment into meaningful reform - political, economic and institutional?

In an era defined by rupture, both Australia and Pakistan face variations of the same challenge: how to maintain a balance in relations with two big powers i.e. China and the US.